Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018最新文献_第2页

Down the Black Hole: Dismantling Operational Practices of BGP Blackholing at IXPs 在黑洞下:拆除ixp中BGP黑洞的操作实践

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355593

Marcin Nawrocki, Jeremias Blendin, C. Dietzel, T. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch

{"title":"Down the Black Hole: Dismantling Operational Practices of BGP Blackholing at IXPs","authors":"Marcin Nawrocki, Jeremias Blendin, C. Dietzel, T. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355593","url":null,"abstract":"Large Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks pose a major threat not only to end systems but also to the Internet infrastructure as a whole. Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering (RTBH) has been established as a tool to mitigate inter-domain DDoS attacks by discarding unwanted traffic early in the network, e.g., at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs). As of today, little is known about the kind and effectiveness of its use, and about the need for more fine-grained filtering. In this paper, we present the first in-depth statistical analysis of all RTBH events at a large European IXP by correlating measurements of the data and the control plane for a period of 104 days. We identify a surprising practice that significantly deviates from the expected mitigation use patterns. First, we show that only one third of all 34k visible RTBH events correlate with indicators of DDoS attacks. Second, we witness over 2000 blackhole events announced for prefixes not of servers but of clients situated in DSL networks. Third, we find that blackholing on average causes dropping of only 50% of the unwanted traffic and is hence a much less reliable tool for mitigating DDoS attacks than expected. Our analysis gives also rise to first estimates of the collateral damage caused by RTBH-based DDoS mitigation.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86916868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

What You See is NOT What You Get: Discovering and Tracking Social Engineering Attack Campaigns 你所看到的不是你得到的:发现和跟踪社会工程攻击活动

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355600

Phani Vadrevu, R. Perdisci

{"title":"What You See is NOT What You Get: Discovering and Tracking Social Engineering Attack Campaigns","authors":"Phani Vadrevu, R. Perdisci","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355600","url":null,"abstract":"Malicious ads often use social engineering (SE) tactics to coax users into downloading unwanted software, purchasing fake products or services, or giving up valuable personal information. These ads are often served by low-tier ad networks that may not have the technical means (or simply the will) to patrol the ad content they serve to curtail abuse. In this paper, we propose a system for large-scale automatic discovery and tracking of SE Attack Campaigns delivered via Malicious Advertisements (SEACMA). Our system aims to be generic, allowing us to study the SEACMA ad distribution problem without being biased towards specific categories of ad-publishing websites or SE attacks. Starting with a seed of low-tier ad networks, we measure which of these networks are the most likely to distribute malicious ads and propose a mechanism to discover new ad networks that are also leveraged to support the distribution of SEACMA campaigns. The results of our study aim to be useful in a number of ways. For instance, we show that SEACMA ads use a number of tactics to successfully evade URL blacklists and ad blockers. By tracking SEACMA campaigns, our system provides a mechanism to more proactively detect and block such evasive ads. Therefore, our results provide valuable information that could be used to improve defense systems against social engineering attacks and malicious ads in general.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87723891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

How Cloud Traffic Goes Hiding: A Study of Amazon's Peering Fabric 云流量是如何隐藏起来的:对亚马逊对等网络的研究

