{"title":"Disaggregated Tips: The Case for Disaggregating Inflation-Linked Bonds into Bonds Linked to Narrower CPI Components","authors":"William W. Jennings","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.587983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.587983","url":null,"abstract":"Investors generally face inflation-linked obligations - a fact contributing to the popularity of TIPS and other inflation-linked bonds. With TIPS, one characterization of inflation, the Consumer Price Index, applies to all investors. Investors, however, face different flavors of inflation. To date, these heterogeneous needs have not been addressed by the inflation-linked marketplace. The paper describes the case for and mechanics of splitting TIPS into disaggregated TIPS matched to components of the Consumer Price Index. Disaggregated TIPS better address the risks of investors' specific real liabilities. An appendix highlights disaggregated TIPS applicability to pension schemes with post-retirement health benefit obligations.","PeriodicalId":177602,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115025289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Enter at Your Own Risk: HMO Participation and Enrollment in the Medicarerisk Market","authors":"J. Abraham, A. Arora, M. Gaynor, D. Wholey","doi":"10.3386/w7385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w7385","url":null,"abstract":"We examine HMO participation and enrollment in the Medicare risk market for the years 1990 to 1995. We develop a profit- maximization model of HMO behavior, which explicitly considers potential linkages between an HMO's production decision in the commercial enrollee market and its participation and production decisions in the Medicare risk market. Our results suggest that the payment rate is a primary determinant of HMO participation, while the price of a supplemental Medicare insurance policy positively affects HMO Medicare enrollment. We also find empirical support for the existence of complementarities in the joint production of an HMO's commercial and Medicare products.","PeriodicalId":177602,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114187604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hmos and Fee-for-Service Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare","authors":"L. Baker","doi":"10.3386/w5360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w5360","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing levels of HMO activity may influence health expenditures in other sectors of the market. Medicare provides FFS coverage to the majority of its beneficiaries and may thus provide a way of examining these so-called spillover effects. This paper examines 1986-1990 Medicare FFS expenditures at the county- and MSA- levels, coupled with county- and MSA-level measures of HMO market share. Fixed-effects and IV estimates of the relationship between market share and expenditures are presented. All of the models imply that FFS expenditures are concave in market share and that expenditures are decreasing in market share for market shares above about 18%. Many of the estimates suggest that expenditures become decreasing in market share at much lower levels (between 0% and 10%). Fixed-effects estimates imply that increases in market share from 20 to 30 percent would be associated with expenditure reductions of 3.4% -6.6% in Part A expenditures and 2.5% - 5.6% in Part B expenditures. IV estimates imply larger responses. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that managed care can affect non-managed-care expenditures.","PeriodicalId":177602,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing eJournal","volume":"353 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124460082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulated Price Discrimination and Quality: the Implications of Medicaid Reimbursement Policy for the Nursing Home Industry","authors":"P. Gertler","doi":"10.3386/W1667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W1667","url":null,"abstract":"Nursing homes participate simultaneously in a regulated and an unregulated market, and are required to supply the same quality of service to both markets. Specifically, nursing homes compete for patients who finance their care privately, and patients whose care is financed by the government's Medicaid program. The government reimburses nursing homes a set fee for the care of Medicaid patients, whereas nursing homes charge \"private pay\" patients what the market will bear. Quality is determined by competition in the\"private pay\" patient market. The greater the size of the \"private pay\" market relative to the Medicaid market, the higher is quality. We find that Medicaid policy makers face a trade-off between the access of Medicaid patients to care and quality. Specifically, an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate causes nursing homes to reduce quality, increase\"private pay\" price, and to admit more Medicaid patients and fewer \"private pay\" patients. Hence, in the nursing home industry, higher prices are associated with lower levels of quality. In addition, nursing homes set quality higher if the remibursement rate is set via \"cost plus\" pricing than if it is set via \"flat rate\" pricing. Moreover, consumers in both markets are better off under \"cost plus\" pricing, nursing homes earn higher profits under \"flat rate\" pricing, and total governmental Medicaid expenditures are the same under both reimbursement methods.","PeriodicalId":177602,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1985-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132763909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}