{"title":"Hermann von Helmholtz and logical empiricism","authors":"M. Heidelberger","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123146927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Berlin Group and the Society for Scientific Philosophy","authors":"N. Milkov","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-14","url":null,"abstract":"In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of likeminded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific knowledge.","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114374722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neurath on political economy","authors":"J. O'neill","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122402638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reichenbach and the problem of induction","authors":"F. Padovani","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-27","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117089047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Lvov-Warsaw School and logical empiricism","authors":"J. Woleński","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"464 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116411846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"French conventionalism and the Vienna Circle","authors":"Anastasios Brenner","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126098309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Schlick, Carnap, and Feigl on the mind-body problem","authors":"Sean Crawford","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-28","url":null,"abstract":"Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Herbert Feig are the most prominent of the positivists to formulate views on the mind-body problem. (C. G. Hempel’s one-off treatment [1935] is set aside here; see Kim [2003] and Crawford [2013].) While their views differed from each other and changed over time, they were all committed to some form of scientific physicalism, though a linguistic or conceptual rather than ontological form of it. In focus here are their views during the heyday of logical positivism and its immediate aftermath, though some initial scene-setting of Schlick’s and Carnap’s pre-positivist views will help to understand the final opposing positions of Carnap and Feigl. All three philosophers are largely—entirely, in the case of Schlick and Feigl—concerned with sensations and sensory consciousness, or what Feigl came to call (after the psychologist E. C. Tolman) “raw feels” and what are now usually called “qualia” or “phenomenally conscious” mental states.","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134545703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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