{"title":"Guiding Directed Fuzzing with Feasibility","authors":"Weiheng Bai, Kefu Wu, Qiushi Wu, Kangjie Lu","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00010","url":null,"abstract":"Directed fuzzing is a useful technique that can confirm bugs found by static analysis, reproduce existing bugs, and efficiently test code changes. A general mechanism in directed fuzzing is to calculate the distance between the current progress and the target, and use that as a feedback to guide the directed fuzzing. A fundamental problem with existing distance calculation is that it is feasibility-unaware. For instance, it always assumes that the two branches of an if statement have equal feasibility, which is likely not true in real-world programs and would inevitablly incur significant biases in the directed fuzzing. In this work, we propose feasibility-aware directed fuzzing, AFLGopher. Our new feasibility-aware distance calculation provides precise feedback to guide directed fuzzing to reach targets efficiently. We propose new techniques to address challenges of the feasibility prediction. Our new classification method allows to predict the feasibility of all branches based on limited traces, and our runtime feasibility-updating mechanism gradually improves the prediction precision. We implement AFLGopher, and the evaluation results show that AFLGopher uses less time to reach the bugs, compared to the state of the art.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126069390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anis Fellah-Touta, L. Bossuet, Carlos Andres Lara-Nino
{"title":"Combined Internal Attacks on SoC-FPGAs: Breaking AES with Remote Power Analysis and Frequency-based Covert Channels","authors":"Anis Fellah-Touta, L. Bossuet, Carlos Andres Lara-Nino","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00035","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the field of side-channel analysis has observed a revolution in the design of the attack methodology. Conventional approaches which require the use of highly specialized equipment like oscilloscopes and spectrum analyzers, despite highly precise, might be regarded as impractical in some scenarios. On the other hand, the use of less-accurate internal sensors which can monitor the power footprint of a circuit has risen in popularity. Delay sensors have shown promising results. These structures are interesting since they can be implemented from regular hardware resources available in most circuits. This means that components already available in the target platform might be leveraged to implement a side-channel attack. Moreover, it has been shown that is not necessary to have direct access to the platform to carry out such an attack; which implies that if there is a remote link such as Ethernet, an adversary might be able to perform Remote Power Analysis (RPA) of the system. So far, the main challenge for the success of this kind of attack is the problem of cutting and aligning the power traces. This is usually achieved through secondary digital channels which carry some trigger information. In this paper, we simplify the conditions for an RPA attack to take place. Namely, our method mitigates the need for connecting digital triggers to the remote sensor. We demonstrate this approach by performing a successful key recovery on a hardware implementation of AES.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"48 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116823779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Konstantinos Kalogiannis, A. Henriksson, Panos Papadimitratos
{"title":"Vulnerability Analysis of Vehicular Coordinated Maneuvers","authors":"Konstantinos Kalogiannis, A. Henriksson, Panos Papadimitratos","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00006","url":null,"abstract":"Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) latest standardization efforts focus on a Maneuver Coordination Service (MCS), for automated vehicles to cooperatively perform maneuvers. The goal is to avoid degrading to lower levels of automation, i.e., human input for maneuvering, e.g., when an obstacle ahead needs to be avoided. MCS-equipped vehicles communicate with nearby vehicles that are possibly affected by the impending maneuver, to establish that a maneuver can safely take place. An MCS-equipped vehicle that misbehaves can be catastrophic: transmitting falsified MCS messages or preventing their reception can mislead victim vehicles into aborting a maneuver, being delayed and, worse even, collide. In this work, we investigate the robustness of existing Maneuver Coordination Protocols (MCPs) and analyze the effect of falsification and jamming attacks. Our analysis shows an increased probability for neck injuries, i.e., whiplash, and potentially more severe injuries. As a first step towards thwarting attacks targeting MCPs, we extend MCPs to take into account on-board vehicle sensors, along with MCP messaging, before committing to a maneuver. Our results demonstrate the MCP vulnerability, the improvement thanks to the sensors, and the need to further improve MCP security. We conclude with a road-map towards a resilient MCS.