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Managing Institutional Complexity – A Case Study on the Legitimacy Strategies of Puma 管理制度复杂性——以彪马公司合法性战略为例
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance Pub Date : 2013-10-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2336934
Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, A. Scherer, G. Palazzo
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引用次数: 0
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance: The Initial Quest of Effective Board Paradigm - A Survey Based on Nonlinear Regression Equation Modeling 董事会独立性与公司长期绩效:对有效董事会范式的初步探索——基于非线性回归方程模型的调查
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance Pub Date : 2011-12-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2034532
Wei Liu
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引用次数: 3
Shareholder Activism in Belgium: The Belgian AGMs and EGMs in 2011 比利时的股东行动主义:2011年比利时年度股东大会和股东特别大会
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance Pub Date : 2011-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1929792
Christoph van der Elst
{"title":"Shareholder Activism in Belgium: The Belgian AGMs and EGMs in 2011","authors":"Christoph van der Elst","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1929792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1929792","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the voting turnout, the voting behavior of large and small shareholders and the resolutions voted at annual general meetings (AGMs) and extra-ordinary general meetings (EGMs) of Belgian listed companies in 2011. The average voting turnout was 49,9 per cent in 2011, down from 51,3 per cent in 2010. The shareholders had to vote on 9 resolutions of the board of directors on average and on 11 resolutions during the accompanying EGM. Only three resolutions are part of all agendas of general meetings. All ordinary resolutions were adopted and average approval rates are above 90 per cent. EGMs rejected two of the 340 resolutions. We conclude that shareholder activism is limited, that voting turnouts are stable and are (only) influenced by the ownership structure of the company. We criticize the position and role of the AGM as instrument for shareholder activism: some items are superfluous while shareholders are not allowed to vote for other issues. We encourage studying the options for shareholders’ participation in the determination of the long term direction of the company, its mission, its expansion strategies, its risk policies and the like.","PeriodicalId":215226,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126816668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Incentives vs. Entrenchment: A Comparison of Competing Governance Mechanisms 激励与巩固:竞争治理机制的比较
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance Pub Date : 2009-07-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2133610
B. Bolton
{"title":"Incentives vs. Entrenchment: A Comparison of Competing Governance Mechanisms","authors":"B. Bolton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2133610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133610","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the relationships between firm performance and the incentive and entrenchment effects of corporate governance structures. It analyzes whether the benefits of providing stock ownership to directors are greater than the potential costs of entrenching officers and directors. Using the dollar amount of stock owned by various classes of directors, the results suggest that the incentive effect dominates any costs related to entrenchment: firms with greater stock ownership outperform other firms, regardless of the degree of managerial entrenchment that may be present. This result is robust to firm size, growth opportunities, time period, and other controls. The implication for policy-makers is that providing directors with incentives through stock ownership remains a very effective corporate governance mechanism.","PeriodicalId":215226,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134378077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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