Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance最新文献

{"title":"Statistical Significance and the Replication Crisis in the Social Sciences","authors":"Anna Dreber, M. Johannesson","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.461","url":null,"abstract":"The recent “replication crisis” in the social sciences has led to increased attention on what statistically significant results entail. There are many reasons for why false positive results may be published in the scientific literature, such as low statistical power and “researcher degrees of freedom” in the analysis (where researchers when testing a hypothesis more or less actively seek to get results with p < .05). The results from three large replication projects in psychology, experimental economics, and the social sciences are discussed, with most of the focus on the last project where the statistical power in the replications was substantially higher than in the other projects. The results suggest that there is a substantial share of published results in top journals that do not replicate. While several replication indicators have been proposed, the main indicator for whether a results replicates or not is whether the replication study using the same statistical test finds a statistically significant effect (p < .05 in a two-sided test). For the project with very high statistical power the various replication indicators agree to a larger extent than for the other replication projects, and this is most likely due to the higher statistical power. While the replications discussed mainly are experiments, there are no reasons to believe that the replicability would be higher in other parts of economics and finance, if anything the opposite due to more researcher degrees of freedom. There is also a discussion of solutions to the often-observed low replicability, including lowering the p value threshold to .005 for statistical significance and increasing the use of preanalysis plans and registered reports for new studies as well as replications, followed by a discussion of measures of peer beliefs. Recent attempts to understand to what extent the academic community is aware of the limited reproducibility and can predict replication outcomes using prediction markets and surveys suggest that peer beliefs may be viewed as an additional reproducibility indicator.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123544069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Reserves, Exchange Rates, and Monetary Policy: From the Trilemma to the Quadrilemma","authors":"J. Aizenman","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.313","url":null,"abstract":"The links of international reserves, exchange rates, and monetary policy can be understood through the lens of a modern incarnation of the “impossible trinity” (aka the “trilemma”), based on Mundell and Fleming’s hypothesis that a country may simultaneously choose any two, but not all, of the following three policy goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. The original economic trilemma was framed in the 1960s, during the Bretton Woods regime, as a binary choice of two out of the possible three policy goals. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, emerging markets and developing countries found that deeper financial integration comes with growing exposure to financial instability and the increased risk of “sudden stop” of capital inflows and capital flight crises. These crises have been characterized by exchange rate instability triggered by countries’ balance sheet exposure to external hard currency debt—exposures that have propagated banking instabilities and crises. Such events have frequently morphed into deep internal and external debt crises, ending with bailouts of systemic banks and powerful macro players. The resultant domestic debt overhang led to fiscal dominance and a reduction of the scope of monetary policy. With varying lags, these crises induced economic and political changes, in which a growing share of emerging markets and developing countries converged to “in-between” regimes in the trilemma middle range—that is, managed exchange rate flexibility, controlled financial integration, and limited but viable monetary autonomy. Emerging research has validated a modern version of the trilemma: that is, countries face a continuous trilemma trade-off in which a higher trilemma policy goal is “traded off” with a drop in the weighted average of the other two trilemma policy goals. The concerns associated with exposure to financial instability have been addressed by varying configurations of managing public buffers (international reserves, sovereign wealth funds), as well as growing application of macro-prudential measures aimed at inducing systemic players to internalize the impact of their balance sheet exposure on a country’s financial stability. Consequently, the original trilemma has morphed into a quadrilemma, wherein financial stability has been added to the trilemma’s original policy goals. Size does matter, and there is no way for smaller countries to insulate themselves fully from exposure to global cycles and shocks. Yet successful navigation of the open-economy quadrilemma helps in reducing the transmission of external shock to the domestic economy, as well as the costs of domestic shocks. These observations explain the relative resilience of emerging markets—especially in countries with more mature institutions—as they have been buffered by deeper precautionary management of reserves, and greater fiscal and monetary space.\u0000 We close the discussion noting that the global financial crisis, and th","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116542383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contests: Theory and Topics","authors":"Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.440","url":null,"abstract":"Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape. In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are rewarded for “getting ahead” of their opponents instead of their absolute performance metrics. Many social, economic, and business phenomena exemplify such competitive schemes, ranging from college admissions, political campaigns, advertising, and organizational hierarchies, to warfare. The economics literature has long recognized contest/tournament as a convenient and efficient incentive scheme to remedy the moral hazard problem, especially when the production process is subject to random perturbation or the measurement of input/output is imprecise or costly. An enormous amount of scholarly effort has been devoted to developing tractable theoretical models, unveiling the fundamentals of the strategic interactions that underlie such competitions, and exploring the optimal design of contest rules. This voluminous literature has enriched basic contest/tournament models by introducing different variations to the modeling, such as dynamic structure, incomplete and asymmetric information, multi-battle confrontations, sorting and entry, endogenous prize allocation, competitions in groups, contestants with alternative risk attitude, among other things.