{"title":"With a Little Help from My Friends. Political Competition with Interest Groups","authors":"P. Accardo, G. de Feo, Giacomo De Luca","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3836462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3836462","url":null,"abstract":"Higher electoral competition reinforces the position of special interest groups, which can endorse politicians in exchange for the support of specific policies. This paper formalizes this intuition and test it on Italian electoral data, using the 1991 electoral reform as an exogenous source of variation in electoral competition. Focusing on organized crime as a form of special interest group, our differences-in-differences estimates suggest that, after the reform, organized crime-prone areas reported higher vote shares awarded to the party traditionally supported by criminal organizations and a larger dispersion of votes across candidates of the same party.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126337119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government in Nigeria Can Achieve Good Governance Through Good Management","authors":"J. Ugoani","doi":"10.32861/bmer.69.115.126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32861/bmer.69.115.126","url":null,"abstract":"Poor public management defined by corruption and lack of prudence in public life continues to hold Nigeria hostage and makes good governance difficult. Since the 1980s government has been using many methods including the processes of privatization and commercialization as means of re-engineering the public sector for total quality management, and to increase the share of the public sector’s contribution to the gross domestic product. The experiment never achieved the desired level of success partly due to lack of political will on the part of government to wedge a total war against corruption, and also partly because the public sector is a large scale administration that has many entry and revolving doors which government finds difficult to close. These limitations provide the incentives for widespread public corruption that is recognized as one of the greatest challenges of government in carrying out its mandate. 110 respondents participated in this study conducted through the exploratory research design. The participants provided useful data that were triangulated with data from secondary sources for the purpose of the study. To achieve the objective of the investigation, data were analyzed through statistical techniques and the result showed significant positive correlation between good governance and good management. It was recommended that appointments in the public sector should feature a combination of people from private and public sectors of the economy to enhance competence with the aim of reducing public sector corruption. Further study should examine the reasons behind rising budget deficits as a way of reducing cost of governance in Nigeria.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133496431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Politics and the UK's Monetary Policy","authors":"Fang‐Shuo Chang, Shiu‐Sheng Chen, Po-Yuan Wang","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12256","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether politics causes regime shifts in deviations from the optimal monetary policy in the United Kingdom. After using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to construct the welfare‐maximizing policy rule and deviations from the optimal Taylor rule, we show that politics does indeed play an important role in explaining these deviations. In addition to politics, unemployment rates account for regime shifts in the Taylor rule deviations.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123968746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Courts as Monitoring Agents: The Case of China","authors":"Xiao-yuan. Dong, S. Voigt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3630237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630237","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that courts are not only a crucial part of the rule of law in the conventional sense but that they can also serve an important function in revealing information regarding the performance of lower level governments to the central government, and thereby improve their performance. After having developed a general argument in that vein, the recent reforms to the Chinese court system are partially interpreted as an attempt to make the courts monitoring agents of the central government. Based on primary data from more than 1,000 Chinese local courts, the argument is tested empirically and its hypotheses are largely confirmed.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123455997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charlie Rafkin, Advik Shreekumar, Pierre-Luc Vautrey
{"title":"Public Inference from Crisis Policy: Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Charlie Rafkin, Advik Shreekumar, Pierre-Luc Vautrey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613446","url":null,"abstract":"We study how people make inferences and change their behaviors in response to government information and actions using several online information experiments du","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121907136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Legacy of Representation in Medieval Europe for Incomes and Institutions Today","authors":"Jamie Bologna Pavlik, A. Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3032584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3032584","url":null,"abstract":"Why can some governments credibly commit to the rule of law and protection of property rights while others cannot? A potential answer involves deep historical traditions of institutions that constrain rulers. We explore whether experiences with representative assemblies in medieval/early modern Europe have left their mark on incomes and institutions today. We employ Stasavage’s (2010) data on representative assembly activity in 30 medieval/early modern European polities and the Putterman and Weil (2010) data on descendancy shares from circa 1500 populations to construct country-level measures of historical assembly experience. In a cross-country analysis, we find that assembly experience is positively and significantly correlated with current incomes, a measure of the rule of law and property rights, and the Polity IV index that emphasizes executive constraint. Once the latter two variables are controlled for, the estimated effect of assembly experience on current incomes is insignificant.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132116480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public-Private Partnership and the Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals: The Role of Subnational Governments","authors":"A. Arimoro, Abba Amsami Elgujja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3678670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678670","url":null,"abstract":"Governments around the world including developed and developing economies are grappling with the challenge of wide infrastructure deficits. The case of the African continent is even more critical. Considering also that the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals aim to “leave no one behind,” it becomes imperative to explore avenues to allow the private sector to finance and deliver infrastructure. Public-Private Partnership is now considered as one of the most successful global strategies to support the public sector in the provision of infrastructure. This paper examines the role of Public-Private Partnership in the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals vis-a-vis the role of sub-national governments in ensuring a viable framework for the successful arrangement and execution of Public-Private Partnership projects. The methodology adopted for the paper a doctrinal review of literature and case studies on the subject. The paper recommends the engagement of stakeholders and the strengthening of sub-national frameworks for sub-national Public-Private Partnership.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130366123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sabotage from Abroad? The Economic Impact of U.S. Interference in Chile 1970-73","authors":"E. Walther","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3852413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3852413","url":null,"abstract":"In 1973, Augusto Pinochet led a US-backed coup against Salvador Allende, Chile's democratically elected president. Pinochet's supporters argued that the coup was the only way to save the country amid statism and socioeconomic breakdown. But how much was Allende to blame for the crisis that precipitated his downfall? In this paper, I conclude that Allende's project of socialist transformation in hyper-polarized 1970s Chile was doomed regardless of external provocation. However, more research would be needed to fully measure the impact of US economic interference.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115947737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Buchanan and Bloomington","authors":"Emil Duhnea, Adam Martin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3326168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3326168","url":null,"abstract":"Elinor Ostrom (2011) describes the work of James Buchanan as “foundational” to the Bloomington approach to political economy. This chapter explores the relationship between Buchanan’s “Virginia School” approach to that of the Bloomington School. We examine the foundational role of the Calculus of Consent, both in inspiring Vincent Ostrom’s Political Theory of a Compound Republic and as a key component of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. We then outline other important connections and areas of overlap between the two schools of thought, such as self-governance and polycentricity.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126771536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Newspapers and Public Grants: A Matter of Quality","authors":"M. Battaggion, A. Vaglio","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12152","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper deals with the issue of newspaper subsidies in a framework of endogenous quality provision. We compare monopoly and duopoly cases in a vertically differentiated model. For monopolies we show that a per-copy subsidy reduces quality. Conversely, in duopolies in the vertically differentiated model, we show that a state subsidy might increase the quality of the low-quality newspaper and decrease the quality of the high-quality newspaper.","PeriodicalId":196887,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: Structure & Scope of Government (Topic)","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121601221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}