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What Makes Normative Concepts Normative 是什么使规范性概念成为规范性的
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview20213716
Shawn Hernandez, N. Laskowski
{"title":"What Makes Normative Concepts Normative","authors":"Shawn Hernandez, N. Laskowski","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview20213716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20213716","url":null,"abstract":"When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as good, ought, and reason. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Eklund (2017) is a notable exception. He argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively” (2017, p. 79). One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties (2017, p. 71).2 In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128396190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon 做一个有自杀倾向的坏脾气的好处
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202137123
Glenn quot Trujillo, Boomer quot
{"title":"The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon","authors":"Glenn quot Trujillo, Boomer quot","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202137123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137123","url":null,"abstract":"Emil Cioran offers novel arguments against suicide. He assumes a meaningless world. But in such a world, he argues, suicide and death would be equally as meaningless as life or anything else. Suicide and death are as cumbersome and useless as meaning and life. Yet Cioran also argues that we should contemplate suicide to live better lives. By contemplating suicide, we confront the deep suffering inherent in existence. This humbles us enough to allow us to change even the deepest aspects of ourselves. Yet it also reminds us that our peculiar human ability—being able to contemplate suicide—sets us above anything else in nature or in the heavens. This paper assembles and defends a view of suicide written about in Cioran’s aphorisms and essays.","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133300724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Saying What One Means 说出自己的意思
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202137118
Joseph Swenson
{"title":"Saying What One Means","authors":"Joseph Swenson","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202137118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137118","url":null,"abstract":"Few would dispute that Nietzsche writes differently than most philosophers, especially when judged by the standards of contemporary philosophical writing. There is plenty of dispute, however, about why Nietzsche has chosen to present his thinking in the ways that he does. When one turns to much recent Nietzsche scholarship, it would appear that the literary quality of his writing is often treated as something that is merely accidental rather than integral to his philosophical project. Here one finds a working assumption that it is possible to paraphrase Nietzsche’s unconventional style of writing into more conventional forms of philosophical prose without losing sight of the philosophical goals that he is trying to achieve. This paper argues that this working assumption underappreciates the fact that Nietzsche’s chosen style of writing is intended to perform a variety of functions within his philosophy. One underappreciated function of Nietzsche’s writing, I will argue, aims to promote a radical disruption and revaluation of his readers’ basic habitual attitudes towards their experience of their own lives. Such therapeutic and transformative experiences, I conclude, are not only basic to Nietzsche’s philosophical project but are also intimately connected to the literary quality of his writing and cannot easily survive philosophical paraphrase.","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116735737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Making Sense of “Microaggression” 理解“微攻击”
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202137113
Heather Stewart
{"title":"Making Sense of “Microaggression”","authors":"Heather Stewart","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202137113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137113","url":null,"abstract":"Though philosophers are beginning to pay attention to the phenomenon of microaggressions, they are yet to fully draw on their training and skills in conceptual analysis to help make sense of what microaggression is. In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of microaggression. I ultimately argue that ‘microaggression’ as a concept gets its meaning not by decomposing into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by means of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” That is to say, what unifies the concept of microaggression is a set of common, overlapping features that link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all cases. I identify and explain a common set of features that together form the basis for a family resemblance account of the concept. I then argue that despite the difficulty that microaggressions pose in terms of being reliably recognized and understood as such, some people, in virtue of their epistemic standpoint, are better suited to recognize these features and subsequently identify instances of micraoggression in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff, 1993; Hill Collins, 1990, 2004; hooks, 2004; Harding, 2004, 2008; Wylie, 2013).","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117096413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified 为什么商业公司的道德言论自由权不能被证明是正当的
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202137120
A. T. Wright
{"title":"Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified","authors":"A. T. Wright","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202137120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137120","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I develop two philosophically suggestive arguments that the late Justice Stevens made in Citizens United against the idea that business corporations have free speech rights. First, (1) while business corporations conceived as real entities are capable of a thin agency conceptually sufficient for moral rights, I argue that they fail to clear important justificatory hurdles imposed by interest or choice theories of rights. Business corporations conceived as real entities lack any interest in their personal security; moreover, they are incapable of exercising innate powers of choice. Second, (2) I argue that the structure and functionally individualized purpose of a business corporation—to increase value for its shareholders—undermines the implicit joint commitment necessary to derive corporate rights of free speech from non-operative shareholder-member rights. Since one cannot transfer innate moral rights such as free speech, any exercise of this right on behalf of another must be limited in scope.","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124483783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry 案例、知识与实验探究
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202137112
A. Ward
{"title":"Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry","authors":"A. Ward","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202137112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202137112","url":null,"abstract":"In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122830276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ameliorative Potential in the Relational Autonomy Debate 关系自主辩论中的改善潜力
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202036232
N. Jackson
{"title":"Ameliorative Potential in the Relational Autonomy Debate","authors":"N. Jackson","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202036232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036232","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122627371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility” 评论德博拉-海克斯的 "认识论上的无知与道德责任
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202036230
Cheryl Abbate
{"title":"Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility”","authors":"Cheryl Abbate","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202036230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036230","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124550428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind 消除唯物主义、历史意识和科林伍德的心灵哲学
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2020-04-22 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview202036110
T. Lord
{"title":"Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind","authors":"T. Lord","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview202036110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036110","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121923530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spirituality and the Wine’s Soul 精神与葡萄酒的灵魂
Southwest Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2020-04-22 DOI: 10.5840/swphilreview20203612
Michelle Williams
{"title":"Spirituality and the Wine’s Soul","authors":"Michelle Williams","doi":"10.5840/swphilreview20203612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20203612","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":181924,"journal":{"name":"Southwest Philosophy Review","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133697200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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