{"title":"The Impact of Financial Education of Executives on Financial Practices of Medium and Large Enterprises","authors":"Cláudia Custódio, Diogo Mendes, Daniel J. Metzger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3450851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450851","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of a course in finance for executives of medium and large enterprises through a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Mozambique. Survey data and accounting data provide consistent evidence that managers change firm financial policies in response to finance education. The largest treatment effect is on short-term financial policies related to working capital. Reductions in accounts receivable and inventories generate an increase in cash flows used to finance long-term investments. Those changes also improve the performance of the treated firms. Overall, our results suggest that relatively small and low-cost interventions, such as a standard executive education program in finance, can help firms to mitigate financial constraints and potentially affect economic development.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125093265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate Fears and the Demand for Green Investment","authors":"A. Anderson, D. Robinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3490730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490730","url":null,"abstract":"Linking a nationally representative survey to individual pension data, we show how environmental fears, manifesting in extreme beliefs about future climate calamities, are associated with individual portfolio rebalancing decisions. Extreme weather conditions in Sweden in 2014 stoked fears of future environmental calamities, especially in those living closer to the catastrophes. After this heat wave, but not before, investors who fear climate-related catastrophes rebalanced their retirement portfolios towards green investments. This aligns with other behaviors: they also report that they recycle more than their neighbors, think green investments outperform, and are willing to pay higher fees for green mutual funds.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134409736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crowdfunding as Gambling: Evidence from Repeated Natural Experiments","authors":"Tolga Demir, A. Mohammadi, Kourosh Shafi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3430744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430744","url":null,"abstract":"We explore whether sensation-seeking, a personality trait that involves risk-taking for novelty and thrill, is one of the underlying motivations for participating in peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding markets. To empirically substantiate this argument, we test whether individuals participating in Prosper, one of the largest lending markets in the U.S., reduce their lending activity when gambling in the form of playing the multistate lotteries Powerball and Mega Millions becomes more attractive. Lottery is a repeated natural experiment: lottery jackpots are randomly won and a series of draws with no winners form large jackpots. We find that the thrill of winning a large jackpot lottery, perhaps intensified by advertising and media coverage around this event, fulfills some lenders' desire of sensation-seeking and substitutes participating in Prosper, decreasing their lending activity. We discuss implications for lenders and borrowers, as well as platform organizers and policy makers.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126165537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Funds and Financial Intermediaries","authors":"Magnus Dahlquist, V. Sokolovski, Erik Sverdrup","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3396632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3396632","url":null,"abstract":"Hedge funds and financial intermediaries are connected through their prime brokerage relationship. We find that systematic financial intermediary risk, as measured by the covariation between the hedge fund return and the return of a portfolio of key prime brokers, is important for understanding the cross-section of hedge fund returns. Once we control for the systematic risk, we find little evidence that idiosyncratic financial intermediary risk matters. We evaluate if large adverse shocks to individual prime brokers propagate to their clients, and find a significant impact only in the case of the Lehman bankruptcy. However, that impact was mitigated for funds with multiple prime brokers, suggesting even extreme prime broker shocks are diversifiable.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128263701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bad Times, Good Credit","authors":"Bo Becker, M. Bos, Kasper Roszbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2587713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2587713","url":null,"abstract":"Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers is understood to be a key friction in credit markets. Can amplified information problems explain why the supply of corporate credit contracts in recessions and crises? Alternatively, asymmetric information may be reduced by economic slowdowns. We test these opposing views of information frictions in the credit market using data on lending from a large bank, through two business cycles. We find that this banks’ ability to sort borrowers by credit quality is best in bad times. This suggests that information frictions are counter-cyclical in corporate credit markets.