Tax eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Tax-Financing of Budget Deficits in LDCs: Re-Validation of Laffer Curve Theory","authors":"S. Okafor","doi":"10.11114/AEF.V4I3.2297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11114/AEF.V4I3.2297","url":null,"abstract":"Urgent need for quick action to put Nigeria and other developing economies back to the path of economic recovery has almost imposed state of emergency on these economies. Most LDCs are faced with acute shortage of development funds due to recessions accompanying incessant crashes in international financial market. Raising existing tax rates to finance budget deficit in LDCs often generates public debate on pros and cons of such policy option. Study considered Nigeria as typical case of LDCs. Study focused on establishing the effectiveness of tax-financing of budget deficit under Laffer curve theory. Study spanned across 1970-2015. Data were analyzed using ADF, CUSUM, heteroskedasticity, multiple regression, Johansen cointegration and ECM. Results indicate that: (1) Custom and exercise duties, petroleum profit tax and value-added tax contributed significantly to the reduction in budget deficit while company income tax had nonsignificant impact(2)Total government revenue constituted major chunk of planned income for budget deficit financing(3) Deficit financing of capital health expenditure yielded high returns while that of recurrent education expenditure and capital education expenditure was accompanied by low returns (4)Growth and employment generation accelerated deficit financing while private investment decelerated it (5) There were long and short-run relationships among budget deficit, taxes, human capital investment and macroeconomic indicators with significant rate of adjustment of short-run disequilibrium. Study concluded that tax-financing of budget deficit was effective under Laffer curve effect. It was recommended, among others, that LDCs should enlarge their tax bases through inclusion, to finance budget deficit.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84949504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causation, Science and Taxation","authors":"B. Bogenschneider","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2934153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2934153","url":null,"abstract":"A surprising feature of legal and economic discourse on taxation is the rare mention of causation. Causation is typically only discussed in respect of tort law and criminal law and not in other areas such as tax law. This seems to be because much of the analysis of taxation is a type of applied moral philosophy where the idea is to justify a preferred tax policy and not to discuss how a tax policy would cause a desirable outcome. Scientific inquiry is concerned however with identifying a theory of causation in respect of tax policy. For example, corporate tax cuts are often thought to cause economic growth. A scientific approach to taxation requires us to test this and other theories of taxation. This is necessary because science proceeds at least in part by the falsification or at times the augmentation of theories of causation. Hence, ideas about tax causation that seem to be wrong in the sense that an explanation of cause-and-effect seems to be subpar should be of special interest to tax scholars. Several of these are discussed here as follows: (i) the Laffer curve positing a negative relation between statutory tax rates and tax collections; (ii) the “small open economy” model of corporate tax incidence as passed entirely to labor; and (iii) the “trickle-down” economics or deadweight loss of income taxation however posited without any corresponding deadweight loss from wage taxation. The combination of these ideas forms the basis for much of modern tax policy design. However, the thesis of this paper is that these theses are subpar and that tax clinicians (such as, tax lawyers and accountants) may be able to infer causation in the tax context as a more advanced type of scientific inquiry. The practical experience of practitioners amounts to a clinical form of scientific knowledge about taxation.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78625997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do the Rich Pay Their Fair Share of Taxes? An Empirical Study of United States Data","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2931527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2931527","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines Internal Revenue Service data and applies philosophical and ethical concepts in an attempt to determine whether the rich pay their fair share of income taxes. Also included is a bibliography containing links to more than 80 studies on tax evasion and public finance.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85380385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Special Tax Zones and the WTO","authors":"R. Avi-Yonah, Martin G. Vallespinos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2928644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2928644","url":null,"abstract":"Since the SCM agreement was enacted in 1995, the global leadership in the field of STZs has shifted from the OECD to the WTO. \u0000The WTO general agreement includes a broad set of policy goals that goes beyond trade relationships, but its legal framework has been systematically narrowed to the task of assuring market access, non-discrimination, and fairness in trade. Other relevant issues that has impacts on trade, such as for example harmful tax competition or tax base erosion, has not been sufficiently weighted and has been treated as secondary items. \u0000As of today, having passed more than 20 years since the enactment of the first WTO agreements, the WTO overall treatment of STZs appears to be inconsistent with the general policy goals of the organization. While service STZs generally remain free from challenge because there are no formal subsidy rules concerning services, manufacturing STZs with substantial activities have been significantly curtailed by the SCM Agreement. The disparity in the treatment of “goods” and “services” has produced a negative impact on developing countries, as they tend to rely more on manufacturing STZs to achieve economic growth, while benefitting developed countries, which to rely more on offshore banking, technology, and financial services STZs in order and attract investment. \u0000The fairness and distributional concerns raised by this disparity in treatment has also been placed in a secondary position, on the grounds that the objectives of the WTO are limited to market access, freedom, and non-discrimination in trade. This perspective, however, is not consistent with the rationale and general policy goals of the organization, as provided by the main WTO agreement.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78160698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) Against Tax Avoidance : Case Study in Indonesia","authors":"Kiryanto Winarto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2923547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2923547","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study was to analyze the behavior of tax avoidance before and after the application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Population in this research is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2012. Selected in 2007 as a sample prior to the IFRS and the 2012 samples after the IFRS. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling and obtained 70 samples from the company. The analytical tool used is Paired Sample Test. Tax avoidance in this study proxied using four measurements is Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR), Books Tax Gap (BTG), General Accepted Accounting Principle Affective Tax Rate (GAAP ETR), Current Effective Tax Rate (Current ETR). Before analyzed, then tested for normality for each - each a proxy measurement of the resulting 45 samples for measurement CETR, 35 samples for the measurement of BTG, 56 samples for measurement GAAP ETR, and 58 samples for measurements Current ETR. The practical implication of the research suggests the government to make a policy to reduce ability tax avoidance.