Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium最新文献_第7页

Cracking the Wall of Confinement: Understanding and Analyzing Malicious Domain Take-downs 打破限制之墙:理解和分析恶意域名删除

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23243

Eihal Alowaisheq, Peng Wang, Sumayah A. Alrwais, Xiaojing Liao, Xiaofeng Wang, Tasneem Alowaisheq, Xianghang Mi, Siyuan Tang, Baojun Liu

{"title":"Cracking the Wall of Confinement: Understanding and Analyzing Malicious Domain Take-downs","authors":"Eihal Alowaisheq, Peng Wang, Sumayah A. Alrwais, Xiaojing Liao, Xiaofeng Wang, Tasneem Alowaisheq, Xianghang Mi, Siyuan Tang, Baojun Liu","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23243","url":null,"abstract":"Take-down operations aim to disrupt cybercrime involving malicious domains. In the past decade, many successful take-down operations have been reported, including those against the Conficker worm, and most recently, against VPNFilter. Although it plays an important role in fighting cybercrime, the domain take-down procedure is still surprisingly opaque. There seems to be no in-depth understanding about how the take-down operation works and whether there is due diligence to ensure its security and reliability. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on domain takedown. Our study was made possible via a large collection of data, including various sinkhole feeds and blacklists, passive DNS data spanning six years, and historical WHOIS information. Over these datasets, we built a unique methodology that extensively used various reverse lookups and other data analysis techniques to address the challenges in identifying taken-down domains, sinkhole operators, and take-down durations. Applying the methodology on the data, we discovered over 620K takendown domains and conducted a longitudinal analysis on the take-down process, thus facilitating a better understanding of the operation and its weaknesses. We found that more than 14% of domains taken-down over the past ten months have been released back to the domain market and that some of the released domains have been repurchased by the malicious actor again before being captured and seized, either by the same or different sinkholes. In addition, we showed that the misconfiguration of DNS records corresponding to the sinkholed domains allowed us to hijack a domain that was seized by the FBI. Further, we found that expired sinkholes have caused the transfer of around 30K takendown domains whose traffic is now under the control of new owners.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74196534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Analyzing Semantic Correctness with Symbolic Execution: A Case Study on PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification 用符号执行分析语义正确性:以pkcs# 1 v1.5签名验证为例

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23430

Sze Yiu Chau, Moosa Yahyazadeh, Omar Chowdhury, Aniket Kate, Ninghui Li

{"title":"Analyzing Semantic Correctness with Symbolic Execution: A Case Study on PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification","authors":"Sze Yiu Chau, Moosa Yahyazadeh, Omar Chowdhury, Aniket Kate, Ninghui Li","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23430","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss how symbolic execution can be used to not only find low-level errors but also analyze the semantic correctness of protocol implementations. To avoid manually crafting test cases, we propose a strategy of meta-level search, which leverages constraints stemmed from the input formats to automatically generate concolic test cases. Additionally, to aid root-cause analysis, we develop constraint provenance tracking (CPT), a mechanism that associates atomic sub-formulas of path constraints with their corresponding source level origins. We demonstrate the power of symbolic analysis with a case study on PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Leveraging meta-level search and CPT, we analyzed 15 recent open-source implementations using symbolic execution and found semantic flaws in 6 of them. Further analysis of these flaws showed that 4 implementations are susceptible to new variants of the Bleichenbacher lowexponent RSA signature forgery. One implementation suffers from potential denial of service attacks with purposefully crafted signatures. All our findings have been responsibly shared with the affected vendors. Among the flaws discovered, 6 new CVEs have been assigned to the immediately exploitable ones.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80031996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Constructing an Adversary Solver for Equihash 构造Equihash的对手求解器

