LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)最新文献_第2页

House Price Beliefs and Mortgage Leverage Choice 房价信念与抵押贷款杠杆选择

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3001866

Michael C. Bailey, E. Dávila, Theresa Kuchler, J. Stroebel

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引用次数: 144

No Shopping in the U.S. Mortgage Market: Direct and Strategic Effects of Providing Information 美国抵押贷款市场不购物:提供信息的直接和战略影响

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2948491

A. Alexandrov, Sergei Koulayev

{"title":"No Shopping in the U.S. Mortgage Market: Direct and Strategic Effects of Providing Information","authors":"A. Alexandrov, Sergei Koulayev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2948491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2948491","url":null,"abstract":"We document and analyze price dispersion in the U.S. mortgage market. We find significant price dispersion in posted prices in the retail channel: for example, a consumer with a prime credit score and with a 20% down payment for a conforming loan might see a spread in interest rates of 50 basis points, controlling for all relevant consumer/property characteristics, including discount points. This amounts to extra 342 dollars per year, for every 100,000 of the loan. We also show, from survey evidence, that close to half of consumers did not shop before taking out a mortgage, and that most consumers do not seem to realize that there is price dispersion. Using a proprietary dataset of lenders' ratesheets, we estimate an equilibrium model of costly search where majority of consumers hold incorrect beliefs regarding price dispersion. In addition to search costs, we show that non-price factors, such as consumer preference of one lender over another, also play an important role in preventing consumers from searching more. In one of our counterfactuals, we show that if 20% of consumers had obtained one extra quote, consumers would save $4 billion dollars a year, most coming from the indirect/equilibrium effect of firms lowering prices in response to more shopping. In another counterfactual, we show that if consumers were to focus on mortgage cost only, they would save about $9 billion dollars a year.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130523425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 48

Lending to Sensation-Seeking Households 贷款给寻求刺激的家庭

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2821378

Khrystyna Bochkay, Indraneel Chakraborty, Roman Chychyla, Alok Kumar

引用次数: 4

The Australian House Party Has Been Glorious - But the Hangover May Be Severe: Reforms to Mitigate Some of the Risks 澳大利亚众议院党一直很光荣——但宿醉可能很严重:改革以减轻一些风险

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-28 DOI: 10.22459/NDLA.09.2017.06

G. North

引用次数: 0

On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked 论社会信用与脱离网络的权利

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2728414

Nizan Geslevich Packin, Yafit Lev Aretz

{"title":"On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked","authors":"Nizan Geslevich Packin, Yafit Lev Aretz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2728414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2728414","url":null,"abstract":"Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are. This ancient social philosophy is at the heart of a new financial technology system – social credit. In recent years, loosely regulated marketplace lenders have increasingly developed methods to rank individuals, including some traditionally considered unscored or credit-less. Specifically, some lenders built their score-generating algorithms around behavioral data gleaned from social media and social networking information, including the quantity and quality of social media presence, the identity and features of the applicant’s contacts, the applicant’s online social ties and interactions, the applicant’s contacts’ financial standing, the applicant’s personality attributes as extracted from her online footprints, and more.This Article studies the potential consequences of social credit systems predicated on a simple transaction: authorized use of highly personal information in return for better interest rates. Following a detailed description of emerging social credit systems, the Article analyzes the inclination of rational and irrational customers to be socially active online and/or disclose all their online social-related information for financial ranking purposes. This examination includes, inter alia, consumers’ preferences as well as mistakes, gamesmanship, and consumers’ self-doxing or lack thereof. The Article then moves to discuss policy challenges triggered by social-based financial ranking that may become the new creditworthiness baseline criteria. It focuses on (i) direct privacy harms to loan seekers, and derivative privacy harm to loan seekers’ online contacts or followers, (ii) online social segregation potentially mirrored by offline social polarization, and (iii) due process violations derived from algorithmic decision-making and unsupervised machine learning. The Article concludes by making a significant normative contribution, introducing a limited “right to be un-networked,” to accommodate the welcomed aspects of social credit systems while mitigating many of their undesired consequences.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116919119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

The Law and Economics of Consumer Debt Collection and its Regulation 消费者债务催收的法律与经济学及其规制

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3191392

Todd J. Zywicki

引用次数: 8

Do Student Loan Borrowers Opportunistically Default? Evidence from Bankruptcy Reform 学生贷款借款人会投机违约吗?来自破产改革的证据

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2592600

R. Darolia, Dubravka Ritter

引用次数: 5

Payday Lenders, Vehicle Title Loans, and Small-Value Financing: The CFPB's Proposal to Regulate the Fringe Economy 发薪日贷款人，车辆所有权贷款和小额融资:CFPB监管边缘经济的建议

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-09 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2616357

Christopher K. Odinet

{"title":"Payday Lenders, Vehicle Title Loans, and Small-Value Financing: The CFPB's Proposal to Regulate the Fringe Economy","authors":"Christopher K. Odinet","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2616357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2616357","url":null,"abstract":"The market for payday lenders, businesses that provide vehicle title loans, and other small-value financing players is rife with controversy. Some see them as predatory lenders that weave a web of never-ending debt designed to capture the weakest and most economically vulnerable of society. However, advocates of these financial institutions argue that for many Americans who are otherwise shut out of the conventional lending market, these players provide the only viable source of credit in times of economic hardship. Whatever the view, these businesses, their borrowers, and the credit markets that they together comprise are often referred to in legal and economic research and literature as the \"fringe economy.\" And interestingly, aside from a patchwork of state law rules, this area of the financial services sector is fairly unregulated.However, on Thursday, March 26, 2015 the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a report outlining the agency’s long heralded plans to impose nation-wide regulations on the fringe economy. The first part of this article gives an overview of the fringe economy, the types of services and products it provides, and gives a snapshot of existing, state-based regulations. The second part goes into the nuts and bolts of the proposed rules.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114615279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Leverage, Default, and Mortality: Evidence from Cancer Diagnoses 杠杆、违约和死亡率:来自癌症诊断的证据

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2583975

Arpita Gupta, E. Morrison, C. Fedorenko, S. Ramsey

引用次数: 17

Failure to Refinance 再融资失败

LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2014-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2693301

Benjamin J. Keys, Devin G. Pope, Jaren C. Pope

引用次数: 212