{"title":"Unbundling Banking, Money, and Payments","authors":"Dan Awrey","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3776739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3776739","url":null,"abstract":"For centuries, our systems of banking, money, and payments have been legally and institutionally intertwined. The fact that these three—theoretically distinct—systems have been bundled together so tightly and for so long reflects a combination of historical accident, powerful economic and political forces, path dependence, and technological capacity. Importantly, it also reflects the unique and often under-appreciated privileges and protections that the law bestows on conventional deposit-taking banks. These privileges and protections have served to entrench banks as the dominant suppliers of both money and payments: erecting significant barriers to entry, undermining financial innovation and inclusion, spurring destabilizing regulatory arbitrage, and exacerbating the “too-big-to-fail” problem. Against this backdrop, the recent emergence of a variety of new financial technologies, platforms, and policy tools hold out the tantalizing prospect of breaking this centuries-old stranglehold over our basic financial infrastructure. The essential policy problem, at least as conventionally understood, is that creating a level legal playing field would pose a serious threat to both monetary and financial stability. This Article demonstrates that this need not be the case and advances a blueprint for how we can safely unbundle banking, money, and payments, thereby enhancing competition, promoting greater financial innovation and inclusion, and ameliorating the too-big-to-fail problem.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83999655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State Aid and Competition in the European Banking Markets","authors":"Falk Hendrik Laser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3776254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776254","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate whether bank bailouts since the outbreak of the financial crisis affected competition in the European banking markets. Using a unique dataset on large bank rescues I compare the development of market power of rescued and non-rescued banks between 2000 and 2018. I find that bank bailout coincides with a substantial drop of six percentage points in the Lerner index. Effects are heterogeneous and driven by bank rescues directly after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and not by bank rescues triggered during the European sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010. My findings cast positive light on European competition policy as banks do not appear to have capitalized on rescue money in terms of market power. Protecting competition in European banking markets remains a topical policy issue in light of rising levels of market power and potential public interventions in the course of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76084046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Open Banking and Open Data in Australia: Global Context, Innovation and Consumer Protection","authors":"B. Zeller, A. Dahdal","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3766076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3766076","url":null,"abstract":"‘Open Banking’ is a digital finance innovation built upon customer data sharing between incumbent financial institutions and third party financial service providers. Open Banking is reshaping the banking sector through extending the reach and convenience of traditional banking services by opening up and leveraging consumer data. This disruption is both challenging and changing the nature of established banks and banking. This article provides a brief global survey of Open Banking regulatory developments as context for Australia’s new Consumer Data Right (CDR) regime. Spearheaded by the Open Banking movement, the CDR is the first step Australian policymakers have taken towards realizing the potential of open data capitalism. Australia is a jurisdiction, like the EU, that is increasing taking data protection and control seriously. We argue that emerging Australian Open Banking arrangements are both a measured response to digital financial developments, and another front in Australia’s ongoing commitment to uphold online consumer protection and empowerment.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87215180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ekaterina E. Emm, Gerald D. Gay, Han-pao Ma, Honglin Ren
{"title":"The Rise and Breakup of the Commodity Exchange Membership: An Analysis of CBOT Seat Prices","authors":"Ekaterina E. Emm, Gerald D. Gay, Han-pao Ma, Honglin Ren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764229","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We conduct a clinical analysis of the CBOT full membership that provides holders with rights to trade any of the exchange’s contracts using a unique database of seat information from the period 1897–2020. We examine microstructure and asset pricing properties of seats including during periods before and following the CBOT’s transition from trading primarily agriculture futures to financial futures as well as periods before and following its demutualization at which time members experienced a separation in their ownership and trading rights. Our analysis adds an interesting dimension to the risk management literature and provides added insight into the market for exchange seats including their returns, turnover, and sensitivities to asset factor premia and to exchange volume.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89700262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ikhlaas Gurrib, Qian Long Kweh, Davide Contu, Firuz Kamalov
