Studia graeco-arabica最新文献_第6页

Editare l’epitome dei primi due libri dell’Antologia di Giovanni Stobeo 出版约翰·斯托贝选集前两本书的缩略图

Studia graeco-arabica Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.12871/97888333961494

T. Dorandi

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Intentional Objects in Conscious Activity and Other Contexts: An Inter-cultural History 有意识活动和其他语境中的意向对象:跨文化历史

Studia graeco-arabica Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.12871/97888333961499

R. Sorabji

{"title":"Intentional Objects in Conscious Activity and Other Contexts: An Inter-cultural History","authors":"R. Sorabji","doi":"10.12871/97888333961499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12871/97888333961499","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of intentional objects of consciousness, which Brentano made the mark of the mental, goes back to the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle of 200 - 600 CE, especially Philoponus, who in turn influenced Islamic Philosophy, which in its turn influenced Philosophy in medieval Latin. I am going to talk about Representation and Reality by looking at the history of the idea of intentional objects, not the conceptual objects of the intellect, but rather the intentional objects of the senses, memory, imagination and various kinds of thought. This will include an extensive update of a paper I wrote in 1991, 1 in the light of further thinking and reading and of new findings by others, including important contributions by Tim Crane, Victor Caston and Rotraud Hansberger. The argument for such intentional objects that is most popular today turns in various ways on the point that in many cases there is no external object of our attention. If I hope for a fortune, or believe I have acquired one, the fortune does not have to exist in order to be the object of my hope or belief. But my hope or belief does require such an object, where this is understood as one that may or may not correspond to an actually existent , or actually present object. This can be called an intentional object . In my 1991 paper I ascribed the kind of argument most popular in modern times to the 19 th century German philosopher Franz Brentano. 2 I now want to retract this, and ascribe it to Brentano’s pupil, Anton Marty.","PeriodicalId":208121,"journal":{"name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131172944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Where is Maimonides’ Logic? 迈蒙尼德的逻辑在哪里?

Studia graeco-arabica Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.12871/978883339614915

J. Stern

{"title":"Where is Maimonides’ Logic?","authors":"J. Stern","doi":"10.12871/978883339614915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12871/978883339614915","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that scholars interested in Maimonides’ mastery and creative use of logic, and in his original contributions to the subject, should explore his Guide of the Perplexed (in Arabic, Dalālat al-Ḥa ʾ irīn and, in Hebrew, Moreh Nevukhim ) rather than, or in addition to, his Treatise on the Art of Logic (in Arabic, Maqāla fī ṣinaʿat al-manṭiq and, in Hebrew, Millot Ha-higgayon ) on which previous research has exclusively focused. I support this hypothesis through a close analysis of Maimonides’ account of (propositional) attribution (or what we would call ‘predication’) as part of his analysis of divine attributes, showing both Al-Fārābī’s Aristotelian influence and the ways in which Maimonides departs from his predecessor. In particular, I argue that Maimonides analyzes affirmative attributes in external speech as categorial negations of privations in inner speech which he takes to be better than the former but nonetheless false because of their composite logical syntax which misrepresents God’s unity. Second, he rejects indefinite nouns (which had been proposed by Al-F ā r ā b ī as a preferred way of describing the deity). Finally, I show how he distinguishes the one name of God, the Tetragrammaton , from descriptions of God (e.g., ‘The Just’) which are built up out of propositional components that suffer from the same composite syntactic representational structure as affirmative and negated attributive propositions. More generally, the paper highlights Maimonides’ al-Fārābīan conception of logic as a theory of form or syntax and his sensitivity to metaphysical presuppositions of logical analyses.","PeriodicalId":208121,"journal":{"name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115350912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Gersonides’ Modal Syllogistic as An Interpretation of Aristotle: A First Reading 格尔索尼德斯的模态三段论:对亚里士多德的一种解释

Studia graeco-arabica Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.12871/978883339614918

P. Thom

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引用次数: 0