{"title":"Analysis of the Linux random number generator","authors":"Zvi Gutterman, Benny Pinkas, Tzachy Reinman","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.5","url":null,"abstract":"Linux is the most popular open source project. The Linux random number generator is part of the kernel of all Linux distributions and is based on generating randomness from entropy of operating system events. The output of this generator is used for almost every security protocol, including TLS/SSL key generation, choosing TCP sequence numbers, and file system and email encryption. Although the generator is part of an open source project, its source code (about 2500 lines of code) is poorly documented, and patched with hundreds of code patches. We used dynamic and static reverse engineering to learn the operation of this generator. This paper presents a description of the underlying algorithms and exposes several security vulnerabilities. In particular, we show an attack on the forward security of the generator which enables an adversary who exposes the state of the generator to compute previous states and outputs. In addition we present a few cryptographic flaws in the design of the generator, as well as measurements of the actual entropy collected by it, and a critical analysis of the use of the generator in Linux distributions on diskless devices","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123902410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New constructions and practical applications for private stream searching","authors":"J. Bethencourt, D. Song, Brent Waters","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.27","url":null,"abstract":"A system for private stream searching allows a client to retrieve documents matching some search criteria from a remote server while the server evaluating the request remains provably oblivious to the search criteria. In this extended abstract, we give a high level outline of a new scheme for this problem and an experimental analysis of its scalability. The new scheme is highly efficient in practice. We demonstrate the practical applicability of the scheme by considering its performance in the demanding scenario of providing a privacy preserving version of the Google News Alerts service","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132728423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deterring voluntary trace disclosure in re-encryption mix networks","authors":"P. Golle, Xiaofeng Wang, M. Jakobsson, Alex Tsow","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.14","url":null,"abstract":"An all too real threat to the privacy offered by a mix network is that individual mix administrators may volunteer partial tracing information to a coercer. While this threat can never be eliminated - coerced mix servers could simply be forced to reveal all their secret data - we can deter administrators from succumbing to coercive attacks by raising the stakes. We introduce the notion of a trace-deterring mix permutation to guarantee privacy, and show how it ensures that a collateral key (used for an arbitrary purpose) be automatically revealed given any end-to-end trace from input to output elements. However, no keying material is revealed to a party who simply knows what input element corresponds to what output element. Our techniques are sufficiently efficient to be deployed in large-scale elections, thereby providing a sort of publicly verifiable privacy guarantee. Their impact on the size of the anonymity set-while quantifiable - are not of practical concern","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131952628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The final nail in WEP's coffin","authors":"Andrea Bittau, M. Handley, Joshua Lackey","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.40","url":null,"abstract":"The 802.11 encryption standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is still widely used today despite the numerous discussions on its insecurity. In this paper, we present a novel vulnerability which allows an attacker to send arbitrary data on a WEP network after having eavesdropped a single data packet. Furthermore, we present techniques for real-time decryption of data packets, which may be used under common circumstances. Vendor produced mitigation techniques which cause frequent WEP re-keying prevent traditional attacks, whereas our attack remains effective even in such scenarios. We implemented a fully automatic version of this attack which demonstrates its practicality and feasibility in real networks. As even rapidly re-keyed networks can be quickly compromised, we believe WEP must now be abandoned rather than patched yet again","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130060234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fundamental limits on the anonymity provided by the MIX technique","authors":"D. Kesdogan, D. Agrawal, D. Pham, D. Rautenbach","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.17","url":null,"abstract":"The MIX technique forms the basis of many popular services that offer anonymity of communication in open and shared networks such as the Internet. In this paper, fundamental limits on the anonymity provided by the MIX technique are found by considering two different settings. First, we consider an information theoretic setting to determine the extent of information inherent in observations of the traffic passing through the MIX. We show that if the size of sender anonymity sets is less than the total user population, the information contained in traffic observations is sufficient to deduce all communication relationships between senders and receivers using the MIX. More importantly, we show that even if every user sends a message in each communication round, it is possible to compromise the anonymity significantly. We precisely characterize the extent of compromised anonymity in each case. In the second setting, we assume that the attacker has unlimited computational resources and is free to choose any attack algorithm. We derive tight upper and lower bounds on the minimum number of observations required to deduce all recipient peer-partners of a targeted user. The analysis done in these two settings reveals many discrete mathematical structures inherent in anonymity sets, and the intuition gained from these structures can be used when designing or using a MIX based anonymity technique","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129473186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical attacks on proximity identification