{"title":"Monotone Persuasion","authors":"Jeffrey Mensch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3265980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265980","url":null,"abstract":"We explore Bayesian persuasion environments in which the state and action spaces are ordered, allowing for complementarity between actions and types. Building on the literature on monotone comparative statics, we identify conditions that guarantee that these are optimal among all (possibly non-monotone) signal structures. When the action space is binary, supermodularity of the sender's and receiver's preferences suffices for the optimal signal to have a monotone structure. With a continuum of actions, the conditions are more intriguing. We identify a novel single-crossing condition using a virtual utility representation of the sender's payoff. We also provide a technique to compute the optimal monotone signal structure, even when this monotonicity is due to an exogenous constraint. Applications are given to quadratic loss functions with biases, capacity constraints, and credit ratings.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125834746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"I Didn’t Want to Offend You: The Cost of Avoiding Sensitive Questions","authors":"Einav Hart, Eric M. VanEpps, M. Schweitzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3437468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3437468","url":null,"abstract":"Within a conversation, individuals balance competing concerns, such as the motive to gather information and the motives to avoid discomfort and to create a favorable impression. Across three pilot studies and four experimental studies, we demonstrate that individuals avoid asking sensitive questions, because they fear making others uncomfortable and because of impression management concerns. We demonstrate that this aversion to asking sensitive questions is both costly and misguided. Even when we incentivized participants to ask sensitive questions, participants were reluctant to do so in both face-to-face and computer-mediated chat conversations. Interestingly, rather than accurately anticipating how sensitive questions will influence impression formation, we find that question askers significantly overestimate the interpersonal costs of asking sensitive questions. Across our studies, individuals formed similarly favorable impressions of partners who asked non-sensitive (e.g., “Are you a morning person?”) and sensitive (e.g., “What are your views on abortion?”) questions, despite askers’ reticence to ask sensitive questions.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123273746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Homophobia and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Evidence from China","authors":"R. Dai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3413673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3413673","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the two-way causal relationship between homophobia and HIV/AIDS incidence using China General Social Survey (CGSS) and Chinese epidemiological data. Applying the System Two-Stage Least Square (S2SLS) methods, I find no evidence that the homophobic attitudes in China could be attributable to the spread of HIV. Also, tolerance of homosexuality is found to drive down local HIV incidence, possibly by promoting health-seeking behaviors and the utilization of medical services among mem who have sex with men (MSM). A one standard deviation increase in tolerance of homosexuality reduces the incidence rate of HIV by 0.07 standard deviations, which can also counteract increases of the lag HIV prevalence by 0.09 standard deviations. By enhancing adherence to HIV treatment, tolerance towards homosexuality is positively linked to AIDS incidence. The impact of tolerance of homosexuality on HIV/AIDS incidence remains significant after controlling for local medical supply. Empirical evidence shows that tolerance of homosexuality and medical interventions are working in a complementary way to prevent the spread of HIV.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129533394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Engaged are American Citizens, and What is Civic Engagement Anyway?","authors":"Kenneth Shores, S. Ben‐Porath, M. Jefferson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3335840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3335840","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new framing that accounts for trends and disparities in civic engagement. We orient along two axes: the modal, describing the extent to which civic engagement is structured, and its content, describing the extent to which civic engagement has partisan objectives. Accordingly, this structure creates four domains of civic engagement: associational-partisan (e.g., voting), social-partisan (e.g., boycotting), associational-civic (e.g., participating in Parent-Teacher Organizations), and social-civic (e.g., talking with neighbors). Using data from the Current Population Survey and item response theory methods, we generate civic engagement scores in each of these domains for as many as 35,618 U.S. respondents. Similar to prior studies, income and educational attainment are associated with large disparities in civic engagement across all domains. However, in contrast to prior studies, young Americans are not outpacing older Americans in social-partisan engagement; rather, older Americans are more engaged in every sector of engagement we measure.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132751551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavioral Instruments in Environmental Regulation","authors":"A. Rowell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3330205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330205","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter briefly describes the use and usefulness of behavioral and psychological instruments in environmental regulation. Behavioral instruments — tools for regulating behavior that build on empirical research about how people actually behave — can contribute to environmental law in at least two ways. First, behavioral research can be used descriptively to understand and to interrogate the behaviors that generate environmental impacts. This is useful because it can help flag where environmental law is most likely to run aground on behavioral phenomena, and because it can highlight areas where legal interventions may be most and least effective. Second, behavioral research is useful prescriptively for helping to identify effective mechanisms for shaping behavior towards preferred ends. The chapter gives an overview of three key findings in law and behavior (dual-process cognition, loss aversion, and time inconsistency), and describes two key instruments (default rules and framing) that build on the insights of behavioral research, and which can be used to shape people’s behavior towards environmental ends.