{"title":"COVID-19, Short-selling Ban and Energy Stock Prices","authors":"Ikhlaas Gurrib, Qian Long Kweh, Davide Contu, Firuz Kamalov","doi":"10.46557/001C.18562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46557/001C.18562","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the short-selling ban imposed by the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange of Italy, the authority that regulates the Italian securities market, on three Italian energy stocks. We find that the effect of the short-selling ban was temporary.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"11 6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78339705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Free Banking and Competition in Antebellum America","authors":"Bryan P. Cutsinger, L. Rouanet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3934059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3934059","url":null,"abstract":"Economic historians remain divided over America’s experiment with free banking during the antebellum era. Some argue that the reforms, which liberalized the bank-chartering process, simply exchanged one set of entry barriers for another, while others hold that free banking improved competition in the banking systems of those states that adopted it. One challenge that has plagued efforts to provide a clear assessment of free-banking’s effectiveness is a lack of reliable data. In this paper, we use Warren Weber’s near-comprehensive database of antebellum bank balance to assess whether the banking system responded in a manner consistent with the removal of entry barriers. We find that the passage of a free banking law increased bank assets, deposits, and banknotes substantially, and that this effect was long lasting. Specifically, we find that two years after the adoption of free banking, bank loans and discounts increased by 72%, and by 61% six years after the reform. Taken together, our results indicate that free banking had a substantial and long-lasting effect on the competitiveness of the banking systems in which it was tried.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86989123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Large Banks and Systemic Spillovers","authors":"C. Lundblad, Jitao Ou, Zhongyan Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3782771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3782771","url":null,"abstract":"What are the spillover effects when central financial institutions with dominant market shares simultaneously halt their liquidity creation and risk transformation roles? To shed light on this question, we build a novel, comprehensive dataset. Firms without a history of debt financing exhibit limited exposure to a systemic event. For firms that rely on external debt financing, their exposures are mainly driven by pre-existing connections to these central financial institutions. Further, having multiple bank connections or access to public debt issuance does not mitigate systemic exposures. The often-hypothesized diversification channels appear to be limited when central institutions are collectively constrained.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"12 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78344424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lender of Last Resort, Buyer of Last Resort, and a Fear of Fire Sales in the Sovereign Bond Market","authors":"V. Acharya, Diane Pierret, Sascha Steffen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2762265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2762265","url":null,"abstract":"We document the mechanism through which the risk of fire sales in the sovereign bond market contributed to the effectiveness of two major central bank interventions designed to restore financial stability during the European sovereign debt crisis. As a lender of last resort via the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), the European Central Bank (ECB) improved the collateral value of sovereign bonds of peripheral countries. This resulted in an elevated concentration of these bonds in the portfolios of domestic banks, increasing fire-sale risk and making both banks and sovereign bonds riskier. In contrast, the ECB’s announcement of being a potential buyer of last resort via the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program attracted new investors and reduced fire-sale risk in the sovereign bond market.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83471475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frequent Batch Auctions Under Liquidity Constraints","authors":"Zeyu Zhang, Gbenga Ibikunle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3752032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752032","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit European regulatory interventions to investigate the effects of sub-second periodic auctions on market quality under dark trading restrictions. The restrictions are linked to an observable increase in periodic auctions and an economically meaningful loss of liquidity. While periodic auctions ameliorate illiquidity, their effects are significantly less than those of the restrictions; therefore, the combined effects of periodic auctions’ increases and the restrictions are general declines in liquidity and informational efficiency. However, consistent with theory, periodic auctions are linked to reductions in adverse selection costs, thereby underscoring their potential to address latency arbitrage and the technological arms race.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83820529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockchain and the Law – Legality, Law-like Characteristics, and Legal Applications","authors":"E. Alston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3641997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3641997","url":null,"abstract":"The transformative potential of blockchain means the technology has expanded beyond its initial uses in supporting cryptocurrencies. Because of the range of potential applications of blockchain, the technology has a complex relationship with the law. When the terms blockchain and the law are used, this can typically mean one of three things. First, when describing the most salient application of the technology - to develop and secure cryptocurrency networks - the question tends to deal with the legal status of a given cryptocurrency. Second, blockchains themselves have important law-like characteristics in terms of their effects in constraining and incentivizing network participants to act in the interest of network users. Third, blockchains have several potentially transformative legal applications in terms of facilitating smart contracts and more complex associational forms. In this chapter I detail each of these distinct relationships between blockchain and the law in order to clarify the legal space for blockchain scholars and protocol designers.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88904296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}