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Preference-Based Discrimination and Profit: On the Profitability of Discriminatory Spatial Policy 基于偏好的歧视与利润——论歧视性空间政策的盈利能力
Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2004-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/J.1530-9134.2004.00014.X
R. Wallace
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引用次数: 5
Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense 专利、秘密和第一发明人辩护
Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2001-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.265745
V. Denicoló, L. Franzoni
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引用次数: 101
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