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23337

X. Bai, Jian Gao, Chenglong Hu, L. Zhang

{"title":"Constructing an Adversary Solver for Equihash","authors":"X. Bai, Jian Gao, Chenglong Hu, L. Zhang","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23337","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain networks, especially cryptocurrencies, rely heavily on proof-of-work (PoW) systems, often as a basis to distribute rewards. These systems require solving specific puzzles, where Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) can be designed for performance or efficiency. Either way, ASICs surpass CPUs and GPUs by orders of magnitude, and may harm blockchain networks. Recently, Equihash is developed to resist ASIC solving with heavy memory usage. Although commercial ASIC solvers exist for its most popular parameter set, such solvers do not work under better ones, and are considered impossible under optimal parameters. In this paper, we inspect the ASIC resistance of Equihash by constructing a parameterindependent adversary solver design. We evaluate the product, and project at least 10x efficiency advantage for resourceful adversaries. We contribute to the security community in two ways: (1) by revealing the limitation of Equihash and raising awareness about its algorithmic factors, and (2) by demonstrating that security inspection is practical and useful on PoW systems, serving as a start point for future research and development.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89303374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

CodeAlchemist: Semantics-Aware Code Generation to Find Vulnerabilities in JavaScript Engines CodeAlchemist:语义感知代码生成以查找JavaScript引擎中的漏洞

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23263

HyungSeok Han, DongHyeon Oh, S. Cha

{"title":"CodeAlchemist: Semantics-Aware Code Generation to Find Vulnerabilities in JavaScript Engines","authors":"HyungSeok Han, DongHyeon Oh, S. Cha","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23263","url":null,"abstract":"JavaScript engines are an attractive target for attackers due to their popularity and flexibility in building exploits. Current state-of-the-art fuzzers for finding JavaScript engine vulnerabilities focus mainly on generating syntactically correct test cases based on either a predefined context-free grammar or a trained probabilistic language model. Unfortunately, syntactically correct JavaScript sentences are often semantically invalid at runtime. Furthermore, statically analyzing the semantics of JavaScript code is challenging due to its dynamic nature: JavaScript code is generated at runtime, and JavaScript expressions are dynamically-typed. To address this challenge, we propose a novel test case generation algorithm that we call semantics-aware assembly, and implement it in a fuzz testing tool termed CodeAlchemist. Our tool can generate arbitrary JavaScript code snippets that are both semantically and syntactically correct, and it effectively yields test cases that can crash JavaScript engines. We found numerous vulnerabilities of the latest JavaScript engines with CodeAlchemist and reported them to the vendors.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86511589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 96

Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability 区块链可扩展性和互操作性的匿名多跳锁

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23330

Giulio Malavolta, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, Clara Schneidewind, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei

{"title":"Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability","authors":"Giulio Malavolta, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, Clara Schneidewind, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23330","url":null,"abstract":"—Tremendous growth in cryptocurrency usage is exposing the inherent scalability issues with permissionless blockchain technology. Payment-channel networks (PCNs) have emerged as the most widely deployed solution to mitigate the scalability issues, allowing the bulk of payments between two users to be carried out off-chain. Unfortunately, as reported in the literature and further demonstrated in this paper, current PCNs do not provide meaningful security and privacy guarantees [30], [40]. In this work, we study and design secure and privacy- preserving PCNs. We start with a security analysis of existing PCNs, reporting a new attack that applies to all major PCNs, including the Lightning Network, and allows an attacker to steal the fees from honest intermediaries in the same payment path. We then formally deﬁne anonymous multi-hop locks (AMHLs), a novel cryptographic primitive that serves as a cornerstone for the design of secure and privacy-preserving PCNs. We present several provably secure cryptographic instantiations that make AMHLs compatible with the vast majority of cryptocurrencies. In particular, we show that (linear) homomorphic one-way functions sufﬁce to construct AMHLs for PCNs supporting a script language (e.g., Ethereum). We also propose a construction based on ECDSA signatures that does not require scripts , thus solving a prominent open problem in the ﬁeld.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74951053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 201

Unveiling your keystrokes: A Cache-based Side-channel Attack on Graphics Libraries 揭示你的击键:对图形库的基于缓存的侧通道攻击

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23221

Daimeng Wang, Ajaya Neupane, Zhiyun Qian, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, S. Krishnamurthy, E. Colbert, Paul L. Yu

