The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism最新文献

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Global Legal Pluralism and Conflict of Laws 全球法律多元化与法律冲突

The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism Pub Date : 2020-09-10 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780197516744.013.39

R. Michaels

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引用次数: 4

Theorizing Justice under Conditions of Global Legal Pluralism 全球法律多元化条件下的正义理论化

The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism Pub Date : 2020-09-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197516744.013.25

Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli

引用次数: 1

Federalism as Legal Pluralism 作为法律多元主义的联邦制

The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism Pub Date : 2020-09-10 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780197516744.013.34

Erin Ryan

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引用次数: 0