{"title":"Historical perspectives on the ethics of consent","authors":"Daniel Lee","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115108754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral obligations and consent","authors":"A. Müller","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-12","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, I examine the effects consent has on our moral obligations. In particular, I address three questions: (1) Whose obligations are affected by a person’s consent? It is uncontroversial that consent changes the normative situation of the agent to whom it is given. But can it also create a new obligation for the person giving it? (2) Which obligations are affected by consent? Consent makes a difference to whether or not an action constitutes a breach for some moral obligations but not for others. Here, I survey the moral obligations that are most often thought to be consent-sensitive in this sense. (3) Why does a person’s consent sometimes ensure that an action no longer breaches an obligation? I distinguish three answers to this question and discuss their implications for determining the scope of our ability to consent.","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123419796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative consent and authority 1","authors":"David M. Estlund","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-32","url":null,"abstract":"Among our moral requirements, there might be requirements to consent to authority in certain cases. In those cases, what happens if we don’t consent? Can we escape the authority in that way, by abusing our power to refuse consent? Why not say, instead, that, just as consent is sometimes null if it fails to meet certain standards, likewise, non-consent can be defective too and null as a result? The nullity of non-consent means, roughly, that the authority situation is as it would have been if the non-consent had not occurred—that is, just as if consent had occurred. The view that authority could be grounded in what would have been a requirement to consent could be formulated as a novel form of a hypothetical consent theory of authority, based on what I have called “normative consent”. 2 If this view can be sustained, authority can simply befall us, whether we have consented to it or not, though the conditions under which this occurs are a separate question. In this short piece, I do not attempt to explain or defend the normative consent approach in a general way. But after a brief sketch of the approach, I go more deeply than before into the questions I refer to as “bypass objections” (which are aimed at all hypothetical consent theories) and the question of what I shall call quasi-voluntarism . My main thesis is that, while normative consent theory, in certain versions, might indeed be quasi-voluntarist, even if it were not it would yet have moral force on other, utterly non-voluntarist grounds. A warning: in that part of the argument we will have occasion to distinguish voluntarism, quasi-voluntarism, proto-voluntarism, pseudo-voluntarism, and anti-voluntarism. I will explain each as it arises.","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130353568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consent and Autonomy","authors":"Tom Walker","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131754222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consent to pain","authors":"V. Bergelson","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132208901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Historical perspectives in medical ethics","authors":"Tom O’Shea","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114473254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exploitation and consent","authors":"Matt Zwolinski","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-15","url":null,"abstract":"To exploit someone is to take unfair advantage of their vulnerability or weakness. But are exploitative interactions necessarily non-consensual? This essay explores the relationship between exploitation and consent, and argues that exploitative exchanges need not involve any defect in consent. Nor do defects in consent such as coercion or ignorance necessarily render an interaction wrongfully exploitative. Defects in consent are thus neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation, though they may be relevant in determining its moral weight and moral force.","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"17 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126096068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Custers, F. Dechesne, W. Pieters, B. Schermer, Simone van der Hof
{"title":"Consent and privacy","authors":"B. Custers, F. Dechesne, W. Pieters, B. Schermer, Simone van der Hof","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-23","url":null,"abstract":"Consent to personal data-processing practices has become quite a mundane activity in the digital world. When downloading apps to our smartphones, we – almost automatically – consent to the privacy policies associated with the particular services they provide. Also, when subscribing to social networking services, consenting to their privacy policies is inescapable. Another particularly visible practice is to ask internet users to accept cookies (i.e., small pieces of data stored on people’s computers to “remember” their actions and preferences). The (consent to) disclosure of personal data and the subsequent use of such data is the domain of privacy and data protection. This chapter explores the discussion on the role of consent in privacy and personal data protection. It is shown how legal, ethical, economic and technological studies point to similar core issues related to the limitations of communication and decision making, inhibiting the effectiveness of consent for privacy protection. In section 22.2 the relation between privacy and consent is examined. In section 22.3 ethical and legal requirements for (informed) consent in relation to privacy and personal data protection are discussed. Special attention is given to the issues concerning children’s consent. Next, the limits of consent in privacy and personal data protection are discussed from a technological perspective (section 22.4) and from the perspectives of legal, social and (behavioral) economics (section 22.5). In section 22.6 potential solutions to the issues regarding privacy and consent are offered and analyzed. In section 22.7 conclusions are provided.","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116982404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consent and contracts 1","authors":"B. Bix","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-21","url":null,"abstract":"Consent – in one form or another – is at the core of the modern understanding of contract law. This Chapter shows how the nature of consent involved in contractual transactions is distinctively different from the consent involved in other sorts of events and transactions. The text also focuses issues of consent are in tension with another important aspect of contracts and contracting: that contracts – and their predictable enforceability – are central to modern commercial life. \u0000The Chapter begins by offering some general reflections on the nature of consent. It then considers the connection between consent and various doctrinal defenses to the enforcement of contracts. A subsequent section describes the way in which modern contracting practice generally falls far short of consent in its fullest sense. Finally, the text reflects on the practical effects “defective” consent may have for the enforcement of agreements, as well as the moral implications of defective consent for individuals’ obligations to keep contracts.","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127527002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral education and the ethics of consent","authors":"W. Edmundson","doi":"10.4324/9781351028264-33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351028264-33","url":null,"abstract":"Expressions of consent are valid only if freely given. Consent coerced at gunpoint is normally not binding, and subtler forms of influence also vitiate consent: hypnosis and brainwashing, for example. This leads to a difficulty for liberal theories of political obligation. How can a citizen, who has been raised from birth to believe she is morally bound to the state, validly consent to its demands? John Rawls and Bernard Williams each addressed the problem, and each proposed a similar solution: modes of moral and civic education do not preclude valid consent if the citizen would freely consent to have been educated in those ways. The argument of this chapter is that this solution leads to a dilemma: either the familiar practices of early education must be radically and pervasively reformed, or political philosophers must concede that state authority cannot be consensual “all the way down.”","PeriodicalId":198418,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128614298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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