Organizations & Markets eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Typecasting and Legitimation: A Formal Theory","authors":"M. Hannan, Greta Hsu, L. Pólos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1331663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331663","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a unifying framework to integrate two of organizational sociology’s theory fragments on categorization: typecasting and form emergence. Typecasting is a producer-level theory that considers the consequences producers face for specializing versus spanning across category boundaries. Form emergence considers the evolution of categories and how the attributes of producers entering a category shapes its likelihood of gaining legitimacy among relevant audiences. Both theory fragments emerge from the processes audiences use to assign category memberships to producers. In this paper, we develop this common foundation and clearly outline the arguments that lead to central implications of each theory. We formalize these arguments using modal expressions to represent key categorization processes and the theory-building framework developed by Hannan, Polos, and Carroll (2007). Categorization in market contexts has attracted considerable interest in recent years, spurred in large part by Zuckerman’s (1999) seminal work in capital markets. Empirical work on this subject covers a range of topics, including category emergence, proliferation, and erosion (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Ruef 2000; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005; Bogaert, Boone, and Carroll 2006; Pontikes 2008), the consequences of different categorical positions and category structures for individual producers (Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Hsu, 2006; Negro, Hannan, and Rao 2008; Hsu, Hannan, and Kocak 2008), and the role of audience members in structuring understanding of categories (Boone, Declerck, Rao, and Van Den Buys 2008; Kocak 2008; Kocak, Hannan, and Hsu 2008). This paper focuses on two theory fragments, typecasting and form emergence, which exemplify the different emphases in research approaches. Typecasting theory focuses on well-established categories and considers the implications for individual producers of specializing in versus generalizing across categorical boundaries (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von Rittman 2003). Research suggests that audiences have an easier time making sense of specialists but that a clear association with a single category restricts the range of future opportunities. Form-emergence theory considers how the attributes of producers associatedwith an emerging category shapes its likelihood of gaining legitimacy among relevant audiences (McKendrick and Carroll 2001; McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, and Khessina 2003). Work in this area finds that a category is more likely to become a well-established form when new entrants have focused identities (as in the case of de-novo entrants, the producers who begin as members of the category). These theory fragments have progressed largely independently of one another. This is not surprising given differences in levels of analysis and key outcomes. Yet, they are clearly conceptually connected. Both theory fragments address the positioning of producers in a space of categories and the effect of such positions on an audienc","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132038064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Dynamic View on the Financing of Extreme Growth Companies","authors":"T. Vanacker, S. Manigart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1331051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331051","url":null,"abstract":"This paper researches the determinants of financing decisions of extreme growth companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal dataset, free of survivorship bias, covering the financing events of extreme growth companies for up to eight years. Results are generally consistent with the extended pecking order theory. Profitable companies are more likely to use internal finance, while they have unused debt capacity, which is contrary to the predictions of the static trade-off theory. External equity is used as a last resort. Nearly 20% of the firms issuing external equity have a negative shareholders' equity in the previous year. Finally, consistent with the static trade-off theory, companies with a higher probability and costs of financial distress and higher agency costs are more likely to issue external equity financing.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128116296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms","authors":"D. Bergemann, S. Morris","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00553.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00553.X","url":null,"abstract":"A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent-value environment with single-crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism, including indirect ones. The contraction property requires that the interdependence is not too high. In a linear signal model, the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having all eigenvalues smaller than one. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130550078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mothers' Quest for Job Protection: Building the Nest or Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Evidence Using Spanish Longitudinal Data","authors":"Daniel Fernandez-Kranz, Aitor Lacuesta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1330386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1330386","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has found that temporary contracts delay marriage and fertility in Spain. Using newly released administrative data we study the motivations behind the fertility delay that is associated with job protection. We find that during the five years after the birth of the first child mothers in protected jobs promote less and their wages grow less (16 per cent) compared to mothers that had a fixed-term contract at the time of childbirth. The poor after-birth outcomes of mothers in protected jobs contrasts with their better performance before birth, with wages growing more rapidly than those of other women and other mothers. We provide evidence that a permanent contract acts as insurance against the negative wage effects of motherhood, but at the price of less wage growth. We also find that mothers that had a permanent contract at childbirth reduce their working time more, forgo opportunities of promotion outside the firm and have a lower return to each additional year of experience compared to mothers with a temporary contract. Our interpretation of these results is that job protection helps mothers conciliate work and family responsibilities rather than to achieve professional success.