The Journal of Slavic Military Studies最新文献

{"title":"Improvised Liberation, October 1944: The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation and the Red Army in Norway. Part I","authors":"Sven G. Holtsmark","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990554","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is the first of a double article on the Red Army’s offensive against the German 20th Mountain Army in the Murmansk sector, October–November 1944, soon to be known as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive Operation, Petsamo-Kirkenesskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya, or simply the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. Based on Soviet military archival sources, the article focuses on the background of the Karelian Front’s 14th Army’s move into Norway on 18 October 1944. Was this reflecting a larger scheme to prepare the ground for a Soviet military presence in Norway or to create leverage for political influence? My conclusion is that it was not. Pursuing retreating German troops across the border into Norway was not part of the plans for the 14th Army’s offensive; the move into Norway became unavoidable once the strategic aim of the offensive — to surround and then destroy the German forces on Soviet territory — failed. Contrary to Soviet expectations — and leaving behind much of their heavy weapons and equipment and suffering heavy losses — the 20th Mountain Army successfully withdrew its main units from Finnish and Soviet territory across the border to Norway. This operational rationale for the Soviet military presence in Norway also explains why the last Soviet troops left as early as September 1945. This first article follows the evolution of the Karelian Front’s planning against the German units in the Murmansk sector from its beginning in February 1944 until late September, when Stavka finally instructed the Front commander Kirill A. Meretskov to finalize the planning for the 14th Army’s offensive. As crucial background to the operational planning and developments, and based on mostly Soviet and British sources, the article also analyzes Norway’s place in Stalin’s and his entourage’s ambitions for the post-war order in Europe.","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114523000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mechanized Corps – a study in mobility and transport","authors":"H. Davie","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990556","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT David Glantz described the Soviet use of forward detachments as the ‘tip of the spear’ of a tank army; small, armored, heavily armed and fully motorized groups wending their way through the German defenses, avoiding contact and operating up to 50 km in advance of the main body. This article seeks to examine the other end, the ‘butt of the spear’: the mechanized corps which provided the mass of infantry required to defend the bridgehead at the end of the offensive. Although they contained a large number of vehicles, the scale of allocation was nothing like that of Western armies and, given wartime shortages, even these were not met. So how did the mechanized corps keep up on the long distance operations of late 1944? This article analyzes the mobility and logistics of mechanized corps during the campaigns of 1945. Using this example, it will seek to explain how the units operated as part of the larger tank armies, and how their use evolved during the earlier campaigns of 1943-44.","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134582663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Yugoslavia and Political Assassinations: The History and Legacy of Tito’s Campaign Against the Émigrés","authors":"Alexander Lee","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990563","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131682798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Escapes from Russian Captivity by Prisoners of War Taken on the Eastern Front (August 1914 – February 1917)","authors":"A. Miodowski","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990553","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the Great War, more than 2 million prisoners from the armies of the Central Powers found themselves in Russian captivity. Most of those soldiers were captured between 1914 and 1916. Apart from the wounded and those taken prisoner in combat, the group of POWs also included deserters and those who had consciously decided to surrender to the Russians on the battlefield. Initially, Russian military authorities attempted to establish POW camps far from large cities and railway lines. However, the growing number of prisoners and the shortage of the financial resources necessary for the construction of new camps forced a change in the original plans. Therefore, new groups of prisoners were directed to cities to be accommodated in existing buildings, hastily adapted for their needs. These circumstances were conducive to escapes. However, getting out of Siberia or Central Asia was not easy. Consequently, the percentage of those who made that effort, in relation to the overall number of prisoners of war kept on the far side of the Urals, was low. According to official Russian data, only several hundred POWs escaped from their camps every month. Of those, only few would reach Sweden, Persia, or China. It was only the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 that allowed the mass of 2 million prisoners to be repatriated from Russia. The scholarly research initiated anew by historians on the centenary of the end of the Great War should take a broader account of the subject matter of prisoners of war, particularly with regard to those captured on the Eastern and Caucasian Fronts. The present article seeks to address this need.","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121149058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Silver Birds over the Estuary: The MiG-21 in Yugoslav and Serbian Air Force service, 1962-2019","authors":"Tim Ripley","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990558","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123376534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Charles Dick, Intelligence Corps Reservist Who Educated a Whole Generation of Senior NATO Officers in Soviet and Russian Operational Art","authors":"Christopher P. Donnelly","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990557","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132969834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II","authors":"Yan Mann","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990555","url":null,"abstract":"There are multiple reasons why a new, original look at the Second World War and Joseph Stalin is merited today. Stephen Kotkin’s recent biography of Stalin covers his life through the beginning of the Second World War and offers scholars and the general reading public an indepth look at not only Stalin’s rise to power but, in some ways more importantly, the environment that helped create, sustain, and empower