Microeconomics: Production最新文献

{"title":"Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods","authors":"John Asker, Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3736394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3736394","url":null,"abstract":"Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions per se can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. We show that limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"174 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75675551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Input Price Discrimination with Horizontal Shareholding","authors":"Youping Li, Jie Shuai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3724165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3724165","url":null,"abstract":"Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer holds non-controlling stakes in its rival and both buy input from an unptream monopolist. We find that under price discrimination a lower price is charged to the firm that holds the rival's shares so production is shifted toward it. This dampens the anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding and results in higher output, lower final good price, and improved consumer, producer and social welfare relative to uniform pricing.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73042062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Procurement Auctions with Advised Bidders","authors":"A. Malenko, A. Tsoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3720209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3720209","url":null,"abstract":"In procurement auctions, suppliers' senior managers in charge of bidding often rely on advisors, such as project managers and technical specialists, to evaluate project costs. These advisors may be biased for inflating the costs due to agency or career concerns. We study the procurement agency's choice between sealed-bid static auctions and a dynamic Dutch auction in this setting. If the number of competing suppliers is small, static auctions result in lower expected costs than the Dutch auction. This ranking is reversed if procurement is sufficiently competitive. The Dutch auction is always more efficient regardless of the number of suppliers.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79815520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Don’t Bite the Hand That Feeds You: Food Pantries and Food Retailer Profitability","authors":"T. Kopp, Lauren Chenarides","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710584","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the extent to which the presence of food pantries diverts food sales from retail grocers. Hunger-relief programs, such as food services provided through food banks, serve as emergency assistance to meet households' temporary food needs, yet a growing population in the United States regularly relies on these services. \u0000 \u0000There is little empirical research that examines just how individuals factor hunger-relief programs into their planning horizons, whether the presence of these organizations diverts sales from grocers, and how that affects food retailers' revenues and profits. \u0000 \u0000Further, the presence of multiple grocers in one market constitutes a common good problem, given that the savings in food waste disposal fees occur for each retailer privately, while a potential reduction of total demand affects all retailers' sales. \u0000 \u0000Using data on the location of food pantries and annual sales volume from retail grocers in Arizona, we measure the statistical relationships between food pantry density and retail grocers' annual sales volume. Preliminary results show that food pantry presence does not statistically, significantly affect retailers' revenues, suggesting that food pantries and food retailers do not directly compete for market share.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89722152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Opportunism in Vertical Contracting: A Dynamic Perspective","authors":"Jihwan Do, Jeanine Miklós-Thal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709550","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the downstream firms, we model opportunism as a consequence of asynchronous recontracting in an infinite-horizon continuous-time model. We find that the extent of opportunism depends on the absolute and relative reaction speeds of the different bilateral upstream-downstream firm pairs and on the firms' discount rate. Patience, fast reaction speeds, and asymmetries in reaction speeds across upstream-downstream pairs are shown to alleviate the opportunism problem.