UK Merger Control

Abstract

In Chapter 7, David Reader observes that the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002 formally ended a much maligned public interest approach to merger control in the UK, oft-criticized for the uncertainty permeated by ministerial decision-making. In its place came a new competition-based test to be applied by independent competition authorities with new powers and resources at their disposal. Despite encountering some teething problems as the authorities sought to interpret their respective roles at Phases 1 and 2, the reforms have proven largely successful in delivering one of the most transparent and predictable merger regimes in the world. This chapter reflects on the evolution of UK merger control under the Enterprise Act, observing that a combination of major—and finer-tuning of the competition authority’s Phase 1 enforcement powers has enabled it to effectively deliver upon its mandate. New challenges lie in wait, however, and Reader stresses that the CMA must be allocated the resources and statutory remit to contend with the increased workload implications presented by Brexit and the novel theories of harm associated with mergers in the digital sector. Of further concern are recent reforms to extend the national security public interest ground, which risk a return to the ‘dark ages’ of opaque ministerial decision-making if further safeguards are not implemented.