Stalin in the context of the lateRussian Empire and the Soviet Union. Sean McMeekin’s new entry into the scholarship of the Second World War, Stalin, and inter-war and wartime diplomacy unfortunately falls flat on delivering any type of new, groundbreaking narrative. The final product, in the form of some 660 pages of text entitled Stalin’s War, is reflective of what happens when you put as many conspiracy theories, stereotypes, and clichés as you can find about the Second World War from the past five decades into a blender and mix them together. From minor errors to questionable leaps of logic, this volume has it all. The author begins his book with a generalized premise, singling out Stalin as the ‘common thread linking the on-and-off global wars lasting from 1931–1945’ (p. 2–3). No argument, however, has been made that a common thread needs to be found. Those who might have needed such an argument would, undoubtedly, have been Soviet myth makers, as they were required to enhance Stalin’s role and genius, which the author — knowingly or not — inevitably does. Just because Stalin was found in the center or adjacent to so many inter-war and wartime events does not point to his omnipotence but rather speaks volumes about the importance attached to the Soviet Union during the inter-war period and the war. To focus so much on Stalin takes agency away from the myriad personalities involved in the war’s outbreak and its bloody progression. Although this volume’s emphasis is on Stalin, some attention is devoted to the likes of Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and other major personalities. In doing so, the author shows well the complexity, fluidity, and fickleness of inter-war and wartime diplomacy as each statesman tried his best to maneuver allies and enemies to serve their interests, be they economic, political, or ideological. Moreover, clearly highlighted are the constant missteps taken by Stalin as he attempted to gain as much territory and population as he could in the aftermath of German victories to the detriment of his and the Soviet Union’s international standing — hardly the makings of a diplomatic genius with enviable foresight! Similarly, the author does a commendable job in his, albeit short, discussion of intelligence on the eve of Operation Barbarossa. He points to the wide variety of reports Soviet intelligence received, including the difficulty in ascertaining which information was a true reflection of German goals and plans, especially when juxtaposed with reports that showed what, in hindsight, were inexcus","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123686344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Battle of Prokhorovka: Facts Against Fables","authors":"Roman Töppel","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1990559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990559","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The battle of Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943 is a historical event that can excite passions like almost no other battle of the German-Soviet war. Time and again, Russian historians use old and new arguments to try to maintain the narrative of the Red Army’s supposed victory at Prokhorovka. The following article takes a critical look at some of the recent allegations about the battle of Prokhorovka. It is intended to counteract the ongoing myth making about this battle by juxtaposing the circulating fables and speculations with verifiable facts and figures and shows that there are two main reasons for the persistence of these legends: politics of memory and a lack of knowledge of the available German sources.","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116105763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dr. Jacob W. Kipp - Scholar, Teacher, Linguist, Mentor, Humanist, and Long-Time Assistant Editor to The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","authors":"L. Grau","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.2006480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.2006480","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115402070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Croatian view of the Katyn crime","authors":"Danuta Gibas-Krzak","doi":"10.1080/13518046.2021.1923983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1923983","url":null,"abstract":"The murder of Polish prisoners of war in Katyn and other places of massacre was covered by a conspiracy of silence for decades. It was not until the changes that occurred with the escalation of conflict between the USSR and the United States of America and the democratic West that the murder of soldiers of the Polish Army, Border Defense Corps, and State Police officers saw the light of day. Western politicians knew that in early spring 1940, a special operation supervised by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) was launched in the camps where Polish officers and non-commissioned officers of the Polish Army, Border Defense Corps, and the police were imprisoned, with the aim of liquidating prisoners of war using Chekist methods. This fact was deeply hidden because for the leaders of the West, political interests and the alliance with Stalin were more important than support for allied Poland. Despite numerous reminders from the Polish authorities in exile, the case of Katyn and other places of mass killings of Polish citizens in the East remained taboo until 1951. However, the murder was known to the Polish authorities in exile and Poles in exile after the Second World War, physicians, and pathologists from the International Commission of the Red Cross, who came in 1943 to investigate the mass graves that were discovered after the occupation of the Eastern part of the USSR by German troops. However, the scrupulously documented discoveries of war crimes committed against Polish prisoners of war, the murder of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers, police officers, and other prisoners of Polish nationality who had surrendered to the Red Army or had been arrested by the Soviet political police later during the occupation of the Eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic were disregarded for a long time. Russian propaganda that the German army was responsible for the massacre was both obligatory and official. This version of the event was circulated from the moment that the first data about Katyn were made public. The Russian narrative stated that only the Nazis were behind the murder of Polish soldiers and policemen. Only in the early 1990s did the authorities of the Russian Federation admit that Stalin gave the order to physically liquidate the prisoners of war, which was carried out by special Commissariat for Internal Affairs units. However, over the past few years, there have been Russian historians and journalists who have questioned the research to date.","PeriodicalId":236132,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Slavic Military Studies","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116683536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}