Lukas Baumann, Elias Heftrig, Haya Shulman, M. Waidner
{"title":"The Master and Parasite Attack","authors":"Lukas Baumann, Elias Heftrig, Haya Shulman, M. Waidner","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00029","url":null,"abstract":"We explore a new type of malicious script attacks: the persistent parasite attack. Persistent parasites are stealthy scripts, which persist for a long time in the browser’s cache. We show to infect the caches of victims with parasite scripts via TCP injection.Once the cache is infected, we implement methodologies for propagation of the parasites to other popular domains on the victim client as well as to other caches on the network. We show how to design the parasites so that they stay long time in the victim’s cache not restricted to the duration of the user’s visit to the web site. We develop covert channels for communication between the attacker and the parasites, which allows the attacker to control which scripts are executed and when, and to exfiltrate private information to the attacker, such as cookies and passwords. We then demonstrate how to leverage the parasites to perform sophisticated attacks, and evaluate the attacks against a range of applications and security mechanisms on popular browsers. Finally we provide recommendations for countermeasures.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124233525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Santos, J. E. R. Condia, L. Carro, M. Reorda, P. Rech
{"title":"Revealing GPUs Vulnerabilities by Combining Register-Transfer and Software-Level Fault Injection","authors":"F. Santos, J. E. R. Condia, L. Carro, M. Reorda, P. Rech","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00042","url":null,"abstract":"The complexity of both hardware and software makes GPUs reliability evaluation extremely challenging. A low level fault injection on a GPU model, despite being accurate, would take a prohibitively long time (months to years), while software fault injection, despite being quick, cannot access critical resources for GPUs and typically uses synthetic fault models (e.g., single bit-flips) that could result in unrealistic evaluations. This paper proposes to combine the accuracy of Register- Transfer Level (RTL) fault injection with the efficiency of software fault injection. First, on an RTL GPU model (FlexGripPlus), we inject over 1.5 million faults in low-level resources that are unprotected and hidden to the programmer, and characterize their effects on the output of common instructions. We create a pool of possible fault effects on the operation output based on the instruction opcode and input characteristics. We then inject these fault effects, at the application level, using an updated version of a software framework (NVBitFI). Our strategy reduces the fault injection time from the tens of years an RTL evaluation would need to tens of hours, thus allowing, for the first time on GPUs, to track the fault propagation from the hardware to the output of complex applications. Additionally, we provide a more realistic fault model and show that single bit-flip injection would underestimate the error rate of six HPC applications and two convolutional neural networks by up to 48parcent (18parcent on average). The RTL fault models and the injection framework we developed are made available in a public repository to enable third-party evaluations and ease results reproducibility.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114764656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Healing Protocol: Repairing Schedules Online after Link Failures in Time-Triggered Networks","authors":"Francisco Pozo, G. Rodríguez-Navas, H. Hansson","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00028","url":null,"abstract":"Switched networks following the time-triggered paradigm rely on static schedules that determine the communication pattern over each link. In order to tolerate link failures, methods based on spatial redundancy and based on resynthesis and replacement of schedules have been proposed. These methods, however, do not scale to larger networks, which may be needed e.g. for future large-scale cyberphysical systems. We propose a distributed Self-Healing Protocol (SHP) that, instead of recomputing the whole schedule, repairs the existent schedule at runtime. For that, it relies on the coordination among the nodes of the network to redefine the repair problem as a number of local synthesis problems of significantly smaller size, which are solved in parallel by the nodes that need to reroute the frames affected by link failures. SHP exhibits a high success rate compared to full rescheduling, as well as remarkable scalability; it repairs the schedule in milliseconds, whereas rescheduling may require minutes for large networks.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126882424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amir Taherin, Tirthak Patel, G. Georgakoudis, I. Laguna, Devesh Tiwari
{"title":"Examining Failures and Repairs on Supercomputers with Multi-GPU Compute Nodes","authors":"Amir Taherin, Tirthak Patel, G. Georgakoudis, I. Laguna, Devesh Tiwari","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00043","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the reliability characteristics of supercomputers has been a key focus of the HPC and dependability communities. However, there is no current study that analyzes both the failure and recovery characteristics over multiple generations of a GPU-based supercomputer with multiple GPUs on the same node. This paper bridges that gap and reveals surprising insights based on monitoring and analyzing the failures and repairs on the Tsubame-2 and Tsubame-3 supercomputers.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125978103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nada Lachtar, Abdulrahman Abu Elkhail, Anys Bacha, Hafiz Malik
