Open Military Studies最新文献

MacArthur’s need for speed: Why Fuller was fired at Biak 麦克阿瑟对速度的需求:为什么富勒在比克被解雇

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0121

M. Hall

{"title":"MacArthur’s need for speed: Why Fuller was fired at Biak","authors":"M. Hall","doi":"10.1515/openms-2022-0121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/openms-2022-0121","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The US campaign for Biak in 1944 was one of the most challenging, albeit little known, operations of the Pacific war. Major General Horace Fuller’s HURRICANE Task Force faced a tenacious enemy determined to hold the island’s three airfields at all costs. Grossly underestimating the number of Japanese defenders on Biak, MacArthur and Kreuger allocated Fuller only two regimental combat teams for the initial invasion in May 1944. Once ashore, the US troops encountered a shift in Japanese tactics from defending at the water’s edge to using inland fukkaku, honeycombed underground defensive positions that masked Japanese troops and artillery. When the task force failed to deliver the airfields as quickly as desired by General Douglas MacArthur, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger relieved Fuller as task force commander and replaced him with Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger. This article contends that Krueger did not have good cause to relieve Fuller; rather, he simply did so to placate MacArthur, who, for a multitude of reasons, pressured Krueger for a fast victory. I assess flaws in the planning and execution of the operation, MacArthur’s motives, and personality dynamics between MacArthur and Krueger to support my conclusion that Fuller was ultimately a victim of MacArthur’s impatience.","PeriodicalId":222716,"journal":{"name":"Open Military Studies","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125420703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

“Little Malta”: Psara and the Peculiarities of naval warfare in the Greek Revolution 《小马耳他》:赞美诗和希腊革命时期海战的特点

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0136

Nikolas Pissis

引用次数: 0

American peacetime naval aviation and the Battle of Midway 美国和平时期海军航空兵与中途岛海战

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0129

S. McGregor

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Advanced Base Defense Doctrine, War Plan Orange, and Preparation at Midway: Were the Marines Ready? 先进基地防御学说、橙色战争计划和中途岛准备:海军陆战队准备好了吗?

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0128

Joshua Fogle

{"title":"Advanced Base Defense Doctrine, War Plan Orange, and Preparation at Midway: Were the Marines Ready?","authors":"Joshua Fogle","doi":"10.1515/openms-2022-0128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/openms-2022-0128","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many of the books written about Midway focus on the battle itself, specifically the naval battle between the US and Japanese fleets. Most of the emphasis is placed on understanding and critiquing the decision-making of the leaders of the US and Japanese fleets and aircraft carriers. Aside from discussing the contributions of the air forces flying from Midway itself, many overlook the preparedness and contributions of the Marine defenders stationed there. Other than the occasional shelling by Japanese naval vessels, Midway was only ever attacked a single time on the morning of 4 June 1942 and never faced the invasion force the Japanese sent to take the atoll. The lack of information on the actual defenders on Midway has left unanswered the question of how prepared the Marine forces were to defend Midway from the Japanese. War Plan Orange and US leadership placed significant importance on Midway and directed the Marines to defend it. Advanced Base Defense doctrine of the time had seen significant development in the interwar years and was used when the Marines fashioned the defense of Midway. This article will examine the development of Midway as a base and the doctrine for the defense of advanced bases in effort to determine if the Marines were properly prepared to defend Midway from the Japanese.","PeriodicalId":222716,"journal":{"name":"Open Military Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116568530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Difficult alliance. Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia against Sweden during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) – an introduction to the problematic 困难的联盟。在大北方战争(1700-1721)期间，波兰立陶宛联邦和俄罗斯对抗瑞典-一个问题的介绍

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0139

Krokosz Paweł

{"title":"Difficult alliance. Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia against Sweden during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) – an introduction to the problematic","authors":"Krokosz Paweł","doi":"10.1515/openms-2022-0139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/openms-2022-0139","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With the outbreak of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was officially outside the fighting parties (Denmark, Saxony and Russia against Sweden), despite the fact that the main burden of hostilities was on its territory. It was only in 1704 that its representatives concluded an agreement with Russia and in the following years they undertook a joint fight against the Swedish king Charles XII and the Polish and Lithuanian nobility cooperating with him. Soon the alliance turned out to be “difficult” for both sides. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth obtained military and financial aid from Russia for the expansion of its army. Poland and Lithuania also counted on Russia’s help in regaining the Baltic lands occupied by Sweden, which were also sought by the Polish king and the Saxon elector Augustus II. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth also counted on support in the event that Turkey tried to take back Ukrainian lands from it. On the other hand, Tsar Peter I was successful at the front over the years (including the Battle of Poltava) and strengthened his political and military position in Europe. The tsar also began to interfere in the matters of the internally quarrelsome the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, trying to be an arbiter deciding its fate. Additionally, the prolonged stay of Russian troops there was a heavy burden for the Crown and Lithuania. The common paths of the Commonwealth and August II with Peter I slowly diverged. With the end of the war between Russia and Sweden in 1721, former allies were already enemies. Due to the very wide range of political, military, economic and religious issues, this article is only an introduction to the indicated issues. The author’s intention is to inspire researchers to undertake a new, or revive an already started, historical discourse on the Polish–Russian alliance during the Great Northern War (1700–1721).","PeriodicalId":222716,"journal":{"name":"Open Military Studies","volume":"341 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131946277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

