{"title":"General Introduction","authors":"Michael Butter, Peter O. Knight","doi":"10.4324/9780429452734-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":197943,"journal":{"name":"Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128129465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequences of Conspiracy Theories","authors":"D. Jolley, S. Mari, Karen M. Douglas","doi":"10.4324/9780429452734-2_7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-2_7","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines what is known to date, and reviews the psychological research on the positive and negative consequences of conspiracy theories. It argues that future research efforts should attempt to address the negative psychological and behavioural consequences of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories at first glance appear to satisfy important psychological needs. For example, conspiracy theories may allow people to gain an accurate and consistent understanding of the world; for example, people who need concrete answers and those showing a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events are more likely to be drawn to conspiracy theories. Although there is little empirical evidence, some research suggests that there may be positive consequences of endorsing conspiracy theories. In a similar vein, conspiracy theories may in certain contexts inspire collective action and social change attempts, especially in reaction to threatening events. Potentially, therefore, they have the capacity to satisfy existential needs.","PeriodicalId":197943,"journal":{"name":"Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125006794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Semiotic Approaches to Conspiracy Theories1","authors":"M. Leone, Mari-Liis Madisson, A. Ventsel","doi":"10.4324/9780429452734-1_3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-1_3","url":null,"abstract":"deepens national spirit the white race can be presented as being under serious (Madisson, Ventsel 2016a, 2016b). The extreme- (auto) is an ongoing process of interpretation, the of the is pre-determined by a limited number of stereotypes and does allow exchange of new information.","PeriodicalId":197943,"journal":{"name":"Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115530525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories","authors":"J. Prooijen, O. Klein, J. Đorđević","doi":"10.4324/9780429452734-2_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-2_2","url":null,"abstract":"People have two integrative mental systems in place to process information about the world. One is fast and automatic, relying on emotions, intuitions, and heuristics (“System 1”); the other is slow, effortful, and deliberate, relying on conscious reflection and rational calculations (“System 2”). In the present chapter, we argue that both mental systems uniquely contribute to conspiracy beliefs. Evidence suggests that belief in conspiracy theories largely originates from System 1 processes, as underscored by research findings relating conspiracy beliefs to intuition, decreased analytic thinking, and anxious uncertainty. These insights do not preclude a role for System 2 processes in conspiracy theories, however. Inspired by social intuitionist models of morality, we suggest that once formed, people justify conspiracy theories through a deliberate process in which they selectively search for evidence to support their suspicions. We conclude that conspiracy theories originate through System 1 processes, but people justify and maintain them through System 2 processes that involve motivated reasoning.","PeriodicalId":197943,"journal":{"name":"Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131467757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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