{"title":"The Emerging Contribution of Director Disqualification in UK Competition Law","authors":"P. Whelan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3664603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664603","url":null,"abstract":"Peter Whelan assesses a developing and increasingly significant enforcement tool in the UK competition authority’s armoury in Chapter 11. In it, Whelan notes that the enforcement of UK competition law is deterrence-focused and comprises both criminal and non-criminal (i.e. civil/administrative) elements. The chapter concentrates on the non-criminal enforcement apparatus that has been developed over the last twenty years. More specifically, it critically evaluates a particular enforcement mechanism that has been gaining increasing importance throughout the recent development of UK competition enforcement practice: the use of director disqualification. It first establishes the normative role of director disqualification in the UK’s armoury of non-criminal antitrust sanctions (i.e. its complementing of the deterrent function of corporate antitrust fines), following which it highlights their potential for performing this role effectively. It then outlines the legal basis for the use of director disqualification within the UK and evaluates the policy and enforcement practice to date with respect to such orders, before proceeding to outline some of the insights that the UK director disqualification regime can provide to other jurisdictions. Ultimately it concludes that, on the basis of the promising, albeit nascent, UK experience to date, director disqualification should be seriously considered by jurisdictions that wish to operate a robust competition law enforcement regime.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"43 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114041375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Enforcement in the UK","authors":"B. Rodger","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"In Chapter 12, Barry Rodger retraces his footsteps in relation to his contributions in both earlier collections on the theme of private enforcement in the UK, with a particular slant on the extent to which consumers have benefited, or may benefit, from statutory and case law developments in the area. Accordingly, this chapter assesses how private enforcement of competition law rights has developed in the UK over the last twenty years. Key legislative developments, inter alia the Competition Act 1998, Enterprise Act 2002 and Consumer Rights Act 2015, have transformed the private enforcement architecture, notably with the introduction, and increasingly significant and enhanced role of the specialist tribunal, Competition Appeal Tribunal, and the availability of an opt-out collective redress mechanism. The chapter assesses the key UK statutory and case law developments, in comparison with the US private antitrust enforcement model, to reflect on the disappointing extent to which effective redress for consumers has been provided to date, despite those legal and institutional developments, although the recent Supreme Court ruling in Merricks should be pivotal in this context.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131056865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"UK Merger Control","authors":"David Reader","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In Chapter 7, David Reader observes that the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002 formally ended a much maligned public interest approach to merger control in the UK, oft-criticized for the uncertainty permeated by ministerial decision-making. In its place came a new competition-based test to be applied by independent competition authorities with new powers and resources at their disposal. Despite encountering some teething problems as the authorities sought to interpret their respective roles at Phases 1 and 2, the reforms have proven largely successful in delivering one of the most transparent and predictable merger regimes in the world. This chapter reflects on the evolution of UK merger control under the Enterprise Act, observing that a combination of major—and finer-tuning of the competition authority’s Phase 1 enforcement powers has enabled it to effectively deliver upon its mandate. New challenges lie in wait, however, and Reader stresses that the CMA must be allocated the resources and statutory remit to contend with the increased workload implications presented by Brexit and the novel theories of harm associated with mergers in the digital sector. Of further concern are recent reforms to extend the national security public interest ground, which risk a return to the ‘dark ages’ of opaque ministerial decision-making if further safeguards are not implemented.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122744432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vertical Agreements","authors":"Alison Jones","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Alison Jones looks at vertical agreements in Chapter 3. This chapter charts the development of UK competition law and policy towards vertical agreements over the 20 years since the Competition Act 1998 came into force. It traces how UK policy has evolved, before examining the UK jurisprudence that assesses the compatibility of vertical agreements with competition law. It notes that although many UK cases initially focused on resale price maintenance, more recently a number have analysed vertical restraints affecting online selling, which have proliferated since 2000 with the rapid growth of e-commerce. The chapter also considers how the law could, or should, develop in the future, especially now the transition period following the UK’s departure from the EU has ended. An important issue considered is whether, post-Brexit, the UK authorities should continue to follow EU competition law in this sphere, which has in significant respects been influenced by internal market considerations, or whether it should take a different course.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129922177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Quiet Decline of the UK Cartel OffenceA Principled Victory in the Face of Practical Failure","authors":"A. Macculloch","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"In Chapter 13, Angus MacCulloch focuses on criminal enforcement. The UK Cartel Offence was introduced in the Enterprise Act 2002 to challenge hard-core cartels and enhance the deterrent effect of the UK competition regime. In its initial phase of operation there was some success. However, a number of significant cases failed to secure convictions. This damaged confidence in the ability of the UK competition authorities to bring successful prosecutions, and ultimately questioned the usefulness of the Cartel Offence. This chapter examines the problems that beset the original Cartel Offence and the lessons learned from the small number of prosecutions brought before the courts. It goes on to examine the reforms in 2013, that removed the controversial ‘dishonesty’ element from the offence, and replaced it with carve outs for openness and publication. Alongside the practical issues in relation to the development of the UK Cartel Offence consideration is also given to a parallel process which saw a form of consensus developing in the academic literature as to the nature of the wrong at the heart of individual cartel activity. It is suggested that this greater understanding can be used to direct efforts to rebuild confidence in the reformed UK Cartel Offence going forward. Increased importance should be given to the securing of good evidence of individual culpability in relation to cartel activity during the investigation phase. It argues that once good evidence is secured, better prosecution cases can be built on the basis of the new narrative of wrongfulness for hard core cartel activity.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"612 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123948916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exploitative Abuses","authors":"R. O’Donoghue","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 5 provides a detailed and comprehensive description and analysis of the major exploitative abuses cases considered by the English courts and competition and regulatory authorities since the inception of the Competition Act 1998, including the High Court, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, and the Court of Appeal. This decisional practice and case law have been widely cited and adopted by the EU Courts in Advocate General opinions and in the judgments and opinions of overseas authorities and courts. The chapter also contains a critique of the case law and decisional practice and highlights important practical points and points of principle that have received insufficient (or no) attention, as well as issues on which the case law and decisional practice are arguably wrong. This analysis is timely, since it is clear that the topic of exploitative abuse remains an important one for the UK competition authorities, regulators, and courts, perhaps even more so than authorities and courts in EU Member States.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131609743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Horizontal Agreements","authors":"Richard Whish","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 considers the application of the Competition Act 1998 to ‘Horizontal Agreements’, and in particular to cartel behaviour, since that piece of legislation entered into force on 1 March 2000. It is a tour de force of the enforcement practice. The chapter notes that early years of the legislation were somewhat disappointing, with a fairly low level of enforcement, although the OFT did score success with pioneering investigations of so-called ‘hub and spoke’ cartels in the Football Shirts and Toys and Games cases. From about 2006 onwards there were more decisions from the OFT, and some of the cases, such as Construction bid-rigging and Fuel surcharges, were high profile ones. Despite this, criticism of under-performance was voiced, not least by the National Audit Office. It is noted that in due course the OFT was replaced by the CMA, and there has been a noticeable increase in enforcement in recent years. Whish suggests that in a post-Brexit world it can be anticipated that there will be yet more enforcement, including of larger cartels which historically would have been investigated by the European Commission in Brussels.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125106922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exclusionary Abuses","authors":"Renato Nazzini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868026.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.","PeriodicalId":179347,"journal":{"name":"The UK Competition Regime","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121255843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}