1821 – A New Dawn for Greece. The Greek Struggle for Independence – Contents 1821年的今天，希腊迎来了新的黎明。希腊争取独立的斗争-内容

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0138

Lucien J. Frary

引用次数: 0

“A vast and efficient organism” – Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and the art of command “庞大而高效的有机体”——海军上将切斯特·w·尼米兹与指挥艺术

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0120

Trent Hone

{"title":"“A vast and efficient organism” – Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and the art of command","authors":"Trent Hone","doi":"10.1515/openms-2022-0120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/openms-2022-0120","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the years before World War II, the US Navy developed and refined a particular culture of command. Outwardly, this culture emphasized decentralized authority; it relied on clear mission-based orders that provided direction and fostered the initiative of subordinates. An informal network of connections – personal relationships between officers – supported these formal structures. Intimate familiarity, developed through years of shared experiences and collaboration, was the medium through which the US Navy’s officer corps exercised command. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz leveraged these personal connections and shared experiences to transform the Pacific Fleet and turn it into a “vast and efficient organism” capable of learning, evolving, and overcoming myriad obstacles in pursuit of a singular vision: victory in the war against Imperial Japan. Nimitz’s approach was unique, but it was not unusual; it was an outgrowth of a leadership culture the Navy had actively fostered in the early years of the twentieth century. He used his relationships and familiarity with fellow officers to exercise command decisively and transform his command into a complex adaptive system that accelerated Allied victory in the Pacific in World War II.","PeriodicalId":222716,"journal":{"name":"Open Military Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128310543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

It All Began at Pearl Harbor… 一切都始于珍珠港……

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0125

J. T. Kuehn

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Konstantinos Oikonomos and Russian Philorthodox relief during the Greek war for independence (1821–1829) 希腊独立战争(1821-1829)期间康斯坦丁诺斯·奥科诺莫斯和俄国非正统派救济组织

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0134

L. Gerd

{"title":"Konstantinos Oikonomos and Russian Philorthodox relief during the Greek war for independence (1821–1829)","authors":"L. Gerd","doi":"10.1515/openms-2022-0134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/openms-2022-0134","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the Archipelago expeditions of the Russian Navy in 1769–1774 and 1805–1807, thousands of Greeks fled the Ottoman Empire and resettled in the province of Novorossiia (southern Russia). Among the migrants were prominent merchants who strongly supported the Philiki Etaireia (Friendly Society) and the cause for Greek independence. Although Tsar Alexander I could not openly support the insurrection that broke out in 1821, Russia provided invaluable material assistance to the Greek refugees, who arrived in Russian cities such as Odessa and Kishinev. Special committees under Russian officials distributed funds gathered from private donations and public sources all over Russia. The famous Greek cleric Konstantinos Oikonomos also arrived in Odessa with his family. His speech at the funeral of Patriarch Gregory V (whose relics were buried in Odessa) helped solidify the image of the patriarch as an ethno-martyr. Oikonomos served as a mediator and advisor to the Ober-procurator of the Russian Holy Synod, Alexander Golitsyn, who was responsible for gathering information about Greek clergymen among the refugees. Oikonomos also played an important role in distributing donations for the families of the Greeks displaced after the massacre on Chios in 1822. The documents from Russian archives presented in this essay demonstrate the network of Oikonomos and the pivotal role that he played between the Russian high officials and Greek intellectuals, the Greek merchants, and his poorer compatriots. This chapter features an annex with the unpublished correspondence of Oikonomos as evidence for one of the largest humanitarian actions of the nineteenth century.","PeriodicalId":222716,"journal":{"name":"Open Military Studies","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124170173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Introduction - 1821 – A new dawn for Greece: The Greek struggle for independence 简介- 1821年-希腊的新黎明:希腊争取独立的斗争

Open Military Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/openms-2022-0133

Lucien J. Frary

引用次数: 0