CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic)最新文献

Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management 审计委员会财务专业知识、竞争性公司治理机制和盈余管理

CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic) Pub Date : 2006-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.887512

Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, April Klein, T. L. Neal

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引用次数: 267

Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance 皇家控股:公司治理的失败

CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic) Pub Date : 2005-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.663504

Abe de Jong, Peter Roosenboom, D. DeJong, G. Mertens

引用次数: 18

The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 现代工业革命、退出与内部控制制度失效

CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic) Pub Date : 1993-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.93988

M. C. Jensen

{"title":"The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems","authors":"M. C. Jensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.93988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.93988","url":null,"abstract":"This article, which is based on the author's Presidential address to the American Finance Association in 1993, argues that squeezing out excess capital and capacity is one of the most formidable ongoing challenges facing not only the U.S. economy, but the economies of all industrialized nations. In making this argument, the article draws striking parallels between the 19th‐century industrial revolution and worldwide economic developments in the last three decades. In both periods, technological advances led to not only sharp increases in productivity and dramatic reductions in prices, but also massive obsolescence and overcapacity. And much as the great M&A wave of the 1890s reduced capacity by consolidating some 1,800 companies into roughly 150, the leveraged takeovers, LBOs, and other leveraged recapitalizations of the 1980s provided “healthy adjustments” to overcapacity that was building in many sectors of the U.S. economy. To help public companies make the necessary adjustments to overcapacity, the author urges them to consider adopting some of the features of private equity, including significant equity stakes for managers, high leverage or payouts, and the recruiting of active investors as “partners in the business.”","PeriodicalId":184715,"journal":{"name":"CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124948886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9250

Corporate Governance in Indian Public Financial Institutions 印度公共金融机构的公司治理

CGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.921863

A. Joshi

引用次数: 0