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88157176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A European Perspective on the US Plans for a Destination Based Cash Flow Tax","authors":"J. Becker, J. Englisch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2924313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2924313","url":null,"abstract":"The Republican majority in the US House of Representatives is considering the introduction of a destination based cash flow tax (DBCFT). While its global implementation has the potential of substantially increasing welfare, a unilateral introduction of such a tax system raises a range of questions due to the co-existence with source based taxation systems abroad. We consider the US tax plans from an EU perspective. We show that European exporters may suffer, but European firms with affiliation in the US may benefit from a switch to the DBCFT. American multinational firms with affiliates in the EU will be the likely losers of this policy – a surprising finding given President Trump’s “America first!” rhetoric. Finally, tax competition over profits, IP location and investment will further intensify, which will require policy reactions by the EU and its member countries far beyond the implementation of the OECD BEPS project. We will therefore also discuss the legal and economic implications of possible adjustments in EU tax systems.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88451962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of Corporate Taxation on Bank Transparency: Evidence from Loan Loss Provisions","authors":"Kathleen Andries, John Gallemore, M. Jacob","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2732354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2732354","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the corporate tax system, through its treatment of loan losses, affects bank financial reporting. Exploiting cross-country and intertemporal variation in income tax rates and loan loss provision deductibility, we find that loan loss provisions are increasing in the tax rate for countries that permit general provision tax deductibility. When general provisions are deductible, a 1 percentage point rate increase leads to a provision increase of 4.9% of the sample average. This effect is driven by the tax system's encouragement of timelier loan loss recognition, suggesting that corporate taxation is an important determinant of bank financial reporting transparency.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90346260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or Shareholders (or Both)","authors":"David M. Schizer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2788713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2788713","url":null,"abstract":"The US taxes both corporations and shareholders on corporate profits. In principle, the U.S. could rely on only one of these taxes, as many commentators have suggested. Although choosing to tax the corporation or its owners may seem like taking money from one pocket or the other, this Essay emphasizes a key difference: corporate and shareholder taxes prompt different tax planning. Relying on one or the other mitigates some distortions and leaks, while exacerbating others. As a result, choosing which tax to impose is like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis.In response to these dualing distortions, this Essay recommends using both taxes. Some tax should be collected from corporations, and some from investors. The two rates should be coordinated, so they aggregate to the combined rate Congress wants, which ideally would be the rate for pass-through businesses. The main goal of this Essay is to defend the use of both taxes, and to analyze what the balance should be between them. Using both taxes has three advantages. First, if one of these partially overlapping instruments is avoided, the other still raises some revenue. Second, if the goal is to deter a planning strategy, cutting the rate to zero is an overreaction. If the rate is low enough, paying a tax is cheaper than avoiding it, since tax planning is not free. Third, if one tax is cut instead of repealed, the other can be correspondingly lower, and thus induces less planning.Even so, using two taxes poses challenges as well. First, although the taxes are supposed to backstop each other, they cannot do so when a planning strategy avoids both. Second, using two taxes is likely to increase administrative costs. Third, coordinating the two taxes to produce the right combined rate – ideally the rate for noncorporate businesses – is not easy.Once Congress chooses the combined rate on corporate profits, how should this burden be allocated between corporate and shareholder taxes? Since the corporate tax probably is more distortive, it should be cut significantly. The shareholder tax should be increased to make up the difference (or at least some of it).This Essay also cavasses reforms to shore up corporate and shareholder taxes, so the combined rate that actually is collected comes closer to the one on the books. While the focus is on incremental reform, this Essay’s central recommendation extends to more ambitious reforms as well. They also benefit from using two taxes, instead of one.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74956071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Earnings and Balance-Sheet Properties and the Interplay of Tax Incentives and Tax Enforcement","authors":"Thomas R. Loy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2829348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2829348","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the joint association of tax incentives and tax law enforcement strictness on earnings and balance sheet properties of private firms. It answers a call for additional research on why \"there is (...) substantial within-country variation in managers' incentives to [manage] earnings\" (LaFond et al. (2007), p. 14). There is some evidence that something as homogeneous as tax law seems to be enacted differently within a country's legal framework. The key results are that stricter enforcement seemingly impairs managers' ability or willingness to engage in income-decreasing accrual earnings management. On the downside, managers instead seem to resort to real earnings management choices which are associated with potentially negative long-term real business impact.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84703421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Boxing Match: Can Intellectual Property Boxes Achieve Their Stated Goals?","authors":"B. Klemens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2822575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822575","url":null,"abstract":"A patent box, innovation box, or intellectual property box (IP box) is a tax incentive under which revenues associated with some forms of intellectual property are taxed at a rate lower than general revenues. This paper discusses the common characteristics of IP boxes and how they correspond to stated goals. It presents a model of international tax competition, and shows that the highest expected tax revenue from mobile IP for a country hosting a great deal of fixed, non-IP capital comes from assigning a single tax rate to profits from both mobile and fixed capital — that is, from not implementing an IP box. As a research and development (R&D) credit, several examples show that the IP box is more easily manipulated than a traditional credit on R&D expenses.","PeriodicalId":22313,"journal":{"name":"Tax eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86546604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}