ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"China’s WTO Accession Revisited: Achievements and Challenges in Chinese Intellectual Property Law Reform","authors":"A. Wechsler","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-23309-8_4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23309-8_4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"249 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116445138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Idea Gap in Pink and Black","authors":"L. Cook, Chaleampong Kongcharoen","doi":"10.3386/W16331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16331","url":null,"abstract":"Previous studies have found large gender and racial differences in commercialization of invention. Using novel data that permit enhanced identification of women and African American inventors, we find that gender and racial differences in commercial activity related to invention are lower than once thought. This is despite relatively lower patent activity among women and African Americans. Further, among determinants of commercialization, the evidence suggests that advanced training in engineering is correlated with better commercialization outcomes for women and African Americans than for U.S. inventors as a whole, for whom advanced training in life sciences is more important.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116161405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"‘American Needle 9 – National Football League 0’: Background and Implications of the Supreme Court’s Unanimous Denial of the NFL’s Attempt at Single Entity Status in Sports Law, Antitrust, IP and Labor Law","authors":"Timothy Liam Epstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1623497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1623497","url":null,"abstract":"American Needle manufactured and sold hats for the National Football League (“NFL”) until December of 2000 when the NFL signed an exclusive ten-year licensing agreement with Reebok. As a result, American Needle’s licensing agreement was not renewed, prompting American Needle to file suit against the NFL under the Sherman Act in the Northern District of Illinois. American Needle alleged that the licensing agreement with Reebok was an unlawful restraint on trade and thus a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in that each of the 32 NFL teams had conspired to freeze it and other competitors out of the market for NFL merchandise.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121958842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A European Patent Indicator for Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing","authors":"P. Oldham, S. Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1397108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1397108","url":null,"abstract":"This report provides the first edition of a European patent indicator for access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing developed for the European Environment Agency as part of the Streamlining European Biodiversity Indicators (SEBI 2010) process (Report EEA/BSS/08/012). The patent indicator identifies biodiversity and traditional knowledge within the international patent system using the International Patent Classification and text mining. Statistics on patent trends are provided for European countries and related instruments using the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). Four definitions of biodiversity and traditional knowledge are provided and compared in the report: a) an OECD definition of biotechnology patents; b) a definition capturing the universe of biodiversity and traditional knowledge patent activity based on text mining; c) a definition that assumes that pharmaceutical and chemical compounds are of natural origin; d) a refined indicator based on text mining of the International Patent Classification.The main contribution of the report is to provide the most detailed study to date of the presence of biodiversity and traditional knowledge in the patent system. The report contributes to European work to establish indicators to meet the 2010 target to halt the loss of biodiversity and to work on an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity. In connection with debates under the Convention on Biological Diversity the report considers issues including: disclosure of origin of biodiversity and traditional knowledge; certificate systems, and; the methodological challenges involved in linking patent data with wider economic indicators. The World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) developed by the European Patent Office is a new research tool. In the interest of methodological transparency and development the PATSTAT queries along with IPC definitions and data sets developed for the report are made available in an online data archive referenced in the report. Revised with slight erratum and link to higher resolution version and images on 05/06/2009.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115880803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Excess-Entry Theorem: The Implications of Licensing","authors":"A. Mukherjee, S. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.01088.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.01088.x","url":null,"abstract":"We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for anticompetitive entry regulation due to the standard excess-entry result may not be justified in the presence of licensing. However, if the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry costs where entry does not occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134531338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Complementary Patents and Market Structure","authors":"Klaus M. Schmidt","doi":"10.1111/jems.12041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12041","url":null,"abstract":"Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133440894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property","authors":"P. Rey, D. Salant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1302368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1302368","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream monopoly owner of essential IP increases the number of licenses, it enhances product variety, adding to consumer value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, and thus dissipates profits. As a result, the upstream IP monopoly may want to provide too many or too few licenses, relatively to what maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare. With multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking increases aggregate licensing fees and thus tends to limit the number of licensees, which can also reduce downstream prices for consumers. We characterize the conditions under which these reductions in downstream prices and variety is beneficial to consumers or society.