{"title":"Tariffs and the most favored nation clause","authors":"Kamal Saggi","doi":"10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126800941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WTO Exceptions as Insurance","authors":"R. Fischer, Thomas J. Prusa","doi":"10.1046/J.1467-9396.2003.00415.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1046/J.1467-9396.2003.00415.X","url":null,"abstract":"The paper formalizes the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. The authors use a general-equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. It is shown that sector-specific contingent protection measures are superior to uniform contingent tariffs as an insurance mechanism. A tax-cum-subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) also improves welfare and is superior to contingent protection. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134275422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous Protection, Foreign Direct Investment and Protection-building Trade","authors":"Bruce A. Blonigen, Yuka Ohno","doi":"10.1016/S0022-1996(97)00042-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(97)00042-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118199436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?","authors":"Bruce A. Blonigen, David N. Figlio","doi":"10.1142/9789813277014_0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813277014_0013","url":null,"abstract":"The political economy of trade protection has long been of interest to economists and policy makers. The idea that levels of protection may be endogenous with trade flows has been a particularly important issue in the literature. In general, the endogenous protection literature postulates that import penetration will cause domestic interests to lobby more intensely for protection. Thus, higher levels of import penetration lead to increased protection. As a result, a number of papers (see, for example, Arye L. Hillman, 1982; Wolfgang Mayer, 1984; Robert E. Baldwin, 1985; Stephen P. Magee et al., 1989; Ronald D. Fischer, 1992) have established that foreign firms will import less under a regime of endogenous protection than one where the level of protection is exogenous to trade flows. On the empirical side, Daniel Trefler (1993) finds that ignoring the endogeneity of trade and protection understates the impact of U.S. protection on imports by a magnitude of ten… (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117229739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The theory of endowment, intra-industry and multi-national trade","authors":"J. Markusen, A. Venables","doi":"10.1142/9789811222962_0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811222962_0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"254 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123751885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"FRONT MATTER","authors":"G. Ottaviano","doi":"10.1142/9789811233395_fmatter","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811233395_fmatter","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124768622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm-Specific Assets and the Link Between Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment","authors":"Bruce A. Blonigen","doi":"10.1142/9789813277014_0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813277014_0003","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign direct investment (FDI) theory and empirical studies have generated mixed support for a link between exchange rates and FDI. This paper argues that exchange rate movements may affect acquisition FDI because acquisitions involve firm-specific assets which can generate returns in currencies other than that used for purchase. Using data on Japanese acquisitions in the United States across three-digit SIC industries from 1975 to 1992, maximum-likelihood estimates from discrete dependent variable models support the hypothesis that real dollar depreciations make Japanese acquisitions more likely in U.S. industries, particularly those which more likely have firm-specific assets. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.","PeriodicalId":186871,"journal":{"name":"World Scientific Studies in International Economics","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123895841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}