Strategic Behavior and the Environment最新文献

The Implications of Learning on Bidding Behavior in a Repeated First Price Conservation Auction with Targeting 学习对有目标的重复首价保留拍卖竞价行为的影响

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2021-07-18 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000101

N. James, Liv Lundberg, E. Sills

引用次数: 1

Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment 公共池资源实验中的不平等与同伴惩罚

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2021-07-18 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000099

L. Geest, David C. Kingsley

引用次数: 2

The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis 东北大西洋鲭鱼危机

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2020-03-24 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000092

J. Hougaard, F. Jensen, Aleksandrs Smilgins

引用次数: 1

Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data 理性怀疑论者:论科学数据的战略传播

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2019-05-23 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000089

Youngseok Park

引用次数: 1

Mitigating Wildfire Risk on Private Property with Spatial Dependencies 利用空间依赖关系降低私有财产的野火风险

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2019-05-23 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000091

M. Taylor

引用次数: 4

On the Non-compliance of a Polluting Mine under an Emission Tax 论某污染矿山在征收排放税下的不合规行为

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2019-05-23 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000090

Pauli Lappi

{"title":"On the Non-compliance of a Polluting\u0000 Mine under an Emission Tax","authors":"Pauli Lappi","doi":"10.1561/102.00000090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000090","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement N ◦ 748066. Abstract The production of diﬀerent exhaustible resources, and mining in particular, are a source of stock pollutants and the growth of these stocks can be constrained by abatement and taxation. However, the ﬁrm may have incentives to non-comply with these regulations. This study analyzes the enforcement of an emission tax in a dynamic model, which includes stock externalities and abatement by the mining ﬁrm and by natural processes. The purpose of this investigation is two-fold. First, to study the consequences of a given enforcement scheme in a dynamic model and to generalize the results from previous static models. Second, to analyze the time paths of control variables and the violation level. It is argued that non-compliance in itself does not necessarily imply that net emissions from the mine are excessive compared to the full-compliance emission level. It is the possibility of a zero emission report that may cause the divergence from the socially optimal emission levels. The time path of violation and hence the path of unpaid taxes can have multiple shapes depending on the type of tax applied.","PeriodicalId":191688,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Behavior and the Environment","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134482194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Strategic Environmental Policy, International Trade and Self-enforcing Agreements: The Role of Consumers' Taste for Variety 战略环境政策、国际贸易和自我执行协议:消费者口味多样性的作用

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2018-02-12 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000086

Michael Finus, Alaa Al Khourdajie

引用次数: 6

Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 模拟渔业协议附带支付:西大西洋蓝鳍金枪鱼的案例

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2018-02-11 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000078

D. Reppas

{"title":"Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna","authors":"D. Reppas","doi":"10.1561/102.00000078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000078","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tries to fill a gap in the fisheries economics literature by proposing static and dynamic models with side payments in a stochastic and sequentially harvested fishery. The incentive problem considered in this paper arises between two central regulatory authorities who manage an internationally shared fishery, i.e., when the regulator of one fishing nation (Principal) provides monetary compensation to induce the regulator of another country (Agent) to restrict own fishing activities. Most of the previous analysis for international fishing agreements had either focused on cooperation without side payments (and particular in the context of common-pool resources), or had introduced payments under the implicit assumption that it is politically acceptable for a fishing nation to completely ``buy-out'' another. Compensation in this paper, instead, induces the Agent to harvest less extensively, keeping nonetheless the right to operate exclusively in her own area. The conditions characterizing the solution of the dynamic model in this paper are the analogue of the Martingale Property from the finance literature. The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna fishery serves as an example to illustrate the model with some plausible parameter values. The calibrated model predicts that side payments from Canada to the US could increase Canadian welfare by US$5–10 million, if predicted by the static model; and between US$9.7–16.3, if predicted by the two-period model. Overall, the theoretical development and empirical application of this paper illustrate how side payments can be a helpful additional instrument for designing international fishing agreements.","PeriodicalId":191688,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Behavior and the Environment","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121221103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Introduction to the Special Issue: International Environmental Agreements 特刊导言:国际环境协定

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2018-02-11 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000088

C. Mason

引用次数: 1

Stability of Global Climate Cooperation Under Uncertainty 不确定性下全球气候合作的稳定性

Strategic Behavior and the Environment Pub Date : 2018-02-11 DOI: 10.1561/102.00000081

J. Kersting

引用次数: 3