Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy最新文献_第2页

High-Performance Unsupervised Anomaly Detection for Cyber-Physical System Networks 网络物理系统网络的高性能无监督异常检测

Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy Pub Date : 2018-01-15 DOI: 10.1145/3264888.3264890

Peter Schneider, Konstantin Böttinger

{"title":"High-Performance Unsupervised Anomaly Detection for Cyber-Physical System Networks","authors":"Peter Schneider, Konstantin Böttinger","doi":"10.1145/3264888.3264890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3264888.3264890","url":null,"abstract":"While the ever-increasing connectivity of cyber-physical systems enlarges their attack surface, existing anomaly detection frameworks often do not incorporate the rising heterogeneity of involved systems. Existing frameworks focus on a single fieldbus protocol or require more detailed knowledge of the cyber-physical system itself. Thus, we introduce a uniform method and framework for applying anomaly detection to a variety of fieldbus protocols. We use stacked denoising autoencoders to derive a feature learning and packet classification method in one step. As the approach is based on the raw byte stream of the network traffic, neither specific protocols nor detailed knowledge of the application is needed. Additionally, we pay attention on creating an efficient framework which can also handle the increased amount of communication in cyber-physical systems. Our evaluation on a Secure Water Treatment dataset using EtherNet/IP and a Modbus dataset shows that we can acquire network packets up to 100 times faster than packet parsing based methods. However, we still achieve precision and recall metrics for longer lasting attacks of over 99%.","PeriodicalId":247918,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132542402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 62

Session details: Session 3: Security and Safety Analysis 会议详情:会议3:安全与安全分析

Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy Pub Date : 2018-01-15 DOI: 10.1145/3285937

S. Foley

引用次数: 0

Learning Based Anomaly Detection for Industrial Arm Applications 基于学习的工业臂异常检测

Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy Pub Date : 2018-01-15 DOI: 10.1145/3264888.3264894

V. Narayanan, R. Bobba

引用次数: 34

Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols 基于hanke - kuhn协议族的远程欺诈攻击的统计模型检验

Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy Pub Date : 2018-01-15 DOI: 10.1145/3264888.3264895

Musab A. Alturki, M. Kanovich, Tajana Ban Kirigin, Vivek Nigam, A. Scedrov, C. Talcott

{"title":"Statistical Model Checking of Distance Fraud Attacks on the Hancke-Kuhn Family of Protocols","authors":"Musab A. Alturki, M. Kanovich, Tajana Ban Kirigin, Vivek Nigam, A. Scedrov, C. Talcott","doi":"10.1145/3264888.3264895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3264888.3264895","url":null,"abstract":"Distance-bounding (DB) protocols protect against relay attacks on proximity-based access control systems. In a DB protocol, the verifier computes an upper bound on the distance to the prover by measuring the time-of-flight of exchanged messages. DB protocols are, however, vulnerable to distance fraud, in which a dishonest prover is able to manipulate the distance bound computed by an honest verifier. Despite their conceptual simplicity, devising a formal characterization of DB protocols and distance fraud attacks that is amenable to automated formal analysis is non-trivial, primarily because of their real-time and probabilistic nature. In this work, we introduce a generic, computational model, based on Rewriting Logic, for formally analyzing various forms of distance fraud, including recently identified timing attacks, on the Hancke-Kuhn family of DB protocols through statistical model checking. While providing an insightful formal characterization on its own, the model enables a practical formal analysis method that can help system designers bridge the gap between conceptual descriptions and low-level designs. In addition to accurately confirming known results, we use the model to define new attack strategies and quantitatively evaluate their effectiveness under realistic assumptions that would otherwise be difficult to reason about manually.","PeriodicalId":247918,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126472436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8