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74903642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"원청-하청 간 거래관행이 혁신에 미치는 영향: 독일ㆍ미국의 자동차산업을 중심으로 (On the Impact of the Supplier-Buyer Relation on Innovation: Lessons from the German and the U.S. Automobile Industry)","authors":"Dong Hee Joe, Gusang Kang, Hyuk Ju Kwon, Seongman Moon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3705056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3705056","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 본 연구는 자동차산업에서 완성차기업과 부품기업 간 원-하청 거래관행이 하청 부품기업의 혁신성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 본 연구는 선행연구를 따라 자동차산업 내 원-하청 간 거래관계를 크게 시장거래, 관계계약, 수직통합으로 구분하였다. 이 세 가지 유형은 하청 부품기업이 실시하는 관계특수 투자의 정도, 원-하청 간 정보교류의 정도, 신뢰 수준, 협상력 분포 등에 큰 차이가 있다. 본 연구는 우선 제3장에서 각 거래유형의 특성을 반영한 게임이론 모형을 개발하고, 이어질 사례분석과 실증분석의 지침이 될 이론적 틀을 제시하였다. 다음으로, 제4장에서 자동차 부품산업의 주요국인 독일과 미국의 사례를 분석하여 완성차기업-부품기업 간 거래관계가 특정 유형을 취하게 되는 원인을 분석하였다. 제5장에서 한국과 미국의 관측자료를 이용하여 원-하청 간 거래관행, 특히 하청 부품기업의 매출분산도가 하청 부품기업의 혁신성과에 미치는 영향을 추정하였다. 끝으로 제6장은 본 연구의 결과를 바탕으로 자동차산업 내에서, 문재인 정부의 주요 경제정책기조인 혁신성장과 공정경제의 관계에 대한 정책시사점을 제공한다. 본 연구에서 고안한 이론모형의 주요 예측은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 부품기업-완성차기업 간 일회성 거래(즉 시장거래)에서는, 부품기업이 특정 완성차기업에 납품할 부품의 가치를 높이기 위한 관계특수적 투자를 꺼리게 되는 과소투자문제가 발생한다. 과소투자문제의 심각성은 △ 특정 완성차기업을 위한 투자를 다른 완성차기업을 위해 전용하는 것이 수월할수록 완화되고 △ 부품기업의 투자가 해당 완성차기업에 미치는 영향이 클수록 심해진다. 둘째, 부품기업-완성차기업간 거래관계가 반복적일 경우(즉 관계계약의 경우) 과소투자문제가 완화될 수있다. 반복거래를 통해 과소투자문제가 해결될 여지는 △ 부품기업이 특정 완성차기업을 위해 실시한 투자를 다른 완성차기업에 전용하는 것이 더 수월할수록 △ 부품기업의 투자가 해당 완성차기업의 성과에 미치는 영향이 클수록 △ 투자비용이 적을수록 커진다. 셋째, 수직통합도 과소투자문제를 완화시킨다. 즉 다른 조건이 동일할 때 부품기업과 완성차기업이 공통으로 결합이윤을 극대화하는 경우, 이들이 분리되어 각자의 이윤을 극대화시키는 경우보다 과소투자문제가 덜 심각하다. 수직통합으로 과소투자문제가 해결될 여지는 특정 완성차기업을 위한 투자를 다른 완성차기업을 위해 전용하는 것이 어려울수록 커진다. 본 연구의 사례분석은, 우선 세계 자동차 부품산업의 현황을 경영성과와 연구 개발투자에 집중하여 살펴보았다. 경영성과 면에서는 독일, 미국, 일본을 세계 자동차 부품산업의 3대 주요국으로 꼽을 수 있고, 한국은 이들보다 규모가 현저히 작다. 주요 3개국의 경영성과는 ‘독일 &gt; 일본 &gt; 미국’ 순이다. 본 연구의 이론적 틀이 예측한 바와 같이 매출액의 지역 간 분산도가 낮을수록, 즉 매출이 특정지역에 더 의존하고 있을수록 경영성과가 저조한 경향이 있다. 연구개발투자에 있어서도 독일, 미국, 일본을 주요 3개국으로 꼽을 수 있고, 이들의 연구개발투자 수준은 경영성과와 마찬가지로 ‘독일 &gt; 일본 &gt; 미국’ 순이다. 또한 본 연구의 이론적 틀이 예측했듯이 매출의 지역 간 분산도가 클수록 연구개발투자가 더 활발할 뿐만 아니라 설비투자와 비교할 때, 즉 상대적으로도 더 활발한 경향이 있다. 독일은 자동차 부품산업이 세계에서 가장 오래된 편이고, 경영성과와 혁신성과가 가장 뛰어나며 연구개발투자도 가장 활발하다. 또한 완성차기업보다 부품기업이 혁신을 주도하는 경우가 더 많다. 독일 자동차 부품산업의 뛰어난 경영성과와 혁신활동의 배경으로 역사적 특수성에 따라 부품기업-완성차기업 간 관계에서 부품기업이 높은 협상력을 가지는 점과 부품기업-완성차기업 간 높은 신뢰수준을 꼽을 수 있다. 미국 또한 세계 100대 자동차 부품기업을 가장 많이 보유하고 있는 강국인데, 완성차기업-부품기업 간 관계가 독일과는 다른 특징을 보인다. 미국 자동차산업의 발전과정은 앞서 언급한 세 가지 거래형태를 모두 보여주는데, 특히 ‘시장거래 및 수직통합 → 관계계약’으로 변해왔다. 자동차산업의 초기에는 다수의 영세 완성차기업들이 난립하였다가 Ford, GM, Chrysler의 3대 기업으로 정리되었다. 이들은 1970년대까지는 시장거래와 수직통합을 병행하며 하청 부품기업에 대한 높은 협상력을 유지하였다. 그러나 1970년대 이후 일본 완성차기업들의 진출이 확대되어 경쟁이 심화되었고, 전기ㆍ전자 산업의 혁신이 자동차에 적용되었다. 이에 따라 완성차기업-부품기업 간 정보교류를 통한 혁신의 필요가 높아졌고, 그 결과 관계계약이 보편화되었다. 본 연구의 실증분석은 매출분산도가 클수록 혁신성과가 좋아진다는 것을 한국과 미국에서 모두 발견하였다. 즉 다수의 원청 완성차기업으로부터 고르게 매출을 발생시키는 하청 부품기업일수록 혁신성과가 더 좋다는 것이다. 이 결과는 하청기업이 특정 원청기업을 위해 실시한 관계특수적 투자를 다른 원청기업을 위해 전용하는 것이 수월할수록 하청기업의 투자가 증가하고, 따라서 혁신성과가 좋아질 것이라는 이론적 예측을 뒷받침한다. 또한 한국의 관측자료가 제공하는 추가적인 정보를 이용하여 외상결제비율, 계열사 여부 등 한국 자동차산업의 특성에 대한 분석도 실시하였다. 그 결과 외상결제는 하청 부품기업의 혁신성과에 부정적 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 한국의 정책당국이 하도급거래의 주요 문제로 외상결제를 꼽고 있는 것을 뒷받침한다. 또한 원-하청 간 거래관행이 하청기업의 혁신성과에 미치는 영향이 해당 하청기업의 자산규모, 계열사 여부 등에 따라 달라진다는 것도 발견하였다.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> This study analyzes the impact of buyer-supplier relation on supplier’s innovation in the automobile industry. Following previous studies, this study categorizes the buyer-supplier relation","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80908527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AHEAD: Ad Hoc Electronic Auction Design","authors":"Joffrey Derchu, P. Guillot, Thibaut Mastrolia, M. Rosenbaum","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3705514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3705514","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new matching design for financial transactions in an electronic market. In this mechanism, called ad-hoc electronic auction design (AHEAD), market participants can trade between themselves at a fixed price and trigger an auction when they are no longer satisfied with this fixed price. In this context, we prove that a Nash equilibrium is obtained between market participants. Furthermore, we are able to assess quantitatively the relevance of ad-hoc auctions and to compare them with periodic auctions and continuous limit order books. We show that from the investors' viewpoint, the microstructure of the asset is usually significantly improved when using AHEAD.