{"title":"General or Vocational Schooling? Evidence on School Choice, Returns, and 'Sheepskin' Effects from Egypt 1998","authors":"Fatma El-Hamidi","doi":"10.1080/13841280600772861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280600772861","url":null,"abstract":"In general, vocational education does not lead to higher wages. However, in some countries, labor markets are characterized by employment growth and skill shortages. In these, vocational schooling has produced higher wages and returns on investment than general education. Using 1998 Egyptian household survey, the study adds evidence to the debate on relative benefits of vocational education and of general education at the secondary level. The findings suggest that providing general education to the workforce followed by on-the-job training would provide the most benefit.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130483657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lessons from Finland's Depression of the 1990s: What Went Wrong in Financial Reform?","authors":"Pekka Ahtiala","doi":"10.1080/13841280500512995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500512995","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The role of economic policy in Finland's depression of the 1990s is analyzed with a simple model of an open economy, and the conditions for a successful financial reform derived: Let the system adjust after the removal of interest rate ceilings, and the domestic interest rate then be aligned with foreign rates before liberalizing international capital flows. In Finland, the financial system was liberalized simultaneously with international capital movements, with the domestic shadow interest rate initially considerably higher than the international market rates. A capital inflow the size of the monetary base followed, leading to the ‘crazy years’ of 1987–89. With a large current account deficit, the Bank of Finland tightened money sharply, causing a banking crisis practically wiping out the savings bank sector. The GDP declined by 13%. Several lesser policy measures aggravated the crisis.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114829444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization in Spain","authors":"G. Bel, A. Costas","doi":"10.1080/13841280500513084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500513084","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent evidence on the savings from private production of local public services has become increasingly ambiguous. Here we specify and estimate a model to explain municipal costs for solid waste collection. As we find no effect of the mode of production on costs, we put forward two hypotheses. First, progressive concentration and decreases in bidding competition may come to outweigh gains from privatization. Second, the threat of privatization may have stimulated public unit managers to search for alternative reforms. The results suggest that both inter‐municipal cooperation and recent privatization are associated with lower costs, while old privatization is not.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122204273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Balakrishnan, M. Parameswaran, K. Pushpangadan, M. Suresh Babu
{"title":"Liberalization, Market Power, and Productivity Growth in Indian Industry","authors":"P. Balakrishnan, M. Parameswaran, K. Pushpangadan, M. Suresh Babu","doi":"10.1080/13841280500513076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500513076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using firm‐level panel data we investigate whether reform of the trade and industrial policy regimes in India introduced in 1991 resulted in a reduction in market power and/or an acceleration in productivity growth, consequences that have been predicted in theory. Econometric testing of the theory for every industry group at the two‐digit level in India yielded limited evidence of acceleration in productivity growth and no evidence of a reduction in market power. This is interpreted as suggesting that in the case of Indian industry trade liberalization has not exhibited the potential often attributed to it.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129559888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous Financial Dollarization and Exchange Rate Policy","authors":"Roberto Chang, A. Velasco","doi":"10.1080/13841280500387182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500387182","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We develop a simple model of an economy in which domestic agents borrow and lend from each other in either home or foreign currency. Nominal wage rigidity implies that portfolios are chosen to offset the real variability of labor income. Portfolio choices, in turn, affect the potency of monetary policy, and the mapping from exogenous shocks to aggregate outcomes. The model sheds light on the determinants and implications of financial dollarization, its interaction with monetary policy, and other current issues.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125794285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"De‐dollarization, Indexation and Nominalization: the Chilean Experience","authors":"Luis Oscar Herrera, R. Valdes","doi":"10.1080/13841280500394493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500394493","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper revisits the Chilean experience with dollarization, indexation and nominalization in the 1958–2003 period. The purpose is to understand how Chile generally avoided dollarization and actually de‐dollarized in the 1980s in order to draw some lessons for other countries. We find that many policies that Chile pursued are not easy to implement elsewhere. Some key characteristics of the Chilean process are related to initial institutional conditions and developments, whereas others are connected to macroeconomic performance and specific regulations. Indexation plays a key role in explaining how dollarization can be avoided.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124851734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mis‐invoicing and Trade Policy","authors":"A. Biswas, S. Marjit","doi":"10.1080/13841280500181684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500181684","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Trade statistics reported through official sources may not provide the right information because a regulated system does not induce truthful revelation. Hence, policy prescriptions or evaluations based on official statistics can be misleading. For example, the impact of a devaluation on exports and a decline in tariffs on imports will be overestimated under such circumstances. We adopt the well‐known methodology of utilizing partner country statistics to reflect the consequences of devaluations of the Indian Rupee on exports and imports from 1960 to 1998. First statistical evidence is presented, then tractable analytical results are developed.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117034542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Designing Market Socialism: Trustees of State Property","authors":"Sujian Guo","doi":"10.1080/13841280500181718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500181718","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Market reform in China and other Asian post‐communist states has renewed academic interest in the study of market socialism in the past two decades. This article attempts to answer the question: can market socialism, a market‐based form of socialism within the political context of one‐party communist rule, become competitive and efficient like market capitalism? We examine the fundamental problems of market socialism, particularly in the context of Chinese reform, based on property rights and principal‐agent theory. This article seeks feasible solutions by developing a new Trustee of State Property (TSP) system based on a scientific design of benefit and risk mechanism.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115950369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the IMF Influence Fiscal and Monetary Policy?","authors":"A. Dreher","doi":"10.1080/13841280500181726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500181726","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In theory, the IMF could influence fiscal and monetary policy via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, conditionality, and the moral hazard it induces with the borrowers. This article tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1975–2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement indeed influences fiscal and monetary policy in program countries. There is evidence that participation in IMF Standby and Extended Fund Facility arrangements improves economic policy. Money disbursed and the degree to which a program is implemented does not have any systematic influence. The same is true for future availability of resources as measured by exhaustion of a country’s quota with the Fund. The final section discusses policy implications.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125395440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Discretion, Lobbying, and Political Influence in Models of Trade Policy","authors":"Michael E. S. Hoffman","doi":"10.1080/13841280500181650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280500181650","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most models of trade policy determination and rent‐seeking abstract from the problem of commitment: both the politician's commitment to implement a policy and the lobbyist's commitment to contribute to the politician. This article shows that the commitment problem is a static prisoner's dilemma, in which neither lobbying nor inefficient policies occur. The only way to rationalize the existence of lobbying and protection within a finite time horizon is in a repeated game with uncertain duration. I construct a model in which the uncertainty comes from periodic elections. The model has implications for redistribution and political influence across political systems and institutions.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126548213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}