systems","authors":"G. Hancke","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.30","url":null,"abstract":"The number of RFID devices used in everyday life has increased, along with concerns about their security and user privacy. This paper describes our initial findings on practical attacks that we implemented against 'proximity' (ISO 14443 A) type RFID tokens. Focusing mainly on the RF communication interface we discuss the results and implementation of eavesdropping, unauthorized scanning and relay attacks. Although most of these attack scenarios are regularly mentioned in literature little technical details have been published previously. We also present a short overview of mechanisms currently available to prevent these attacks","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117117607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Siren: catching evasive malware","authors":"Kevin Borders, Xin Zhao, A. Prakash","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.37","url":null,"abstract":"With the growing popularity of anomaly detection systems, which is due partly to the rise in zero-day attacks, a new class of threats have evolved where the attacker mimics legitimate activity to blend in and avoid detection. We propose a new system called Siren that injects crafted human input alongside legitimate user activity to thwart these mimicry attacks. The crafted input is specially designed to trigger a known sequence of network requests, which Siren compares to the actual traffic. It then flags unexpected messages as malicious. Using this method, we were able to detect ten spyware programs that we tested, many of which attempt to blend in with user activity. This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of the Siren activity injection system, as well as a discussion of its potential limitations","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122592700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A logic for constraint-based security protocol analysis","authors":"R. Corin, S. Etalle, A. Saptawijaya","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.3","url":null,"abstract":"We propose VS-LTL, a pure-past security linear temporal logic that allows the specification of a variety of authentication, secrecy and data freshness properties. Furthermore, we present a sound and complete decision procedure to establish the validity of security properties for symbolic execution traces, and show the integration with constraint-based analysis techniques","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123215051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cobra: fine-grained malware analysis using stealth localized-executions","authors":"Amit Vasudevan, R. Yerraballi","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.9","url":null,"abstract":"Fine-grained code analysis in the context of malware is a complex and challenging task that provides insight into malware code-layers (polymorphic/metamorphic), its data encryption/decryption engine, its memory layout etc., important pieces of information that can be used to detect and counter the malware and its variants. Current research in fine-grained code analysis can be categorized into static and dynamic approaches. Static approaches have been tailored towards malware and allow exhaustive fine-grained malicious code analysis, but lack support for self-modifying code, have limitations related to code-obfuscations and face the undecidability problem. Given that most if not all malware employ self-modifying code and code-obfuscations, poses the need to analyze them at runtime using dynamic approaches. However, current dynamic approaches for fine-grained code analysis are not tailored specifically towards malware and lack support for multithreading, self-modifying/self-checking code and are easily detected and countered by ever-evolving anti-analysis tricks employed by malware. To address this problem, we propose a powerful dynamic fine-grained malicious code analysis framework, codenamed Cobra, to combat malware that are becoming increasingly hard to analyze. Our goal is to provide a stealth, efficient, portable and easy-to-use framework supporting multithreading, self-modifying/self-checking code and any form of code obfuscation in both user- and kernel-mode on commodity operating systems. Cobra cannot be detected or countered and can be dynamically and selectively deployed on malware specific code-streams while allowing other code-streams to execute as is. We also illustrate the framework utility by describing our experience with a tool employing Cobra to analyze a real-world malware","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131181897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pixy: a static analysis tool for detecting Web application vulnerabilities","authors":"N. Jovanović, Christopher Krügel, E. Kirda","doi":"10.1109/SP.2006.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.29","url":null,"abstract":"The number and the importance of Web applications have increased rapidly over the last years. At the same time, the quantity and impact of security vulnerabilities in such applications have grown as well. Since manual code reviews are time-consuming, error-prone and costly, the need for automated solutions has become evident. In this paper, we address the problem of vulnerable Web applications by means of static source code analysis. More precisely, we use flow-sensitive, interprocedural and context-sensitive dataflow analysis to discover vulnerable points in a program. In addition, alias and literal analysis are employed to improve the correctness and precision of the results. The presented concepts are targeted at the general class of taint-style vulnerabilities and can be applied to the detection of vulnerability types such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, or command injection. Pixy, the open source prototype implementation of our concepts, is targeted at detecting cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in PHP scripts. Using our tool, we discovered and reported 15 previously unknown vulnerabilities in three Web applications, and reconstructed 36 known vulnerabilities in three other Web applications. The observed false positive rate is at around 50% (i.e., one false positive for each vulnerability) and therefore, low enough to permit effective security audits","PeriodicalId":185805,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125657499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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