{"title":"An Application Agnostic Defense Against the Dark Arts of Cryptojacking","authors":"Nada Lachtar, Abdulrahman Abu Elkhail, Anys Bacha, Hafiz Malik","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00044","url":null,"abstract":"The popularity of cryptocurrencies has garnered interest from cybercriminals, spurring an onslaught of cryptojacking campaigns that aim to hijack computational resources for the purpose of mining cryptocurrencies. In this paper, we present a cross-stack cryptojacking defense system that spans the hardware and OS layers. Unlike prior work that is confined to detecting cryptojacking behavior within web browsers, our solution is application agnostic. We show that tracking instructions that are frequently used in cryptographic hash functions serve as reliable signatures for fingerprinting cryptojacking activity. We demonstrate that our solution is resilient to multi-threaded and throttling evasion techniques that are commonly employed by cryptojacking malware. We characterize the robustness of our solution by extensively testing a diverse set of workloads that include real consumer applications. Finally, an evaluation of our proof-of-concept implementation shows minimal performance impact while running a mix of benchmark applications","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"74 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134362805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"[Title page i]","authors":"","doi":"10.1109/dsn48987.2021.00001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn48987.2021.00001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133277585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Romain Cayre, Florent Galtier, G. Auriol, V. Nicomette, M. Kaâniche, G. Marconato
{"title":"InjectaBLE: Injecting malicious traffic into established Bluetooth Low Energy connections","authors":"Romain Cayre, Florent Galtier, G. Auriol, V. Nicomette, M. Kaâniche, G. Marconato","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00050","url":null,"abstract":"Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is nowadays one of the most popular wireless communication protocols for Internet of Things (IoT) devices. As a result, several attacks have targeted this protocol or its implementations in recent years, illustrating the growing interest for this technology. However, some major challenges remain from an offensive perspective, such as injecting arbitrary frames, hijacking the Slave role or performing a Manin-The-Middle in an already established connection. In this paper, we describe a novel attack called InjectaBLE, allowing to inject malicious traffic into an existing connection. This attack is highly critical as the vulnerability exploited is inherent to the BLE specification itself, which means that any BLE connection can be possibly vulnerable, regardless of the BLE devices involved in the connection. We describe the theoretical foundations of the attack, how to implement it in practice, and we explore four critical attack scenarios allowing to maliciously trigger a specific feature of the target device, hijack the Slave and Master role or to perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack. Finally, we discuss the impact of this attack and outline some mitigation measures.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133888900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Test-of-Time Award","authors":"","doi":"10.1109/dsn48987.2021.00014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn48987.2021.00014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132446188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lun-Pin Yuan, Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Issa M. Khalil, Sencun Zhu
{"title":"Time-Window Based Group-Behavior Supported Method for Accurate Detection of Anomalous Users","authors":"Lun-Pin Yuan, Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Issa M. Khalil, Sencun Zhu","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00038","url":null,"abstract":"Autoencoder-based anomaly detection methods have been used in identifying anomalous users from large-scale enterprise logs with the assumption that adversarial activities do not follow past habitual patterns. Most existing approaches typically build models by reconstructing single-day and individual-user behaviors. However, without capturing long-term signals and group-correlation signals, the models cannot identify low-signal yet long-lasting threats, and will wrongly report many normal users as anomalies on busy days, which, in turn, lead to high false positive rate. In this paper, we propose ACOBE, an Anomaly detection method based on COmpound BEhavior, which takes into consideration long-term patterns and group behaviors. ACOBE leverages a novel behavior representation and an ensemble of deep autoencoders and produces an ordered investigation list. Our evaluation shows that ACOBE outperforms prior work by a large margin in terms of precision and recall, and our case study demonstrates that ACOBE is applicable in practice for cyberattack detection.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124680478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Catch You With Cache: Out-of-VM Introspection to Trace Malicious Executions","authors":"Chao Su, Xuhua Ding, Qingkai Zeng","doi":"10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN48987.2021.00045","url":null,"abstract":"Out-of-VM introspection is an imperative part of security analysis. The legacy methods either modify the system, introducing enormous overhead, or rely heavily on hardware features, which are neither available nor practical in most cloud environments. In this paper, we propose a novel analysis method, named as Catcher, that utilizes CPU cache to perform out-of-VM introspection. Catcher does not make any modifications to the target program and its running environment, nor demands special hardware support. Implemented upon Linux KVM, it natively introspects the target’s virtual memory. More importantly, it uses the cache-based side channel to infer the target control flow. To deal with the inherent limitations of the side channel, we propose several heuristics to improve the accuracy and stability of Catcher. Our experiments against various malware armored with packing techniques show that Catcher can recover the control flow in real time with around 67% to 97% accuracy scores. Catcher incurs a negligible overhead to the system and can be launched at anytime to monitor an ongoing attack inside a virtual machine.","PeriodicalId":222512,"journal":{"name":"2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117276488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}