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130088070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Economics of Innovation, Knowledge Diffusion, and Globalization","authors":"Nelson Lind, N. Ramondo","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.392","url":null,"abstract":"A recent body of literature on quantitative general equilibrium models links the creation and diffusion of knowledge and technology to openness to international trade and to the activity of multinational firms. The unifying theme of this literature is methodological: productivities are Fréchet random variables and arise from Poisson innovation and diffusion processes for ideas. The main advantage of this modeling strategy is that it delivers closed-form solutions for key endogenous variables that have a direct counterpart in the data (e.g., prices, trade flows). This tractability makes the connection between theory and data transparent, helps clarify the determinants of the gains from openness, and facilitates the calculation of counterfactual equilibria.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"12 21","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132513067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Purchasing Power Parity and Real Exchange Rates","authors":"M. Chinn","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.316","url":null,"abstract":"The idea that prices and exchange rates adjust so as to equalize the common-currency price of identical bundles of goods—purchasing power parity (PPP)—is a topic of central importance in international finance. If PPP holds continuously, then nominal exchange rate changes do not influence trade flows. If PPP does not hold in the short run, but does in the long run, then monetary factors can affect the real exchange rate only temporarily. Substantial evidence has accumulated—with the advent of new statistical tests, alternative data sets, and longer spans of data—that purchasing power parity does not typically hold in the short run. One reason why PPP doesn’t hold in the short run might be due to sticky prices, in combination with other factors, such as trade barriers. The evidence is mixed for the longer run. Variations in the real exchange rate in the longer run can also be driven by shocks to demand, arising from changes in government spending, the terms of trade, as well as wealth and debt stocks. At time horizon of decades, trend movements in the real exchange rate—that is, systematically trending deviations in PPP—could be due to the presence of nontraded goods, combined with real factors such as differentials in productivity growth. The well-known positive association between the price level and income levels—also known as the “Penn Effect”—is consistent with this channel. Whether PPP holds then depends on the time period, the time horizon, and the currencies examined.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121100635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance and Enterprise Governance","authors":"Brett H. Mcdonnell","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.345","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance includes legal, contractual, and market mechanisms that structure decision-making within business corporations. Most attention has focused on corporate governance in large U.S. public corporations with dispersed shareholding. The separation of ownership from control in those corporations creates a unique problem, as shareholders typically have weak individual incentive to monitor managers. Mechanisms that have been developed to address this agency problem include independent directors, fiduciary duty, securities law disclosure, executive compensation, various professional gatekeepers, the market for corporate control, and shareholder activism. In most countries outside the United States, there are few companies with dispersed shareholding. Instead, most companies have a controlling shareholder or group. These companies face a different agency problem, the possibility that controlling shareholders may use their power to gain at the expense of minority shareholders.\u0000 Enterprise governance refers to mechanisms aimed at related agency problems that occur in closely held companies without publicly traded equity interests. Here too the agency problem typically encountered is the potential conflict between controllers and minority investors, with the added twist that share illiquidity removes an important protection for the minority. Closely held companies have adopted a variety of contractual mechanisms to address these concerns. Other than the important but special cases of venture capital and private equity fund investments, there is less empirical evidence on governance in closely held companies because information is generally much harder to find.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122516738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions","authors":"M. Knapp","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.106","url":null,"abstract":"Mental illnesses are highly prevalent and can have considerable, enduring consequences for individuals, families, communities, and economies. Despite these high prevalence rates, mental illnesses have not received as much public policy commitment or funding as might be expected. One result is that mental illness often goes unrecognized and untreated. The resultant costs are felt not only in healthcare systems, but across many other sectors, including housing, social care, criminal justice, welfare benefits, and employment.\u0000 This article sets out the basic principles of economic evaluation, with illustrations in this mental health context. It also discusses the main practical challenges when conducting and interpreting evidence from such evaluations.\u0000 Decisions about whether to spend resources on a treatment or prevention strategy are based on whether it is likely to be effective in avoiding, reducing, or curing symptoms, improving quality of life, or achieving other individual-level outcomes. The economic evaluation question is whether the outcomes achieved are sufficient to justify the cost that is incurred in delivering the intervention.\u0000 An economic evaluation has five elements: clarification of the question to be addressed; specification of the intervention to be evaluated and with what alternative it is being compared; the outcomes to be measured; the costs to be measured (including the cost of implementing the intervention and any savings that might accrue); and finally, how outcome and cost findings are to be blended to make a recommendation to the decision-maker. Sometimes, if an evaluation finds that one intervention has better outcomes but higher costs, then the evaluation should also how one (the outcomes) might be trade-off for the other (the costs).