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International Financial Assistance: A Loan Mechanism-Design Approach 国际金融援助:一种贷款机制设计方法
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2009-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00339.x
Alex Mourmouras, W. Mayer
{"title":"International Financial Assistance: A Loan Mechanism-Design Approach","authors":"Alex Mourmouras, W. Mayer","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00339.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00339.x","url":null,"abstract":"International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives in the form of rewards and punishments to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123613722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Instability and the Incentives for Corruption 不稳定与腐败诱因
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2007-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00335.x
Filipe R. Campante, D. Chor, Quoc-Anh Do
{"title":"Instability and the Incentives for Corruption","authors":"Filipe R. Campante, D. Chor, Quoc-Anh Do","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00335.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00335.x","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two effects generate a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. On the empirical side, we find a robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures of incumbent stability, including historically observed average tenures of chief executives and governing parties: regimes that are very stable or very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared with those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that minimizing corruption may require an electoral system that features some re-election incentives, but with an eventual term limit.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132912309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 118
Should You Arm Your Future Victims? 你应该武装你未来的受害者吗?
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2006-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00172.x
J. Azam
{"title":"Should You Arm Your Future Victims?","authors":"J. Azam","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00172.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00172.x","url":null,"abstract":"A model is presented where the ruler may arm the producers, in order to convince them that he will not expropriate them ex post. This sets an upper limit on the tax rate, not higher than their probability of losing their income, should a war occur. The relevance of this analysis is illustrated by discussing various case studies, involving post-conflict situations. Some variants of the model are presented for highlighting some implementation problems, related to asymmetric information or to positive initial endowments of weapons or non-produced wealth, which may lead to war in equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115654748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Stop Us Before We Spend Again: Institutional Constraints on Government Spending 在我们再次花钱之前阻止我们:政府开支的制度限制
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2006-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x
D. Primo
{"title":"Stop Us Before We Spend Again: Institutional Constraints on Government Spending","authors":"D. Primo","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x","url":null,"abstract":"A distributive politics model establishes that the presence of exogenously enforceable spending limits reduces spending and that the effect of executive veto authority is contingent on whether spending is capped and whether the chief executive is a liberal or conservative. Surprisingly, when spending limits are in place, governments with conservative executives spend more than those with more liberal chief executives. Limits are welfare improving, as is the executive veto when it leads to the building of override coalitions. Using 32 years of US state budget data, this paper also establishes empirically that strict balanced budget rules constrain spending and also lead to less pronounced short-term responses to fluctuations in a state's economy. Party variables like divided government and party control of state legislatures tend to have little or no direct effect, with political institutions and economic indicators explaining much of the variation in state spending.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115941236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 92
Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals 基于内生政策建议的游说竞赛
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2005-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00175.x
J. Münster
{"title":"Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals","authors":"J. Münster","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00175.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00175.x","url":null,"abstract":"Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129134097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 31
Protection Versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation 保护与晋升:一项实证调查
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2004-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00135.X
Devashish Mitra, M. Ulubaşoğlu, Thomakos D. Dimitrios
{"title":"Protection Versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Devashish Mitra, M. Ulubaşoğlu, Thomakos D. Dimitrios","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00135.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00135.X","url":null,"abstract":"Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130479502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Adjustments in Different Government Systems 不同政府体制的调整
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2004-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00134.X
Enrico Spolaore
{"title":"Adjustments in Different Government Systems","authors":"Enrico Spolaore","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00134.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0343.2004.00134.X","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a model in which agents have a conflict of interest over what instrument to use for policy adjustment in response to shocks. Three different government systems are analyzed: cabinet systems, in which one decision-maker has full control over adjustment policies; consensus systems, in which adjustment policies must be agreed upon by all agents; and checks-and-balances systems, in which one agent decides what instrument should be used for adjustment, but the remaining agents may veto its use. All three systems may lead to inefficient policies. The cabinet system adjusts too often. The other systems may fail to adjust when adjustment is optimal. The relative performance of the three systems depends on the degree of political fragmentation and the size distribution of shocks.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124682694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 75
The Economics of Trade Disputes, the Gatt's Article Xxiii, and the Wto's Dispute Settlement Understanding 贸易争端经济学、关贸总协定第23条和Wto的争端解决理解
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2002-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00109
C. Bown
{"title":"The Economics of Trade Disputes, the Gatt's Article Xxiii, and the Wto's Dispute Settlement Understanding","authors":"C. Bown","doi":"10.1111/1468-0343.00109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00109","url":null,"abstract":"Economic theory has yet to provide a convincing argument that can explain why the threat of retaliation under the GATTsWTO dispute settlement procedures is not sufficient to prevent countries from violating the agreement. We consider the question of why countries violate the agreed-upon rules in the face of explicit provisions which allow them to legally adjust their trade policy. Using the GATTsWTO institutional structure and the guiding principle of reciprocity, we provide a theory suggesting when countries will choose to implement protection in violation of GATTsWTO rules, as opposed to under the relevant safeguards provisions, when trade policy adjustments are necessary between \"negotiating rounds.\" Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"97 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113983599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 98
Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance 民主与经济表现的可变性
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2002-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.303285
Heitor Almeida, Daniel Ferreira
{"title":"Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance","authors":"Heitor Almeida, Daniel Ferreira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.303285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303285","url":null,"abstract":"Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile economic performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross-country and within-country variability in growth rates. It is also true for some measures of policies. Finally, we show that both the best and worst performers in terms of growth rates are more likely to be autocracies. We argue that the evidence in the paper is consistent with the theoretical implications in Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and Rodrik (1999a). Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124618983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 126
Harmonizing External Quotas in an FTA: A Step Backward? 在自由贸易协定中协调外部配额:倒退?
Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics Pub Date : 1998-10-01 DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00108
O. Cadot, Jaime de Melo, M. Olarreaga
{"title":"Harmonizing External Quotas in an FTA: A Step Backward?","authors":"O. Cadot, Jaime de Melo, M. Olarreaga","doi":"10.1111/1468-0343.00108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00108","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores how political-economy forces shape quantitative barriers against the rest of the world in a FTA. We show that whereas the dilution of lobbying power in a FTA typically leads to a relaxation of external quotas, this result is likely to be overturned as integration deepens. In particular, we show that cooperation among member countries on the level of their external quotas, cross-border lobbying by import-competing interests in the free-trade area and the consolidation of national external quotas into a single one, all lead to stiffer restrictions against imports from the rest of the world. We also show that unlike tariffs, endogenous quotas are not crucially affected by the presence of rules of origin.","PeriodicalId":210641,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economics & Politics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134364595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
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