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"1 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124212454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lessons Learned: Building a Privacy-Preserving Entity Resolution Adaptation of PPJoin using End-to-End Homomorphic Encryption","authors":"Tanmay Ghai, Yixiang Yao, Srivatsan Ravi","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00018","url":null,"abstract":"Entity resolution is the task of disambiguating records that refer to the same entity in the real world. In this work, we explore adapting one of the most efficient and accurate Jaccard-based entity resolution algorithms - PPJoin, to the private domain via end-to-end homomorphic encryption. Towards this, we present our precise adaptation: HE-PPJoin that details certain subtle data structure modifications and algorithmic additions needed for correctness and privacy. We implement HE-PPJoin by extending the PALISADE (now merged with OpenFHE) open-source, homomorphic encryption library and perform experiments to analyze its accuracy and incurred overhead. Furthermore, we directly compare HE-PPJoin against P4Join, an existing privacy-preserving variant of PPJoin, which uses hashing for raw content obfuscation (encryption), by demonstrating a rigorous analysis of the efficiency, accuracy, and privacy properties achieved by our adaptation as well as a characterization of those same attributes in P4Join. In building and designing HE-PPJoin, we faced numerous challenges that required making tradeoffs and analyzing possible alternatives. We have thus summarized and detailed all the lessons we have learned, presented throughout the paper, intended as motivating building blocks for future work in this direction.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131614883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Magdalene Ng, Maria Bada, Kovila P. L. Coopamootoo
{"title":"What We Do in the Shadows: How does Experiencing Cybercrime Affect Response Actions & Protective Practices?","authors":"Magdalene Ng, Maria Bada, Kovila P. L. Coopamootoo","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00077","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasing prevalence of cybercrimes, there is limited understanding of the response strategies and protective (privacy, security) practices of individuals who have experienced at least one attempted or successful cybercrime incident. To address this gap, we conduct an online survey across an N=605 sample from the UK, eliciting firsthand accounts of cybercrime experiences, actions taken in response to such incidents, as well as their level of engagement with security and privacy (SP) methods and technologies. We identify the occurrence of 8 distinct types of cybercrime and 9 corresponding response strategies amongst 319 cybercrime reports, encompassing IT and protective themes. We depict the association between the experience of cybercrime and the utilisation of response strategies through visual representation. In parallel with IT-related or protective SP theme response strategies, we find that the type of cybercrime experienced (e.g., malware) and the frequency of experiences (e.g., multiple cybercrimes or repeated experiences of the same cybercrime type) influence the engagement with SP technologies. This paper provides empirical insights into experiences of different types of cybercrimes, including their multiple occurrences, and (protective) actions. We also provide recommendations for research and practical implementation, emphasising the importance of addressing the specific needs of individuals who have experienced multiple or repeat cybercrimes. Our paper suggests the adoption of a de-responsibiling cyber-strategy that complements individual guardianship — while promoting infrastructure that caters to the diverse range of users.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127395244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carmelo Aparo, C. Bernardeschi, G. Lettieri, Fabio Lucattini, Salvatore Montanarella
{"title":"An Analysis System to Test Security of Software on Continuous Integration-Continuous Delivery Pipeline","authors":"Carmelo Aparo, C. Bernardeschi, G. Lettieri, Fabio Lucattini, Salvatore Montanarella","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00012","url":null,"abstract":"This work presents a modular and scalable analysis system to integrate different Applications Security Testing tools inside a Continuous Integration-Continuous Delivery Pipeline. Docker containerization and tools for stateless execution allow parallelism and replication. As a result of the analysis of an application, the system execution produces as output a unique JSON report that contains all the vulnerabilities found by the tools executed, with a risk score associated to each vulnerability. Two Application Security Testing tools, OWASP ZAP and SonarQube, have been integrated using Gitlab Platform to apply DevOps methodology for java web application analysis. Results on the OWASP Benchmark test suite confirm a consistent improvement of the security analysis and allow comparison of tools accuracy by vulnerability category.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115393849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne Borcherding, Marc-Henri Giraud, Ian Fitzgerald, J. Beyerer
{"title":"The Bandit’s States: Modeling State Selection for Stateful Network Fuzzing as Multi-armed Bandit Problem","authors":"Anne Borcherding, Marc-Henri Giraud, Ian Fitzgerald, J. Beyerer","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00043","url":null,"abstract":"Network interfaces of Industrial Control Systems are a common entry point for attackers, and thus need to be thoroughly tested for vulnerabilities. One way to perform such tests is with network fuzzers, which randomly mutate network packets to induce unexpected behavior and vulnerabilities. Highly stateful network protocols pose a particular challenge to fuzzers, since a fuzzer needs to be aware of the states in order to find deep vulnerabilities. Even if a fuzzer is aware of the states of a stateful network protocol, there are still several challenges to overcome. The challenge we focus on is deciding which state to test next. To make this decision, the fuzzer needs to strike a balance between exploiting known states and exploring states not yet tested. We propose to model this exploration versus exploitation dilemma using a Multi-armed Bandit. In this work, we present two modeling approaches and preliminary experiments. We choose to model the state selection problem with (I) a stochastic Multi-armed Bandit, and (II) an adversarial Multi-armed Bandit. The latter takes into account that coverage can only be discovered once, and that the underlying reward probability therefore decreases over time. Although the adversarial Multi-armed Bandit models the state selection problem more accurately, our experiments show that both approaches lead to statistically indistinguishable fuzzer performance. Furthermore, we show that the baseline fuzzer AFLNet leads to significantly better results in terms of coverage. Building on these unintuitive preliminary results, we aim to investigate the behavior of the agents in more detail, to include additional modeling approaches, and to use additional Systems under Test for the evaluation.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125871617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Megha Sharma, Kuldeep Singh, Palvi Aggarwal, V. Dutt