\u0000 The article illustrates how economic evaluations have been undertaken and employed to address a range of questions, from the very strategic issue to the more specific clinical question. The purpose of the study can, to some extent, determine the type of evaluation that is needed.\u0000 Examples of evaluations are given in a number of areas: perinatal maternal mental illness; parenting programs for conduct disorder; anti-bullying programs in schools; early intervention services for psychosis; individual placement and support; collaborative care for physical health problems; and suicide prevention. The challenges of economic evaluation are discussed, specifically in the mental health field.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129214757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption and Development: A Reappraisal","authors":"Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi, Till Hartmann","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.237","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption and development are two mutually related concepts equally shifting in meaning across time. The predominant 21st-century view of government that regards corruption as inacceptable has its theoretical roots in ancient Western thought, as well as Eastern thought. This condemning view of corruption coexisted at all times with a more morally indifferent or neutral approach that found its expression most notably in development scholars of the 1960s and 1970s who viewed corruption as an enabler of development rather than an obstacle. Research on the nexus between corruption and development has identified mechanisms that enable corruption and offered theories of change, which have informed practical development policies. Interventions adopting a principal agent approach fit better the advanced economies, where corruption is an exception, rather than the emerging economies, where the opposite of corruption, the norm of ethical universalism, has yet to be built. In such contexts corruption is better approached from a collective action perspective. Reviewing cross-national data for the period 1996–2017, it becomes apparent that the control of corruption stagnated in most countries and only a few exceptions exist. For a lasting improvement of the control of corruption, societies need to reduce the resources for corruption while simultaneously increasing constraints. The evolution of a governance regime requires a multiple stakeholder endeavor reaching beyond the sphere of government involving the press, business, and a strong and activist civil society.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126860077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Urban Sprawl and the Control of Land Use","authors":"A. Anas","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.156","url":null,"abstract":"Urban sprawl in popular sources is vaguely defined and largely misunderstood, having acquired a pejorative meaning. Economists should ask whether particular patterns of urban land use are an outcome of an efficient allocation of resources. Theoretical economic modeling has been used to show that more not less, sprawl often improves economic efficiency. More sprawl can cause a reduction in traffic congestion. Job suburbanization can generally increase sprawl but improves economic efficiency. Limiting sprawl in some cities by direct control of the land use can increase sprawl in other cities, and aggregate sprawl in all cities combined can increase. That urban population growth causes more urban sprawl is verified by empirically implemented general equilibrium models, but—contrary to common belief—the increase in travel times that accompanies such sprawl are very modest. Urban growth boundaries to limit urban sprawl cause large deadweight losses by raising land prices and should be seen to be socially intolerable but often are not. It is good policy to use corrective taxation for negative externalities such as traffic congestion and to implement property tax reforms to reduce or eliminate distortive taxation. Under various circumstances such fiscal measures improve welfare by increasing urban sprawl. The flight of the rich from American central cities, large lot zoning in the suburbs, and the financing of schools by property tax revenues are seen as causes of sprawl. There is also evidence that more heterogeneity among consumers and more unequal income distributions cause more urban sprawl. The connections between agglomeration economies and urban sprawl are less clear. The emerging technology of autonomous vehicles can have major implications for the future of urban spatial structure and is likely to add to sprawl.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133245599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Foreign Direct Investment and International Technology Diffusion","authors":"Difei Geng, Kamal Saggi","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190625979.013.241","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in facilitating the process of international technology diffusion. While FDI among industrialized countries primarily occurs via international mergers and acquisitions (M&As), investment headed to developing countries is more likely to be greenfield in nature; that is, it involves the establishment or expansion of new foreign affiliates by multinational firms. M&As have the potential to yield productivity improvements via changes in management and organization structure of target firms, whereas greenfield FDI leads to transfer of novel technical know-how by initiating the production of new products in host countries as well as by introducing improvements in existing production processes.\u0000 Given the prominent role that multinational firms play in global research and development (R&D), there is much interest in whether and how technologies transferred by them to their foreign subsidiaries later diffuse more broadly in host economies, thereby potentially generating broad-based productivity gains. Empirical evidence shows that whereas spillovers from FDI to competing local firms are elusive, such is not the case for spillovers to local suppliers and other agents involved in vertical relationships with multinationals. Multinationals have substantially increased their investments in research facilities in various parts of the world and in R&D collaboration with local firms in developing countries, most notably China and India. Such international collaboration in R&D spearheaded by multinational firms has the potential to accelerate global productivity growth.","PeriodicalId":211658,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127675636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}