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355602

B. Yeganeh, Ramakrishnan Durairajan, R. Rejaie, W. Willinger

{"title":"How Cloud Traffic Goes Hiding: A Study of Amazon's Peering Fabric","authors":"B. Yeganeh, Ramakrishnan Durairajan, R. Rejaie, W. Willinger","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355602","url":null,"abstract":"The growing demand for an ever-increasing number of cloud services is profoundly transforming the Internet's interconnection or peering ecosystem, and one example is the emergence of \"virtual private interconnections (VPIs)\". However, due to the underlying technologies, these VPIs are not publicly visible and traffic traversing them remains largely hidden as it bypasses the public Internet. In particular, existing techniques for inferring Internet interconnections are unable to detect these VPIs and are also incapable of mapping them to the physical facility or geographic region where they are established. In this paper, we present a third-party measurement study aimed at revealing all the peerings between Amazon and the rest of the Internet. We describe our technique for inferring these peering links and pay special attention to inferring the VPIs associated with this largest cloud provider. We also present and evaluate a new method for pinning (i.e., geo-locating) each end of the inferred interconnections or peering links. Our study provides a first look at Amazon's peering fabric. In particular, by grouping Amazon's peerings based on their key features, we illustrate the specific role that each group plays in how Amazon peers with other networks.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75712969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers: Capturing Persistent Misbehavior in the Global Routing Table 分析BGP串行劫机者:捕获全局路由表中的持久错误行为

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355581

Cecilia Testart, P. Richter, Alistair King, A. Dainotti, D. Clark

{"title":"Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers: Capturing Persistent Misbehavior in the Global Routing Table","authors":"Cecilia Testart, P. Richter, Alistair King, A. Dainotti, D. Clark","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355581","url":null,"abstract":"BGP hijacks remain an acute problem in today's Internet, with widespread consequences. While hijack detection systems are readily available, they typically rely on a priori prefix-ownership information and are reactive in nature. In this work, we take on a new perspective on BGP hijacking activity: we introduce and track the long-term routing behavior of serial hijackers, networks that repeatedly hijack address blocks for malicious purposes, often over the course of many months or even years. Based on a ground truth dataset that we construct by extracting information from network operator mailing lists, we illuminate the dominant routing characteristics of serial hijackers, and how they differ from legitimate networks. We then distill features that can capture these behavioral differences and train a machine learning model to automatically identify Autonomous Systems (ASes) that exhibit characteristics similar to serial hijackers. Our classifier identifies ≈ 900 ASes with similar behavior in the global IPv4 routing table. We analyze and categorize these networks, finding a wide range of indicators of malicious activity, misconfiguration, as well as benign hijacking activity. Our work presents a solid first step towards identifying and understanding this important category of networks, which can aid network operators in taking proactive measures to defend themselves against prefix hijacking and serve as input for current and future detection systems.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78845610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 42

Tales from the Porn: A Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of the Web Porn Ecosystem 色情故事:网络色情生态系统的全面隐私分析

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355583

Pelayo Vallina, Álvaro Feal, Julien Gamba, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, A. Fernández

{"title":"Tales from the Porn: A Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of the Web Porn Ecosystem","authors":"Pelayo Vallina, Álvaro Feal, Julien Gamba, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, A. Fernández","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355583","url":null,"abstract":"Modern privacy regulations, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, aim to control user tracking activities in websites and mobile applications. These privacy rules typically contain specific provisions and strict requirements for websites that provide sensitive material to end users such as sexual, religious, and health services. However, little is known about the privacy risks that users face when visiting such websites, and about their regulatory compliance. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive and large-scale analysis of 6,843 pornographic websites. We provide an exhaustive behavioral analysis of the use of tracking methods by these websites, and their lack of regulatory compliance, including the absence of age-verification mechanisms and methods to obtain informed user consent. The results indicate that, as in the regular web, tracking is prevalent across pornographic sites: 72% of the websites use third-party cookies and 5% leverage advanced user fingerprinting technologies. Yet, our analysis reveals a third-party tracking ecosystem semi-decoupled from the regular web in which various analytics and advertising services track users across, and outside, pornographic websites. We complete the paper with a regulatory compliance analysis in the context of the EU GDPR, and newer legal requirements to implement verifiable access control mechanisms (e.g., UK's Digital Economy Act). We find that only 16% of the analyzed websites have an accessible privacy policy and only 4% provide a cookie consent banner. The use of verifiable access control mechanisms is limited to prominent pornographic websites.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90365866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices: A Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach 来自消费者物联网设备的信息暴露:一种多维的、网络知情的测量方法