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116543950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Growth to Value: Option Exercise and the Cross-Section of Equity Returns","authors":"Hengjie Ai, Dana Kiku","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1342884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1342884","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a general equilibrium model to study the link between the cross section of expected returns and book-to-market characteristics. We model two primitive assets: value assets and growth assets that are options on assets in place. The cost of option exercise, which is endogenously determined in equilibrium, is highly procyclical and acts as a hedge against risks in assets in place. Consequently, growth options are less risky than value assets, and the model features a value premium. Our model incorporates long-run risks in aggregate consumption and replicates the empirical failure of the conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) prediction. The model also quantitatively accounts for the pattern in mean returns on book-to-market sorted portfolios, the magnitude of the CAPM-alphas, and other stylized features of the cross-sectional data.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133572017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Leverage as a Measure of Risk","authors":"Daniel Chertok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1330431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1330431","url":null,"abstract":"Leverage is treated as a measure of risk factor sensitivity. It can be computed using the \"equivalent security'' approach to determine \"bucketized risk''.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"339 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123342742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"For a Few Dollars More: the Perplexing Problem of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers","authors":"D. Richmond","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1328097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328097","url":null,"abstract":"The once forbidden subject of unethical billing practices by lawyers is now openly discussed. Reported cases in which lawyers are professionally disciplined or criminally prosecuted for billing abuses are disturbingly routine and press accounts of lawyers' alleged billing and expense fraud are similarly common. These cases have a disproportionately negative effect on the legal profession and are personally ruinous for the lawyers involved. Despite the obvious negative consequences, however, unethical billing practices persist. This article examines this phenomenon. In doing so, it analyzes the reasons for lawyers' misconduct from a practical perspective. These reasons include lawyers' ignorance of, or insensitivity to, applicable standards of conduct; the absence of stable professional bonds; lawyers' competitiveness; law firm compensations systems that directly reward lawyers' productivity based on billable hours; lawyers' perceptions of clients as adversaries; greed and envy; and mental illness, personality disorders, and substance abuse. In discussing fraudulent billing, the article further draws on the psychology and sociology of white collar crime, which is plainly appropriate because billing and expense fraud by lawyers fits neatly within the definition of white collar crime in all respects. Having analyzed the reasons for lawyers' unethical billing practices, the article discusses strategies that law firms may employ to address the problem. The article concludes with a discussion of lawyers' duty to report colleagues who engage in billing and expense fraud to professional authorities under Model Rule of Professional Conduct.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114778568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Abnormal Initial Public Offering (IPO) Price Performance and the Lockup Expiration: Parametric and Nonparametric Tests of Abnormal Performance Occurring at the Expiration of the Lockup Period from 1985 to 2002","authors":"Z. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1327901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1327901","url":null,"abstract":"This project's goal was to evaluate whether abnormally negative performance occurred in the 5-day period surrounding the expiration in the lockup period. This research project used a sample of 5,559 IPOs that went public from 1985 to 2002 to determine the extent of abnormal performance occurring during the expiration of the lockup period. Using (a) standard t tests and (b) nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of abnormal performance, this analysis provides evidence that IPOs do experience a significantly negative performance event during the expiration of their lockup period.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127394420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections","authors":"Lee Harris","doi":"10.7916/CBLR.V2010I1.2918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CBLR.V2010I1.2918","url":null,"abstract":"Shareholder-led campaigns to install new leadership at U.S. firms — so-called proxy contests — occur too rarely and, when they do occur, are led by the same, boring cast of characters too often. This Article presents empirical evidence from a hand-collected database of public filings of proxy statements from 2006, 2007, and 2008, the years public filings are available from the SEC electronic filing system. In short, the data suggest that the system of contested corporate elections is broken and, from there, the Article points the way toward legal reform. When it comes to the interests of retail investors — i.e., individuals with small stakes in a particular firm — the evidence suggests that contested corporate elections are virtually off-limits as conduit for activism. Retail investors almost never launch a campaign and their interests are not represented well by those who do.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129316316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Income and Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash","authors":"Chen Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1325894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1325894","url":null,"abstract":"The classical partial equilibrium inventory approach developed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) predicts the interest and income elasticity are both equal to a constant of 0.5. This paper shows that in a general equilibrium inventory theoretic framework, first, the income elasticity of money is one, rather than 0.5. This is due to incorporation of the value of the time into the model. Second, the interest elasticity has two values depending on a threshold interest rate. When interest rates are below this threshold, the model is the Cash-In-Advance model with a constant income velocity of money and zero interest elasticity; otherwise the interest elasticity is close to 0.5 and the velocity fluctuates in response to variations in interest rates. Finally, the general equilibrium elasticity results are robust across alternative specifications of the agent's utility.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123139228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}