2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium最新文献

Minimal Message Complexity of Asynchronous Multi-party Contract Signing 异步多方合同签名的最小消息复杂度

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.15

S. Mauw, S. Radomirovic, M. Dashti

引用次数: 20

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.25

Nate Foster, B. Pierce, S. Zdancewic

{"title":"Updatable Security Views","authors":"Nate Foster, B. Pierce, S. Zdancewic","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2009.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2009.25","url":null,"abstract":"Security views are a flexible and effective mechanism for controlling access to confidential information. Rather than allowing untrusted users to access source data directly, they are instead provided with are restricted view, from which all confidential information has been removed. The program that generates the view effectively embodies a confidentiality policy for the underlying source data. However, this approach has a significant drawback: it prevents users from updating the data in the view.To address the \"view update problem\" in general, a number of bidirectional languages have been proposed. Programs in these languages---often called lenses---can be run in two directions: read from left to right, they map sources to views; from right to left,they map updated views back to updated sources. However, existing bidirectional languages do not deal adequately with security. In particular, they do not provide a way to ensure the integrity of source data as it is manipulated by untrusted users of the view.We propose a novel framework of secure lenses that addresses these shortcomings. We enrich the types of basic lenses with equivalence relations capturing notions of confidentiality and integrity, and formulate the essential security conditions as non-interference properties. We then instantiate this framework in the domain of string transformations, developing syntax for bidirectional string combinators with security-annotated regular expressions as their types.","PeriodicalId":229418,"journal":{"name":"2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127391371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 40

Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-knowledge 利用零知识实现安全

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.24

M. Backes, Martin P. Grochulla, Catalin Hritcu, Matteo Maffei

引用次数: 20

Specification and Analysis of Dynamic Authorisation Policies 动态授权策略的规范与分析

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.14

Moritz Y. Becker

引用次数: 45

A Secure Cryptographic Token Interface 一个安全的加密令牌接口

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.7

C. Cachin, Nishanth Chandran

引用次数: 39

A Method for Proving Observational Equivalence 一种证明观测等效性的方法

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.9

V. Cortier, S. Delaune

引用次数: 80

Universally Composable Symmetric Encryption 普遍可组合对称加密

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.18

Ralf Küsters, Max Tuengerthal

引用次数: 30

Authentication without Elision: Partially Specified Protocols, Associated Data, and Cryptographic Models Described by Code 没有省略的身份验证:部分指定的协议、关联数据和代码描述的加密模型

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.23

P. Rogaway, Till Stegers

{"title":"Authentication without Elision: Partially Specified Protocols, Associated Data, and Cryptographic Models Described by Code","authors":"P. Rogaway, Till Stegers","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2009.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2009.23","url":null,"abstract":"Specification documents for real-world authentication protocols typically mandate some aspects of a protocol's behavior but leave other features optional or undefined. In addition, real-world schemes often include parameter negotiations, authenticate associated data, and support a multiplicity of options. The cryptographic community has routinely elided such matters from our definitions, schemes, and proofs. We propose encompassing them by explicitly modeling the presence of unspecified protocol functionality. To demonstrate, we provide a new treatment for mutual authentication in the public-key setting, doing this in the computational cryptographic tradition. In our model, compactly described in pseudocode, a protocol core (PC) will call out to protocol details (PD), but, for defining security, such calls will be serviced by the adversary. Parties accepting an authentication exchange will output a string of associated data, the value of which may be determined by the PD calls. We illustrate the approach by re-proving security for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol, but extended in a manner that would be typical were the mechanism embedded in a real-world standard.","PeriodicalId":229418,"journal":{"name":"2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133823430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Securing Timeout Instructions in Web Applications 在Web应用程序中保护超时指令

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.16

Alejandro Russo, A. Sabelfeld

引用次数: 43

Expressive Power of Definite Clauses for Verifying Authenticity 定句真实性验证的表达能力

2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2009-07-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2009.12

G. Filé, R. Vigo

引用次数: 1