{"title":"Entry Deterrence and Experimentation under Demand Uncertainty","authors":"Neelam Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1151837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1151837","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example, and show that cost of entry and experimentation do not have a monotonic relationship.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132163246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hidden Action Principal-Agent Problems with Endogenous Signal Precision","authors":"Priyodorshi Banerjee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1273456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1273456","url":null,"abstract":"We study costly augmentation of signal accuracy by the principal in a binary model, with two-dimensional signal quality. Irrespective of cost, the outcomes when the principal can pre-commit to precision levels differ significantly from those when she cannot.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127346799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Laying Off Credit Risk: Loan Sales versus Credit Default Swaps","authors":"Christine A. Parlour, Andrew Winton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1262885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1262885","url":null,"abstract":"How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134555394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Piracy or Promotion? The Impact of Broadband Internet Penetration on Dvd Sales","authors":"Michael D. Smith, Rahul Telang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.918240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.918240","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet provides copyright holders with new sales and promotional channels for their content, while also providing consumers with new opportunities to illegally obtain free copies of this content. Unfortunately, disentangling these two effects is extremely difficult. In this paper we attempt to disentangle these two effects by applying fixed effects and first difference models to a new dataset quantifying changes in broadband Internet penetration and DVD sales at a local level from 2000 to 2003. We then compare our results to those reported in Liebowitz (2008), who uses similar models in a similar time period on a similar product category: music CDs. Unlike Liebowitz, who finds a strong negative impact of broadband penetration on music sales, our results show that increased broadband penetration leads to a significant increase in DVD sales. Using the most conservative results, 9.3% of the $14.1 billion increase in DVD sales during our study period can be attributed to increased broadband penetration. One interpretation of these results is that the difference arises from differences in the ability to pirate these two types of content: while Internet music piracy was easy and rampant from 2000 to 2003, Internet movie piracy was difficult and of generally low quality in this time period. If this interpretation is true it would suggest that, in the absence of piracy, the Internet has an overall strong positive impact on media sales.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117193560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physical Modeling of Economic Systems: Classical and Quantum Economies","authors":"A. Kondratenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1304630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1304630","url":null,"abstract":"Methods of theoretical physics, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are used to develop classical and quantum models of economies and to derive their equations of motion that describe economy evolution in time, namely, Lagrange and Schrodinger equations correspondingly. The book is intended to economists and physicists interested in formal economics background.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128633140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Executive Perquisites: Evidence from the New SEC Disclosure Rules","authors":"Angela Andrews, S. Linn, Han Yi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1268087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1268087","url":null,"abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended its rules on executive compensation disclosure in 2006 to provide more transparent disclosures to investors regarding stealth compensation items (e.g., executive perks and pensions). In order to shed additional light on the mixed results from prior research, we re-examine 608 S&P 1500 firms' 2007 proxy statements to determine if executive perquisites reflect agency problems (Yermack 2006) or whether they serve a legitimate purpose (Rajan and Wulf 2006). Consistent with the agency cost argument, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. In additional tests, we document that weakly governed firms that hid large amounts of CEO perquisites prior to the new rules experienced a negative market reaction after their proxy statements were released, and that a small number of firms with abnormally high CEO compensation prior to the new rules reduced or eliminated perquisite programs following the new rules. These results suggest that the SEC's expanded disclosure requirements are informative and useful to capital market investors in their attempts to detect the misappropriation of firm resources by weakly governed firms, but that the expanded SEC requirements have been politically costly for some firms.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123845451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accounting in Networks: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective","authors":"S. Anderson, H. Dekker","doi":"10.4324/9780203854310-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203854310-20","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we review the use of TCE in the study of interfirm relationships. An extensive literature in economics and business strategy delves into interfirm governance choices. In our review, we focus on accounting and non-accounting studies to assess how TCE has contributed and can further contribute to the understanding of accounting and control in interfirm settings. We structure this discussion according to the different stages of interfirm relationships and highlight, for each stage, the importance of accounting and management control.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125412193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trust Me, it is High Trust: A Note on Trust Measurement","authors":"Christian Lukas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1113044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1113044","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores whether an exchange featuring (almost) equal expected gains and expected losses for a trusting individual is evidence for high trust or low trust; I argue that such an exchange shows low trust. A simple trust measure is suggested which could be applied both in experimental and analytical research.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132760771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Returns Post Catastrophe Induced Seasoned Equity Offerings of Property and Casualty Insurance Companies","authors":"Qingyi (Freda) Song Drechsler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1138026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1138026","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines returns post seasoned equity offerings (SEO) of property and casualty (PC) insurance companies traded in U.S. between 1981 and 2006. In addition to the return analysis post regular SEO, the unique feature of catastrophe-induced SEO are studied in detail. Modified event study approach is applied to examine the short term return performance, while matching-firm (or industry index) methodology is used to study the long term performance. We do not observe significant long term underperformance compared to the matching firms benchmarks, as is recorded in the finance literature studying SEO across industries. Probit analysis reveals that PC insurers who choose to conduct SEO post major catastrophes display different characteristics than the firms who choose not to. Insurers with CAT induced SEO tend to display either higher leverage level or higher profitability, as the capital raised through SEO is used either to restore capital to survive the financial distress, or on the other end of the spectrum, to expand market share in the profitable hard market following catastrophes. Investors are found to be capable of distinguishing the motivations behind the decision of catastrophe induced SEO, by analyzing firm characteristics as well as stock return performances between the hit of catastrophe events and the SEO date, and use it to assess the value of stocks post SEO accordingly.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116502501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Systemic Risk and Liquidity in Payment Systems","authors":"Gara M. Afonso, H. Shin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1297363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1297363","url":null,"abstract":"We study liquidity and systemic risk in high-value payment systems. Flows in high-value systems are characterized by high velocity, meaning that the total amount paid and received is high relative to the stock of reserves. In such systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to finance outgoing payments, necessitating a high degree of coordination and synchronization. We use lattice-theoretic methods to solve for the unique fixed point of an equilibrium mapping and conduct comparative statics analyses on changes to the environment. We find that banks attempting to conserve liquidity cause an increase in the demand for intraday credit and, ultimately, a disruption of payments. Additionally, we find that when a bank is identified as vulnerable to failure and other banks choose to cancel payments to that bank, there are systemic repercussions for the whole financial system.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131370266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}