Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht, B. Geva, Seraina N. Grunewald
{"title":"Digital Euro, Monetary Objects and Price Stability—a Legal Analysis","authors":"Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht, B. Geva, Seraina N. Grunewald","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjab009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjab009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Eurosystem is mandated to safeguard price stability according to article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Based on a theoretical and policy-oriented approach, this article sheds light on a second public good with enormous practical relevance both for financial markets and institutions as well as for the general public that the Eurosystem, and ultimately the European Central Bank (ECB), must safeguard according to article 128 TFEU: the availability of ideal monetary objects for the public. While monetary policy constitutes the instrument used to keep prices stable, the availability of ideal monetary objects is ensured through the issuance of ‘cash’ that serves as both money with selected properties and an anchor for other monies of the same currency, including sight deposits at commercial banks. Today, the role of ideal monetary objects is (still) primarily fulfilled by tangible banknotes. As the use of tangible banknotes declines, however, a digital equivalent and complement—a digital euro—becomes increasingly necessary. Accordingly, the article concludes that the ECB is both entitled and obliged de lege lata to issue a digital euro on the basis of article 128 TFEU. It further explains that neither tangible cash nor a digital euro can simultaneously be used as instruments in themselves to maintain price stability.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125617932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Promises and Perils of Central Bank Digital Currencies","authors":"L. Larue, Clément Fontan, J. Sandberg","doi":"10.4000/REGULATION.18018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REGULATION.18018","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the proposal that central banks should issue digital currencies (CBDC) to provide a public alternative to private digital accounts and cryptocurrencies. We build on some recent themes in political economy research to give a broader and more balanced perspective than the existing literature, highlighting both the promises and perils of CBDC. We argue that, on the one hand, the present state of the private financial sector is problematic and regulators should seek to tackle the issues of financial power, financial instability and lack of adequate monetary policy options. On the other hand, implementing CBDC comes with risks of its own, such as that of creating a “Frankenstein scenario” where too much power is given to unelected technocrats. Our tentative conclusion is therefore that CBDC should be seen as a second-best option, while the primary focus of policy makers should be on the possibility of financial re-regulation.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"238 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133418006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Informal Central Bank Communication","authors":"Annette Vissing-Jorgensen","doi":"10.3386/w28276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28276","url":null,"abstract":"Starting from a set of facts on the timing of stock returns relative to Federal Reserve decision-making, I argue that informal communication â?? including unattributed communication -- plays a central role in monetary policy communication. This contrasts with the standard communications framework in which communication should be public and on-the-record because it serves to ensure accountability and policy effectiveness. I lay out possible benefits of using unattributed communication as an institution, but these should be weighed against substantial costs: It runs counter to accountability to use unattributed communication, causes frustration among those trying to understand central bank intensions, and enables use of such communication by individual policymakers. Unattributed communication driven by policymaker disagreements is unambiguously welfare reducing, because it reduces policy flexibility and harms the central bank's credibility and decision-making process. I suggest that central banks resist unattributed communication via expensive newsletters and increase consensus-building efforts to reduce disagreement-driven unattributed communication.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128086967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The ECB, the Courts and the Issue of Democratic Legitimacy After Weiss","authors":"N. de Boer, Jens van ’t Klooster","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/5swka","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/5swka","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the new challenges that the ECB faces in implementing its monetary policy and asks to what extent judicial review can help address these. The ECB mandate provides no clear guidance for many of the ECB’s recent challenges, which include a sovereign bond market panic, technical limits to the efficacy of its tools, and questions concerning the environmental impact of its operations. For this reason, the ECB’s decisions suffer from democratic authorization gaps; it makes choices with far-reaching consequences for which there is no clear basis in the mandate. In this context, courts can either opt to accept choices made by the ECB, as the ECJ has mostly done, or, as the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided to do, itself weigh in on monetary policy. Neither approach, we argue, can improve the tenuous democratic legitimacy of the ECB in the absence of proper democratic guidance. There are, however, other ways the Member States and the EU’s political institutions can provide the ECB with guidance on how to deal with its new choices.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"284 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122472947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Bradley, D. Finer, M. Gustafson, Jared Williams