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74215371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporation-Startup Alliance Portfolios in Entrepreneurial Settings","authors":"S. Prashantham, A. Madhok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758098","url":null,"abstract":"Startups partnering with corporations compete with one another for the latter’s attention. Based on an inductive study of concurrent partnerships between startups and one established firm as part of a programmatic initiative of the latter, we explore how startups differ in terms of (i) attention received from the corporation, (ii) actions on their part to attract and sustain such attention, and (iii) the impact of such attention dynamics on how the partnership unfolds. We find that too much attention too soon can ultimately jeopardize relational outcomes by provoking more self-oriented partnering actions. Conversely, difficulty in attracting attention initially elicits self-reflective and more oblique, other-oriented partnering actions ultimately leading to more valued relational outcomes. We highlight the dark side of both attention and direct relational action.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90712383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dynamics of Single- and Multi-Sided Platform Monopolies","authors":"Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Albert D. Metz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3692861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692861","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we develop a general model of one-sided and two-sided platform businesses and apply it to a monopolist framework. We have a particular interest in how the social loss and other metrics depend on the strength of the network (direct or indirect) effect. We study how network effects impact monopoly power, how the deadweight loss decomposes between market power and the unpriced network externality, and how cross-subsidies relate to the strength of the network effects. We find that the stronger the network effect, the larger the optimal size of the platform and the greater the deadweight loss, while the smaller is the monopolist’s profit margin. In the two-sided setting, we explore the social benefits of allowing positive profit on one side to subsidize price on the other side below cost. We find that under some of the more extreme parameterizations we consider, a regulated platform required to break-even on both sides of the platform (rather than just in total) could be socially less desirable than the unregulated monopolist. This result obtains infrequently across the parameterizations we study, but it is a possibility.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81041579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When and Who Do Platform Companies Acquire? Understanding the Role of Acquisitions in the Growth of Platform Companies","authors":"M. Miric, Margherita Pagani, O. E. Sawy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3784359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784359","url":null,"abstract":"The success of platform companies often depends on their ability to “scale” their customer and supplier base. Existing studies have focused on a variety of approaches that platforms may use to scale but have not systematically considered that platforms might acquire other companies as part of this growth strategy. In this paper, we study the acquisition patterns of digital platform companies and contrast these with the acquisition patterns of digital non-platform companies. We find that platform companies acquire earlier (shortly after founding) when compared with non-platform companies, and they often first acquire competing platform companies from the same market niche. As platform companies mature, they begin to acquire non-platform companies from other market niches. This contrasts with how acquisitions are made by non-platform companies, as shown in our analysis.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87987593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}