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355577

Jingjing Ren, Daniel J. Dubois, D. Choffnes, A. Mandalari, Roman Kolcun, H. Haddadi

{"title":"Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices: A Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach","authors":"Jingjing Ren, Daniel J. Dubois, D. Choffnes, A. Mandalari, Roman Kolcun, H. Haddadi","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355577","url":null,"abstract":"Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly found in everyday homes, providing useful functionality for devices such as TVs, smart speakers, and video doorbells. Along with their benefits come potential privacy risks, since these devices can communicate information about their users to other parties over the Internet. However, understanding these risks in depth and at scale is difficult due to heterogeneity in devices' user interfaces, protocols, and functionality. In this work, we conduct a multidimensional analysis of information exposure from 81 devices located in labs in the US and UK. Through a total of 34,586 rigorous automated and manual controlled experiments, we characterize information exposure in terms of destinations of Internet traffic, whether the contents of communication are protected by encryption, what are the IoT-device interactions that can be inferred from such content, and whether there are unexpected exposures of private and/or sensitive information (e.g., video surreptitiously transmitted by a recording device). We highlight regional differences between these results, potentially due to different privacy regulations in the US and UK. Last, we compare our controlled experiments with data gathered from an in situ user study comprising 36 participants.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88496143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 192

DNS Observatory: The Big Picture of the DNS DNS观测站:DNS的大图

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355566

Pawel Foremski, Oliver Gasser, G. Moura

{"title":"DNS Observatory: The Big Picture of the DNS","authors":"Pawel Foremski, Oliver Gasser, G. Moura","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355566","url":null,"abstract":"The Domain Name System (DNS) is thought of as having the simple-sounding task of resolving domains into IP addresses. With its stub resolvers, different layers of recursive resolvers, authoritative nameservers, a multitude of query types, and DNSSEC, the DNS ecosystem is actually quite complex. In this paper, we introduce DNS Observatory: a new stream analytics platform that provides a bird's-eye view on the DNS. As the data source, we leverage a large stream of passive DNS observations produced by hundreds of globally distributed probes, acquiring a peak of 200 k DNS queries per second between recursive resolvers and authoritative nameservers. For each observed DNS transaction, we extract traffic features, aggregate them, and track the top-k DNS objects, e.g., the top authoritative nameserver IP addresses or the top domains. We analyze 1.6 trillion DNS transactions over a four month period. This allows us to characterize DNS deployments and traffic patterns, evaluate its associated infrastructure and performance, as well as gain insight into the modern additions to the DNS and related Internet protocols. We find an alarming concentration of DNS traffic: roughly half of the observed traffic is handled by only 1 k authoritative nameservers and by 10 AS operators. By evaluating the median delay of DNS queries, we find that the top 10 k nameservers have indeed a shorter response time than less popular nameservers, which is correlated with less router hops. We also study how DNS TTL adjustments can impact query volumes, anticipate upcoming changes to DNS infrastructure, and how negative caching TTLs affect the Happy Eyeballs algorithm. We find some popular domains with a a share of up to 90 % of empty DNS responses due to short negative caching TTLs. We propose actionable measures to improve uncovered DNS shortcomings.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87829936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 25

Booting the Booters: Evaluating the Effects of Police Interventions in the Market for Denial-of-Service Attacks 引导引导者:评估警察干预市场对拒绝服务攻击的影响