{"title":"When Bankers Go to Hail: Insights into Fed-Bank Interactions from Taxi Data","authors":"D. Bradley, D. Finer, M. Gustafson, Jared Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3141240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3141240","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce taxi ridership between the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and large financial \u0000institutions with major presences in New York City as a proxy for Fed activity. A \u0000market-timing strategy that buys the market portfolio (risk-free asset) when lagged Fed-bank \u0000ridership is low (high) earns a 50% larger Sharpe ratio than the market portfolio. The \u0000strategy’s superior performance is concentrated around FOMC meetings and Fed-primary \u0000dealer interactions. Collectively, our findings are consistent with a monetary policy channel \u0000whereby Fed-bank interactions increase when one of the parties possesses monetary policy-related information that will ultimately adversely affect stock prices.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126961632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central Bank Collateral as an Instrument for Climate Mitigation","authors":"Andrew McConnell, Boyan Yanovski, K. Lessmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3630662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630662","url":null,"abstract":"Central banks can provide vital support in the transition towards a climate-neutral economy because they are largely independent authorities of the monetary systems and therefore have unique capabilities and policy options unavailable to governments. This paper discusses potential green monetary policy instruments to identify the most appropriate ones to be used to support the transition process. We identify adding collateral \"haircuts\" based on assets’ carbon intensity to the central bank collateralised lending framework as the most promising conduit of green monetary policy. The impact of such an intervention is then formally explored by extending a general equilibrium transition model to include a simple banking sector with central bank lending facilities. We find that the instrument is effective in increasing carbon neutral investment while decreasing carbon intensive investment and emissions. Additionally, adjusting the collateral framework together with a carbon tax reduces the burden on governments which might allow for a less painful transition involving a lower carbon tax.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130804980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Application of National Law by the European Central Bank: Challenging European Legal Doctrine?","authors":"F. Amtenbrink","doi":"10.2866/45956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2866/45956","url":null,"abstract":"The operationalisation in late 2014 of Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSMR) has profoundly changed the European financial market regulatory and supervisory landscape. The most apparent change is the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the new integrated single supervisory framework in which it is responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). One prominent feature of the SSM are the arrangements concerning the application of national law by the ECB. Pursuant to Article 4 (3) sub-para. 1 SSMR, in applying all relevant Union law for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSMR, including all relevant secondary law, the ECB must not only apply national legislation by which options explicitly granted in regulations have been exercised, but also national legislation transposing relevant EU Directives. These arrangements have implications that surpass the operation of the SSMR itself, as they touch upon fundamental aspects of European legal doctrine that have received comparably less attention until now. By way of illustration, in this short written version of a contribution to the 2019 ECB Legal Conference the implications of two aspects linked to the application by a Union institution of national law are discussed: the direct application by the ECB of Directives that have been inadequately implemented into national law and, moreover, the exercise of public power by the ECB that is at least partially rooted in national law. The latter point has recently also been scrutinised by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in its decision on the compatibility with the German Federal Constitution of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124258485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shadow Central Banking","authors":"Marco Dell’Erba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3488040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488040","url":null,"abstract":"Private entities have recently attempted to invade the realm of central banking activities. This Article identifies this activity as “Shadow Central Banking,” and draws analogies with the previous emergence of “shadow banking” more generally. The “shadow banking” system emerged as a network of new and often non-regulated entities, that gradually entered the business of banks. Shadow banking‘s development depended on specific causes and responded to specific needs of the financial system. This transformations ultimately led to the creation of a far more complex and interconnected financial system, which ultimately collapsed amidst the Financial Crisis in 2008. The similarities between shadow banking and Shadow Central Banking are clear when analyzing the circumstances of their emergence, their pathologies, and the regulatory response. \u0000 \u0000After a brief analysis of the shadow banking system, this Article focuses on the evolving roles of central banks and private initiatives, as their activities have led to the rethinking of central banking activities and the form of money in modern capitalism. This Article proposes that this disruption of traditional central banking activity stems from a new interpretation of the concept of money, one that defyies the classic dichotomy of “central bank money” vs. “commercial bank money”. This Article then analyzes the main characteristics of Shadow Central Banking and identifies specific commonalities not only with the shadow banking system, but also with historical systems that pre-existed the modern central banking framework. Finally, this Article considers the systemic risks, systemic conflicts of interest and opaque corporate governance mechanisms associated with Shadow Central Banking and posits some policy considerations to address such risks.