Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories

J. Prooijen, O. Klein, J. Đorđević
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

People have two integrative mental systems in place to process information about the world. One is fast and automatic, relying on emotions, intuitions, and heuristics (“System 1”); the other is slow, effortful, and deliberate, relying on conscious reflection and rational calculations (“System 2”). In the present chapter, we argue that both mental systems uniquely contribute to conspiracy beliefs. Evidence suggests that belief in conspiracy theories largely originates from System 1 processes, as underscored by research findings relating conspiracy beliefs to intuition, decreased analytic thinking, and anxious uncertainty. These insights do not preclude a role for System 2 processes in conspiracy theories, however. Inspired by social intuitionist models of morality, we suggest that once formed, people justify conspiracy theories through a deliberate process in which they selectively search for evidence to support their suspicions. We conclude that conspiracy theories originate through System 1 processes, but people justify and maintain them through System 2 processes that involve motivated reasoning.
阴谋论背后的社会认知过程
人们有两个综合的心理系统来处理有关世界的信息。一个是快速和自动的,依赖于情感、直觉和启发式(“系统1”);另一种是缓慢的、费力的、深思熟虑的,依靠有意识的反思和理性的计算(“系统2”)。在本章中,我们认为这两种心理系统对阴谋信仰都有独特的贡献。证据表明,对阴谋论的信仰很大程度上源于系统1过程,正如研究结果所强调的那样,阴谋论信仰与直觉、分析思维能力下降和焦虑的不确定性有关。然而,这些见解并不排除系统2过程在阴谋论中的作用。受社会直觉主义道德模型的启发,我们认为,一旦形成,人们就会通过一个深思熟虑的过程来证明阴谋论是正确的,在这个过程中,他们会有选择地寻找证据来支持他们的怀疑。我们得出结论,阴谋论起源于系统1过程,但人们通过涉及动机推理的系统2过程来证明和维护它们。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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