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117008618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Noise and the Breadth and Depth of Social Networks","authors":"M. Jackson, Suraj Malladi, David McAdams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3269543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269543","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how well people learn when information is noisily relayed from person to person; and we study how communication platforms can improve learning without censoring or fact-checking messages. We analyze learning as a function of social network depth (how many times information is relayed) and breadth (the number of relay chains accessed). Noise builds up as depth increases, so learning requires greater breadth. In the presence of mutations (deliberate or random) and transmission failures of messages, we characterize sharp thresholds for breadths above which receivers learn fully and below which they learn nothing. When there is uncertainty about mutation rates, optimizing learning requires either capping depth, or if that is not possible, limiting breadth by capping the number of people to whom someone can forward a message. Limiting breadth cuts the number of messages received but also decreases the fraction originating further from the receiver, and so can increase the signal to noise ratio. Finally, we extend our model to study learning from message survival: e.g., people are more likely to pass messages with one conclusion than another. We find that as depth grows, all learning comes from either the total number of messages received or from the content of received messages, but the learner does not need to pay attention to both.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129821694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Persuasion under the Influence of Fake News","authors":"Sang-Jun Yea","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3296604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3296604","url":null,"abstract":"We study a sequential Bayesian persuasion game in which two news senders having opposite preferences over two alternatives try to persuade voters. The first mover's informative news can be fabricated by the second mover's uninformative news, and either news is randomly transmitted to and received by voters who do not know its genuine source. We construct equilibrium strategies by introducing a novel method using a Rothschild-Stiglitz approach. We find that there are two types of equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the probability that the voters are exposed to the second sender's news -- which we call the prevalence of fake news. When the prevalence of fake news is low, the first sender produces more accurate news as the prevalence of fake news increases, thereby improving the voters' \"information surplus.\" However, when the prevalence of fake news is high, the informativeness of the first sender's news deteriorates by the second sender's fabrication and thus the value of the news is reduced to zero. Our analysis explains an incentive of fake news production and its effect on the quality of the news transmitted via social media, where the source of news is hardly identifiable.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"183 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132869444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cognitive Foundations of Cooperation","authors":"Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Michele Garagnani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3265190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265190","url":null,"abstract":"We conducted an experiment causally manipulating reliance on more intuitive vs. more deliberative behavior through time pressure and time delay. Our design uses a novel manipulation which relies on gradual economic incentives and was devised to avoid the high degree of non-compliance observed in previous experiments. The “social heuristic hypothesis,” which claims that people are intuitively predisposed to cooperate, is not supported in our data. On the aggregate, subjects are not more cooperative under gradually-incentivized time pressure. We also measured individual attitudes on social values and attitudes toward interpersonal risk, and find that both correlate with the tendency to cooperate. A detailed analysis suggests that subjects with a stronger (resp. weaker) prosocial predisposition become more (resp. less) cooperative under time pressure compared to time delay, although the effect is only noticeable for extreme-enough predispositions. A possible interpretation is that relying on more intuitive behavior enhances individual heterogeneous predispositions, while relying on more deliberative behavior moderates them. This suggests that tendencies toward cooperation might not be universal, and rather be moderated by individual characteristics.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126231766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Statement Cycle","authors":"J. Goto, Tomoko Matsumoto, J. Yamasaki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3238998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3238998","url":null,"abstract":"Elected politicians may engage in opportunistic behavior for private benefits, which is a central problem in democratic societies. While re-election incentives can mitigate this problem, they may also induce words without actions: politicians pander to voters right before elections by proposing attractive policies but without actually implementing them. Using the minutes from assembly meetings, we find that politicians' statements follow election cycles: in election years, politicians temporarily change their statements (e.g., increasing amounts of money specified) during the budget-making process, and their contents become less consistent with the realized budget. The effects are larger for politicians whose previous electoral victories were narrower and these changes are associated with a higher probability of being re-elected. We find little evidence that politicians put more efforts to realize their policies when re-election incentives increase. These results imply a failure of the delegation system between voters and politicians, a key element of representative democracy.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133213486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cost of Populism in Argentina, 2003-2015","authors":"N. Cachanosky","doi":"10.30800/MISES.2018.V0.965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30800/MISES.2018.V0.965","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the historical context, and economic and institutional impact of the Néstor Kirchner’s and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s presidencies (Kirchner-Kirchner administration) in Argentina. The effects of the major economic policies during their presidency are explained as well as the indices fall of the institutional quality. The challenges of stepping out of populism are also mentioned.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"277 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114141769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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