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131771701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Creation","authors":"M. Boldrin, D. Levine","doi":"10.4324/9780203014981-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203014981-12","url":null,"abstract":"In the modern theory of innovation, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an effect of creative economic activity. Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient incentive to innovate should the prospect of monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, international trade, and industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary consequence of innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may hurt more than help, innovation and growth. We show that, in most circumstances, competitive rents allow creative individuals to appropriate a large enough share of the social surplus generated by their innovations to compensate for their opportunity cost. We also show that, as the number of pre-existing and IP protected ideas needed for an innovation increases, the equilibrium outcome under the IP regime is one of decreasing probability of innovation, while this is not the case without IP. Finally, we provide various examples of how competitive markets for innovative products would work in the absence of IP and critically discuss a number of common fallacies in the previous literature.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122931862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Whose Stats are They Anyway? Analyzing the Battle Between Major League Baseball and Fantasy Game Sites","authors":"Stacey B. Evans","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1402006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1402006","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an in-depth analysis of the ongoing legal battle in C.B.C Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. and particularly examines the Eastern District of Missouri’s and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis of the right of publicity, the First Amendment, and copyright law. In 2006, the Eastern District Court of Missouri handed down a decision that promised to have a wide-ranging effect on the future of online fantasy sports. In 2007, that decision was affirmed in a divided 2-1 vote by an Appellate Board for the Eighth Circuit. While the district court judge held that players do not have a right of publicity in the names and playing statistics as used in an online fantasy baseball game, the appellate court held that players do in fact have a right of publicity. While the two courts came down differently on this issue, both agreed that even if a right of publicity existed here, the First Amendment trumps that right. District Judge Medler’s decision (affirmed by the Eighth Circuit) has broad reaching implications for the entire genre of fantasy sports operations. The ultimate decision in C.B.C Distribution will go a long way toward determining the course of the multi-billion dollar industry of fantasy sports. Web sites such as ESPN.com and Yahoo.com are able to generate revenue in a variety of ways. Both sites feature stories, advertisements, a variety of games, and other sections of interest. For CBC, its sole source of revenue is its fantasy sports games. The site does not offer other content, stories, or sections that appeal to the masses. Fantasy baseball requires a niche audience that has a fascination with statistics and how a player performs throughout the season. Fantasy baseball is the lifeblood of CBC’s business operation. If the U.S. Supreme Court were to r everse this ruling in favor of Advanced Media, it would initiate a slippery slope, creating a scenario in which a famous person’s name could never be used for entertainment value. Trivial Pursuit, Cranium, and other trivia -based board games use the names of famous people for the purpose of asking questions. Where does the line begin and end with respect to what is considered a legal use of a person’s name? Trivial Pursuit would have to eliminate two entire categories of questions if it was not permissibl e to use names. Two Pop Culture versions are now ma de – they include categories such as movies, TV, sports, and ames. In these versions, players are asked questions on hot gossip, celebrity trivia, and movie information. You cannot have a game based o n popular culture without using the athlete and celebrity names that make up Pop Culture, because the Arts & Entertainment and Sports questions are so heavily based on the use of athlete and celebrity names. Cranium has a new Pop version that asks questions and requires acting out. On an even simpler level, any time you go to the movie theater, trivia questions and scramble puzzles ap","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130574474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Make-or-Buy Decisions in Patent Related Services","authors":"Stefan Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1099384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1099384","url":null,"abstract":"Among the most prominent theoretical frameworks dealing with the economic underlyings of firms’ make-or-buy decisions are Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resourced Based View (RBV). Relying on panel data covering 107 European firms over eight years I test predictions from both TCE and RBV with regard to the outsourcing of patent related services simultaneously. Modelling the share of outsourced patent applications in a Negative Binomial Panel Regression Model I find joint explanatory power of both approaches. My findings support previous literature arguing for an integration of TCE and RBV to a comprehensive theoretical framework of firms make-or-buy decisions.","PeriodicalId":177397,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132185065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}