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123212536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Global Stablecoin: Revolutionary Reserve Asset or Reinventing the Wheel?","authors":"Rory Copeland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3473692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473692","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the geopolitics, legal nuances and monetary policy which inform Carney's proposal. Part I sets out the application of block-chain technology in the context of payment systems, and discusses the geopolitics of Libra and the shift in focus to Central Bank Digital Currencies ('CBDCs'). It suggests that state-backed cryptocurrencies are more likely than their private sector counterparts to fit the role of true digital currencies, at least on a domestic level.<br><br>Part II explains the legal distinctions between the cryptocurrency models proposed by Facebook and others, and CBDCs. The former fulfils the main functions of money by granting a claim to the holder, whereas the latter does so as an 'object' of monetary policy. A Global Stablecoin ('GSC') such as the SHC does not necessarily fall into either camp, but its success as a global reserve currency may hinge upon the fine details of its legal construction. <br><br>In Part III, one conception of the SHC, based on the 'claims model' is set out. Whilst the use of block-chain technology is undoubtedly novel, there are significant similarities between this version of the SHC and previously rejected reforms to the 'Special Drawing Rights' (SDR) allocated by the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'). It is argued that the extent of the similarities indicates that the claims model is likely to face the same hurdles which stymied the campaign to develop the SDRs into a global reserve currency.<br><br>This begs the question, however, of why Carney would propose the SHC if the odds in monetary policy were already so firmly stacked against it. Part IV considers the 'objects model' as applied to a SHC. It tentatively concludes that the features of the objects model which distinguish it from the claims model greatly improve its prospects of success. Specifically, the generation of network effect value, as a substitute for the convertibility value of SDRs, may be the decisive contribution of block-chain technology to a truly international currency. <br><br>The article concludes that a claims-based SHC would, to a great extent, be an attempt to reinvent SDRs in a digital age, and that the advantages of block-chain technology will be insufficient to surmount well-established US monetary policy. The objects model, whilst more ambitious in some respects, constitutes a radically novel proposal which may, for that reason amongst others, gain global traction.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124805315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central Banks and the Future of Money","authors":"J. Murray","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3369649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3369649","url":null,"abstract":"Policymaking circles and central banks around the world are now giving serious consideration to the pros and cons of making central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) available to the general public. While the consensus view remains that such a move would be premature, opinion appears to be shifting. Indeed, developments in a number of advanced and emerging economies indicate that the CBDC model is receiving more serious consideration than it has in the past. The numerous speeches and research papers coming from central banks are testament to this growing interest. Moreover, some countries and central banks have moved beyond talking and have taken active steps to push the initiative further. Proponents view the introduction of CBDCs as a potentially positive development rather than a purely defensive reaction. Indeed, they believe CBDCs could materially improve the role of central bank money in the financial system by providing a more stable unit of account, a more efficient medium of exchange and a more secure store of value. Moreover, the potential benefits go well beyond these traditional central bank money functions. Proponents suggest that CBDCs could temper financial instability, improve the implementation and transmission of monetary policy, raise productivity, help finance government deficits, reduce tax evasion and discourage a number of other costly and illegal activities. These positive claims have not gone unchallenged. The most common concern raised is the destabilizing effect that CBDCs might have on the economy in times of financial stress. As a safe and convenient alternative to commercial bank deposits and other types of private financial assets, CBDCs might act as a dangerous accelerant in the context of a bank run, transforming an isolated concern about one bank’s solvency into a system-wide crisis. Another source of concern is the disruptive effect that CBDCs would likely have on the competitive position of commercial banks, other financial institutions and key financial market infrastructures. In the end, the best way forward for Canada and other countries may not involve the introduction of a CBDC. Some active government engagement now would nevertheless seem advisable to ensure the most promising ways forward are not precluded. Simply leaving it to the market to sort out would be very risky. The disruption caused by any policy reversals that might be contemplated at a later stage could prove insurmountable, leaving us in a place we would rather not be. It is important to understand that maintaining the status quo is unlikely to be a practicable option, given the shifting financial landscape. The question is not whether central banks will need to react, but how they should react to these tectonic technological shocks.","PeriodicalId":182176,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Central Banks & Reserves (Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122537155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}