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355592

Ben Collier, Daniel R. Thomas, R. Clayton, Alice Hutchings

{"title":"Booting the Booters: Evaluating the Effects of Police Interventions in the Market for Denial-of-Service Attacks","authors":"Ben Collier, Daniel R. Thomas, R. Clayton, Alice Hutchings","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355592","url":null,"abstract":"Illegal booter services offer denial of service (DoS) attacks for a fee of a few tens of dollars a month. Internationally, police have implemented a range of different types of intervention aimed at those using and offering booter services, including arrests and website takedown. In order to measure the impact of these interventions we look at the usage reports that booters themselves provide and at measurements of reflected UDP DoS attacks, leveraging a five year measurement dataset that has been statistically demonstrated to have very high coverage. We analysed time series data (using a negative binomial regression model) to show that several interventions have had a statistically significant impact on the number of attacks. We show that, while there is no consistent effect of highly-publicised court cases, takedowns of individual booters precede significant, but short-lived, reductions in recorded attack numbers. However, more wide-ranging disruptions have much longer effects. The closure of HackForums' booter market reduced attacks for 13 weeks globally (and for longer in particular countries) and the FBI's coordinated operation in December 2018, which involved both takedowns and arrests, reduced attacks by a third for at least 10 weeks and resulted in lasting change to the structure of the booter market.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79305321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 36

Errors, Misunderstandings, and Attacks: Analyzing the Crowdsourcing Process of Ad-blocking Systems 错误、误解和攻击:分析广告拦截系统的众包过程

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355588

Mshabab Alrizah, Sencun Zhu, Xinyu Xing, Gang Wang

{"title":"Errors, Misunderstandings, and Attacks: Analyzing the Crowdsourcing Process of Ad-blocking Systems","authors":"Mshabab Alrizah, Sencun Zhu, Xinyu Xing, Gang Wang","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355588","url":null,"abstract":"Ad-blocking systems such as Adblock Plus rely on crowdsourcing to build and maintain filter lists, which are the basis for determining which ads to block on web pages. In this work, we seek to advance our understanding of the ad-blocking community as well as the errors and pitfalls of the crowdsourcing process. To do so, we collected and analyzed a longitudinal dataset that covered the dynamic changes of popular filter-list EasyList for nine years and the error reports submitted by the crowd in the same period. Our study yielded a number of significant findings regarding the characteristics of FP and FN errors and their causes. For instances, we found that false positive errors (i.e., incorrectly blocking legitimate content) still took a long time before they could be discovered (50% of them took more than a month) despite the community effort. Both EasyList editors and website owners were to blame for the false positives. In addition, we found that a great number of false negative errors (i.e., failing to block real advertisements) were either incorrectly reported or simply ignored by the editors. Furthermore, we analyzed evasion attacks from ad publishers against ad-blockers. In total, our analysis covers 15 types of attack methods including 8 methods that have not been studied by the research community. We show how ad publishers have utilized them to circumvent ad-blockers and empirically measure the reactions of ad blockers. Through in-depth analysis, our findings are expected to help shed light on any future work to evolve ad blocking and optimize crowdsourcing mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"87 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91515229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

Modeling BBR's Interactions with Loss-Based Congestion Control 基于损失的拥塞控制的BBR交互建模

Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355604

Ranysha Ware, Matthew K. Mukerjee, S. Seshan, Justine Sherry

{"title":"Modeling BBR's Interactions with Loss-Based Congestion Control","authors":"Ranysha Ware, Matthew K. Mukerjee, S. Seshan, Justine Sherry","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355604","url":null,"abstract":"BBR is a new congestion control algorithm (CCA) deployed for Chromium QUIC and the Linux kernel. As the default CCA for YouTube (which commands 11+% of Internet traffic), BBR has rapidly become a major player in Internet congestion control. BBR's fairness or friendliness to other connections has recently come under scrutiny as measurements from multiple research groups have shown undesirable outcomes when BBR competes with traditional CCAs. One such outcome is a fixed, 40% proportion of link capacity consumed by a single BBR flow when competing with as many as 16 loss-based algorithms like Cubic or Reno. In this short paper, we provide the first model capturing BBR's behavior in competition with loss-based CCAs. Our model is coupled with practical experiments to validate its implications. The key lesson is this: under competition, BBR becomes window-limited by its 'in-flight cap' which then determines BBR's bandwidth consumption. By modeling the value of BBR's in-flight cap under varying network conditions, we can predict BBR's throughput when competing against Cubic flows with a median error of 5%, and against Reno with a median of 8%.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84512810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 52