{"title":"Horizontal Equity","authors":"R. Galbiati","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00603.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00603.x","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of horizontal equity (HE) is considered as a basic principle to follow in order to design and evaluate a redistributive policy. However, the theoretical debate has not yet clarified what exactly horizontal equity is. In this paper we aim to clarify the meaning of the principle of HE and its normative content. In particular, we establish the true status of the two fundaments of the principle of HE, defining what is meant by equals and then treating these equals equally. Our analysis brings forth a new and more appropriate definition of the principle of HE.","PeriodicalId":239205,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economica","volume":"1148 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134352708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets","authors":"J. Tyran, Dirk Engelmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.355282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.355282","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate experimentally how firms and consumers react to a sudden cost increase in a competitive retail market. We compare two conditions that exclusively differ with respect to how difficult it is to organize and enforce boycotts. We find that cost increases translate into sudden price increases, and that consumer boycotts are frequent in response. However, consumer boycotts are unsuccessful in holding down market prices even if collective action problems are completely eliminated. While consumer boycotts do not increase consumer rent, they reduce market efficiency. Consumer boycotts apparently serve to punish firms for seemingly unfair price increases.","PeriodicalId":239205,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economica","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133891188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Size and School District Consolidation: Do Opposites Attract?","authors":"David M. Brasington","doi":"10.1046/J.0013-0427.2003.01046.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1046/J.0013-0427.2003.01046.X","url":null,"abstract":"Municipalities sometimes retain separate police departments and park services while cooperating in public schooling services with neighboring municipalities. The theoretical model of Ellingsen (\"Journal of Public Economics\", 68 , 251-68, 1998) predicts that: (1) under Tiebout sorting, larger size differences make big municipalities more likely to consolidate with small ones, but small municipalities less likely to consolidate with big ones; (2) municipalities never excessively consolidate. The current study examines 298 pairs of municipalities that could consolidate schooling. The decision-making process of the larger and smaller member of each pair is examined separately. The Poirier bivariate probit results are consistent with Ellingsen's predictions but contradict previous empirical findings. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2003.","PeriodicalId":239205,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economica","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117994379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nominal Wage Rigidity in Contract Data: A Parametric Approach","authors":"L. Christofides, Man Tuen Leung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.382261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.382261","url":null,"abstract":"Using wage agreements reached in the Canadian unionized sector during 1976-99, a period of high as well as exceptionally low inflation, we consider how histograms of wage adjustment change as inflation reaches the low levels of the 1990s. The histograms and parametric tests suggest that wage adjustment is characterized by downward nominal rigidity and significant spikes at zero. There is some evidence of modest menu-cost effects. We examine whether the rigidity features of wage adjustment are sensitive to indexation provisions and investigate whether the distinction between short and long contracts is useful.","PeriodicalId":239205,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economica","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132350275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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