{"title":"Unveiling your keystrokes: A Cache-based Side-channel Attack on Graphics Libraries","authors":"Daimeng Wang, Ajaya Neupane, Zhiyun Qian, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, S. Krishnamurthy, E. Colbert, Paul L. Yu","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23221","url":null,"abstract":"Operating systems use shared memory to improve performance. However, as shown in recent studies, attackers can exploit CPU cache side-channels associated with shared memory to extract sensitive information. The attacks that were previously attempted typically only detect the presence of a certain operation and require significant manual analysis to identify and evaluate their effectiveness. Moreover, very few of them target graphics libraries which are commonly used, but difficult to attack. In this paper, we consider the execution time of shared libraries as the side-channel, and showcase a completely automated technique to discover and select exploitable side-channels on shared graphics libraries. In essence, we first collect the cache lines accessed by a victim process during different key presses offline, and then use machine learning to infer the best cache lines (e.g., easily measurable, robust to noise, high information leakage) for a flush and reload attack. We are able to discover effective strategies to classify what keys have been pressed. Using this approach, we not only preclude the need for manual analyses of code and traces — the automated system discovered many previously unknown sidechannels of the type we are interested in, but also achieve high precision in terms of inferring the sensitive information entered on desktop and Android platforms. We show that our approach infers the passwords with lowercase letters and numbers 10,000 1,000,000 times faster than random guessing. For a large fraction of PINs consisting of 4 to 6 digits, we are able to infer them within 20 and 80 guesses respectively. Finally, we suggest ways to mitigate these attacks.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73386286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 33

Life after Speech Recognition: Fuzzing Semantic Misinterpretation for Voice Assistant Applications 语音识别后的生活:语音助理应用的模糊语义误解

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23525

Yangyong Zhang, Lei Xu, Abner Mendoza, Guangliang Yang, Phakpoom Chinprutthiwong, G. Gu

{"title":"Life after Speech Recognition: Fuzzing Semantic Misinterpretation for Voice Assistant Applications","authors":"Yangyong Zhang, Lei Xu, Abner Mendoza, Guangliang Yang, Phakpoom Chinprutthiwong, G. Gu","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23525","url":null,"abstract":"—Popular Voice Assistant (VA) services such as Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant are now rapidly appifying their platforms to allow more ﬂexible and diverse voice-controlled service experience. However, the ubiquitous deployment of VA devices and the increasing number of third-party applications have raised security and privacy concerns. While previous works such as hidden voice attacks mostly examine the problems of VA services’ default Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) component, our work analyzes and evaluates the security of the succeeding component after ASR, i.e., Natural Language Understanding (NLU), which performs semantic interpretation (i.e., text-to-intent) after ASR’s acoustic-to-text processing. In particular, we focus on NLU’s Intent Classiﬁer which is used in customizing machine understanding for third-party VA Applications (or vApps). We ﬁnd that the semantic inconsistency caused by the improper semantic interpretation of an Intent Classiﬁer can create the opportunity of breaching the integrity of vApp processing when attackers delicately leverage some common spoken errors. In this paper, we design the ﬁrst linguistic-model-guided fuzzing tool, named LipFuzzer, to assess the security of Intent Classiﬁer and systematically discover potential misinterpretation-prone spoken errors based on vApps’ voice command templates. To guide the fuzzing, we construct adversarial linguistic models with the help of Statistical Relational Learning (SRL) and emerging Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques. In evaluation, we have successfully veriﬁed the effectiveness and accuracy of LipFuzzer. We also use LipFuzzer to evaluate both Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant vApp platforms. We have identiﬁed that a large portion of real-world","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82255023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 44

Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation Tranco:一个以研究为导向的顶级网站排名，加强了对操纵的防范

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2018-06-04 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2019.23386

V. Pochat, Tom van Goethem, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Maciej Korczyński, W. Joosen

{"title":"Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation","authors":"V. Pochat, Tom van Goethem, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Maciej Korczyński, W. Joosen","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2019.23386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23386","url":null,"abstract":"In order to evaluate the prevalence of security and privacy practices on a representative sample of the Web, researchers rely on website popularity rankings such as the Alexa list. While the validity and representativeness of these rankings are rarely questioned, our findings show the contrary: we show for four main rankings how their inherent properties (similarity, stability, representativeness, responsiveness and benignness) affect their composition and therefore potentially skew the conclusions made in studies. Moreover, we find that it is trivial for an adversary to manipulate the composition of these lists. We are the first to empirically validate that the ranks of domains in each of the lists are easily altered, in the case of Alexa through as little as a single HTTP request. This allows adversaries to manipulate rankings on a large scale and insert malicious domains into whitelists or bend the outcome of research studies to their will. To overcome the limitations of such rankings, we propose improvements to reduce the fluctuations in list composition and guarantee better defenses against manipulation. To allow the research community to work with reliable and reproducible rankings, we provide Tranco, an improved ranking that we offer through an online service available at this https URL.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79875633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 423

Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View Switching 通过自定义内存视图切换保护实时微控制器系统

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/NDSS.2018.23107

C. Kim, Taegyu Kim, Hongjun Choi, Zhongshu Gu, Byoungyoung Lee, X. Zhang, Dongyan Xu

{"title":"Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View Switching","authors":"C. Kim, Taegyu Kim, Hongjun Choi, Zhongshu Gu, Byoungyoung Lee, X. Zhang, Dongyan Xu","doi":"10.14722/NDSS.2018.23107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/NDSS.2018.23107","url":null,"abstract":"Real-time microcontrollers have been widely adopted in cyber-physical systems that require both real-time and security guarantees. Unfortunately, security is sometimes traded for real-time performance in such systems. Notably, memory isolation, which is one of the most established security features in modern computer systems, is typically not available in many real-time microcontroller systems due to its negative impacts on performance and violation of real-time constraints. As such, the memory space of these systems has created an open, monolithic attack surface that attackers can target to subvert the entire systems. In this paper, we present MINION, a security architecture that intends to virtually partition the memory space and enforce memory access control of a real-time microcontroller. MINION can automatically identify the reachable memory regions of realtime processes through off-line static analysis on the system’s firmware and conduct run-time memory access control through hardware-based enforcement. Our evaluation results demonstrate that, by significantly reducing the memory space that each process can access, MINION can effectively protect a microcontroller from various attacks that were previously viable. In addition, unlike conventional memory isolation mechanisms that might incur substantial performance overhead, the lightweight design of MINION is able to maintain the real-time properties of the microcontroller.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91396925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 90

Finding Clues for Your Secrets: Semantics-Driven, Learning-Based Privacy Discovery in Mobile Apps 为你的秘密寻找线索:移动应用中语义驱动、基于学习的隐私发现

Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2018.23099

Yuhong Nan, Zhemin Yang, Xiaofeng Wang, Yuan Zhang, Donglai Zhu, Min Yang

{"title":"Finding Clues for Your Secrets: Semantics-Driven, Learning-Based Privacy Discovery in Mobile Apps","authors":"Yuhong Nan, Zhemin Yang, Xiaofeng Wang, Yuan Zhang, Donglai Zhu, Min Yang","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2018.23099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2018.23099","url":null,"abstract":"A long-standing challenge in analyzing information leaks within mobile apps is to automatically identify the code operating on sensitive data. With all existing solutions relying on System APIs (e.g., IMEI, GPS location) or features of user interfaces (UI), the content from app servers, like user’s Facebook profile, payment history, fall through the crack. Finding such content is important given the fact that most apps today are web applications, whose critical data are often on the server side. In the meantime, operations on the data within mobile apps are often hard to capture, since all server-side information is delivered to the app in the same way, sensitive or not. A unique observation of our research is that in modern apps, a program is essentially a semantics-rich documentation carrying meaningful program elements such as method names, variables and constants that reveal the sensitive data involved, even when the program is under moderate obfuscation. Leveraging this observation, we develop a novel semantics-driven solution for automatic discovery of sensitive user data, including those from the server side. Our approach utilizes natural language processing (NLP) to automatically locate the program elements (variables, methods, etc.) of interest, and then performs a learning-based program structure analysis to accurately identify those indeed carrying sensitive content. Using this new technique, we analyzed 445,668 popular apps, an unprecedented scale for this type of research. Our work brings to light the pervasiveness of information leaks, and the channels through which the leaks happen, including unintentional over-sharing across libraries and aggressive data acquisition behaviors. Further we found that many high-profile apps and libraries are involved in such leaks. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the privacy risk in mobile apps and also highlight the importance of data protection in today’s software composition.","PeriodicalId":20444,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91395982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 54