{"title":"How well does GPT phish people? An investigation involving cognitive biases and feedback","authors":"Megha Sharma, Kuldeep Singh, Palvi Aggarwal, V. Dutt","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00055","url":null,"abstract":"Phishing scams have increased drastically over the years. Prior research has investigated various ways to prevent phishing email scams. However, little is known about human decisions against phishing emails that contain cognitive biases and are either crafted by humans or large-language models (LLMs). Also, less is known about how humans can be trained against such emails. This research aimed to address this literature gap by investigating the effectiveness of human-crafted phishing emails versus GPT3 crafted phishing emails (GPT-3 being an LLM). The study consisted of two between-subjects conditions (N = 30 per condition): human and GPT. Each condition contained three rounds with a total of 40 trials, and participants were required to mark the degree to which the presented email was genuine or phishing in each trial. The second round provided feedback to participants in both conditions. The results showed that human-crafted emails were more effective in phishing people compared to GPT-3 crafted emails even after training across different cognitive biases. However, humans felt more confident against human-crafted emails compared to GPT-3 crafted emails. We highlight the implications of these results for LLM crafted phishing attacks compared to human-crafted phishing attacks.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130496731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ahmet Erinola, Annalina Buckmann, Jennifer Friedauer, Aslı Yardım, M. Sasse
{"title":"“As Usual, I Needed Assistance of a Seeing Person”: Experiences and Challenges of People with Disabilities and Authentication Methods","authors":"Ahmet Erinola, Annalina Buckmann, Jennifer Friedauer, Aslı Yardım, M. Sasse","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00070","url":null,"abstract":"According to the World Health organization, about 16% of the world’s population live with a disability. While they could benefit from digital products and services, users with disabilities often face severe accessibility issues: tasks can only be completed with difficulty, a considerable investment of time, or with assistance of technologies or other people. Further, to access these products and services, they need to authenticate. The accessibility of authentication methods for users with disabilities has not been studied in depth. We use an accessible study design to conduct 13 semi-structured interviews with people with physical, hearing, visual, cognitive, or multiple impairments to better understand the accessibility issues they face when using knowledge- or token-based, and biometric authentication. Our qualitative content analysis shows that none of the commonly available authentication methods is fully accessible to participants, causing them to abandon services or develop workarounds that reduce their own security and privacy. Our results also reveal the role of assistive technologies and human assistants in the authentication experience of users with disabilities. We conclude by encouraging fellow researchers and practitioners to reflect on assisted access when designing security mechanisms, to include people with disabilities using accessible study designs, and to keep in mind that accessible security is about more than usability – to further benefit users without disabilities as well.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129263781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effective Machine Learning-based Access Control Administration through Unlearning","authors":"Javier Martínez Llamas, D. Preuveneers, W. Joosen","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00011","url":null,"abstract":"With the rapid and increasing complexity of computer systems and software, there is a need for more effective, scalable, and secure access control methods. Machine learning (ML) has gained popularity in complementing manually crafted authorisation policies in such environments. However, given the dynamic and constantly evolving nature of software and access control systems, the administration of the latter presents a significant security challenge. This paper examines the administration problem of Machine Learning-based Access Control (MLBAC) systems through Machine Unlearning as a lightweight and secure method. More specifically, we explore this problem through exact and approximate unlearning and evaluate its impact using real-world data. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Machine Unlearning in both reverting policies and addressing potential vulnerabilities that may emerge during the model’s lifecycle. Compared to alternative options such as retraining from scratch, our approach reduces deployment and verification costs, making it a promising solution for MLBAC administration.","PeriodicalId":220415,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115309682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}