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126078849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Review of Norges Bank's Active Management of the Government Pension Fund Global","authors":"Magnus Dahlquist, B. A. Ødegaard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3114175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3114175","url":null,"abstract":"We have reviewed Norges Bank’s active management of the Government Pension Fund Global, referred to simply as the “Fund.” \u0000The absolute performance of the Fund is almost entirely determined by the benchmark choice set by the Ministry of Finance (the asset owner) and is dominated by equity risk. In this sense, the Fund can be viewed as a mega index fund. However, the Fund also deviates from its benchmark and pursues active management. These deviations stem from various investment strategies, such as factor investing, internal and external security selection, trading strategies based on opportunities arising from market imperfections and liquidity provisioning, and real estate investments. In this sense, the Fund can be viewed as akin to a mega index fund, enhanced by its active management. \u0000The relative performance of the Fund (i.e., the return difference between the Fund and its benchmark, also referred to as the active return) is 0.20% per year after costs. In terms of the Fund’s value added after costs, this corresponds to a transfer to the asset owner (and ultimately the Norwegian people) of NOK 30–50 billion over the 2013–2017 period, depending on how we adjust and credit risk taking. The lion’s share of the value added comes from the Fund’s equity portfolio. While it is difficult for us to assess each strategy’s contribution to the Fund’s total performance, a return decomposition suggests that the mean active return is due to security selection rather than market timing and, in particular, that the Fund has been able to choose outperforming external managers that contribute substantially. We also find that activities related to the indexing (e.g., asset positioning and securities lending) contribute to the total return, mitigating the Fund’s costs of passively managing the assets. \u0000In line with our mandate, the executive summary highlights the main findings and concludes with recommendations.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130073548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm Fundamentals and Realized Factor Betas","authors":"M. Halling, M. Ibert, M. Lenz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3011256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011256","url":null,"abstract":"Firm fundamentals, in particular firm size, help explain variation in factor loadings (betas) for the market, size and value factor. Surprisingly, however, they are dominated in terms of explanatory power by an unobserved time-invariant component. This leads to surprisingly stable factor loadings: stocks with high (low) factor loadings tend to remain as such for over a decade. Our models work best in explaining market betas (r-squares up to 64%) and worst in explaining value betas (r-squares up to 35%). These results are robust to different estimation techniques of factor betas and also hold up when we limit the sample to firms with statistically significant betas.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131505535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Open-end Organizational Structures and Limits to Arbitrage","authors":"Mariassunta Giannetti, Bige Kahraman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2427432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427432","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence that open-end structures undermine asset managers’ incentives to attack long-term mispricing. First, we compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with high share restrictions, having a lower degree of open-ending, also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extent than other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116415740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Motives for Entrepreneurial Saving: Evidence from Sweden","authors":"F. Hosseini, Egle Karmaziene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2691916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691916","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the motives for the high saving rates of entrepreneurial households. We use a unique dataset that links Swedish households’ wealth and income to the financial statements of their firms. We exploit the decision to enter, stay in entrepreneurship or leave it. In comparison to the rest of the population, entrepreneurs save one percent more of their income a year before starting a business and 1.9 percent more on their personal accounts while in business. We find that the elevated saving rates among business owners are consistent with the precautionary saving motive among owners of unlimited liability firms and with investment related reasons among owners of limited liability firms. They save on their personal and business accounts. We provide suggestive evidence that entrepreneurs respond to income risk or lack of investment capital by increasing their saving rate.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"3 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133170472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination","authors":"Bo Becker, V. Ivashina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2756926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2756926","url":null,"abstract":"In 2015, 70% of newly-issued leveraged loans had weaker enforcement features, called covenant-light or “cov-lite;” this is nearly a three-time increase in cov-lite issuance compared to a previous peak in 2007. We evaluate whether this development can be attributed to market overheating, increased borrower demand for cov-lite loans, or a rise in creditor coordination costs. The last hypothesis stems from the increasing involvement of non-bank institutions and, in particular, the rise of mutual fund participation in the leveraged loan market after the financial crisis. Based on the wider syndication, (narrower) skills, and diverse incentives of non-bank institutional lenders, optimal contracts between them and corporate borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract provisions in a large sample of U.S. loans for the 2001–2014 period. Consistent with creditor-driven explanations for cov-lite issuance, we show that cov-lite prices compress as the prevalence of cov-lite rises. Time patterns in cov-lite issuance closely match inflows to institutional lenders, and at a given time, cov-lite loans are, overwhelmingly, those with the highest ownership by structured products and/or mutual funds. The number and share of structured products and mutual funds also impact the propensity toward other contractual features that influence when and how creditors have control. However, these factors are less relevant in explaining the strength of restrictions on indebtedness, liens, payments, or assets sales.","PeriodicalId":187122,"journal":{"name":"Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127392133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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