Annual Computer Security Applications Conference最新文献_第4页

TLB Poisoning Attacks on AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization 针对AMD安全加密虚拟化的TLB中毒攻击

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485876

Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, Huibo Wang, Kang Li, Yueqiang Cheng

{"title":"TLB Poisoning Attacks on AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization","authors":"Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, Huibo Wang, Kang Li, Yueqiang Cheng","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485876","url":null,"abstract":"AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an emerging technology of AMD server processors, which provides transparent memory encryption and key management for virtual machines (VM) without trusting the underlying hypervisor. Like Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), SEV forms a foundation for confidential computing on untrusted machines; unlike SGX, SEV supports full VM encryption and thus makes porting applications straightforward. To date, many mainstream cloud service providers, including Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud, have already adopted (or are planning to adopt) SEV for confidential cloud services. In this paper, we provide the first exploration of the security issues of TLB management on SEV processors and demonstrate a novel class of TLB Poisoning attacks against SEV VMs. We first demystify how SEV extends the TLB implementation atop AMD Virtualization (AMD-V) and show that the TLB management is no longer secure under SEV’s threat model, which allows the hypervisor to poison TLB entries between two processes of a SEV VM. We then present TLB Poisoning Attacks, a class of attacks that break the integrity and confidentiality of the SEV VM by poisoning its TLB entries. Two variants of TLB Poisoning Attacks are described in the paper; and two end-to-end attacks are performed successfully on both AMD SEV and SEV-ES.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129483775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

A formal analysis of IKEv2’s post-quantum extension IKEv2后量子扩展的形式化分析

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485885

S. Gazdag, Sophia Grundner-Culemann, T. Guggemos, T. Heider, Daniel Loebenberger

{"title":"A formal analysis of IKEv2’s post-quantum extension","authors":"S. Gazdag, Sophia Grundner-Culemann, T. Guggemos, T. Heider, Daniel Loebenberger","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485885","url":null,"abstract":"Many security protocols used for daily Internet traffic have been used for decades and standardization bodies like the IETF often provide extensions for legacy protocols to deal with new requirements. Even though the security aspects for extensions are carefully discussed, automated reasoning has proven to be a valuable tool to uncover security holes that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. Therefore, Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) is already a customary procedure for the development of some new protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 and MLS. IKEv2, the key exchange for the IPsec protocol suite, is expected to undergo significant changes to facilitate the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography. We present the first formal security model for the IKEv2-handshake in a quantum setting together with an automated proof using the Tamarin Prover. Our model focuses on the core state machine, is therefore easily extendable, and aims to promote the use of ATP in IPsec-standardization. The security model captures gaps in the protocol, but treats the specific implementation (like fragmentation mechanisms, for example) as a black box. With IKE_INTERMEDIATE we showcase this approach on a recently proposed extension that significantly changes the protocol’s state machine.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"367 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116367209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Crypto-Chain: A Relay Resilience Framework for Smart Vehicles 加密链:智能车辆的中继弹性框架

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485920

A. Sani, Dong Yuan, E. Bertino, Zhao Yang Dong

{"title":"Crypto-Chain: A Relay Resilience Framework for Smart Vehicles","authors":"A. Sani, Dong Yuan, E. Bertino, Zhao Yang Dong","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485920","url":null,"abstract":"Recent findings show that smart vehicles can be exposed to relay attacks resulting from weaknesses in cryptographic operations, such as authentication and key derivation, or poor implementation of these operations. Relay attacks refer to attacks in which authentication is evaded without needing to attack a smart vehicle itself. They are a recurrent problem in practice. In this paper, we formulate the necessary relay resilience settings for strengthening authentication and key derivation and achieving the secure design and efficient implementation of cryptographic protocols based on universal composability, which allows the modular design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We introduce Crypto-Chain, a relay resilience framework that extends Kusters’s universal composition theorem on a fixed number of protocol systems to prevent bypass of cryptographic operations and avoid implementation errors. Our framework provides an ideal crypto-chain functionality that supports several cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, we provide an ideal functionality for mutual authentication and key derivation in Crypto-Chain by which cryptographic protocols can use cryptographic operations, knowledge about the computation time of the operations, and cryptographic timestamps to ensure relay resilience. As a proof of concept, we first propose and implement a mutual authentication and key derivation protocol (MKD) that confirms the efficiency and relay resilience capabilities of Crypto-Chain and then apply Crypto-Chain to fix two protocols used in smart vehicles, namely Megamos Crypto and Hitag-AES/Pro.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129333604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Practical Attestation for Edge Devices Running Compute Heavy Machine Learning Applications 运行计算重型机器学习应用的边缘设备的实际认证

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485909

Ismi Abidi, Vireshwar Kumar, Rijurekha Sen

{"title":"Practical Attestation for Edge Devices Running Compute Heavy Machine Learning Applications","authors":"Ismi Abidi, Vireshwar Kumar, Rijurekha Sen","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485909","url":null,"abstract":"Machine Learning (EdgeML) algorithms on edge devices facilitate safety-critical applications like building security management and smart city interventions. However, their wired/wireless connections with the Internet make such platforms vulnerable to attacks compromising the embedded software. We find that in the prior works, the issue of regular runtime integrity assessment of the deployed software with negligible EdgeML performance degradation is still unresolved. In this paper, we present PracAttest, a practical runtime attestation framework for embedded devices running compute-heavy EdgeML applications. Unlike the conventional remote attestation schemes that check the entire software in each attestation event, PracAttest segments the software and randomizes the integrity check of these segments over short random attestation intervals. The segmentation coupled with the randomization leads to a novel performance-vs-security trade-off that can be tuned per the EdgeML application’s performance requirements. Additionally, we implement three realistic EdgeML benchmarks for pollution measurement, traffic intersection control, and face identification, using state-of-the-art neural network and computer vision algorithms. We specify and verify security properties for these benchmarks and evaluate the efficacy of PracAttest in attesting the verified software. PracAttest provides 50x-80x speedup over the state-of-the-art baseline in terms of mean attestation time, with negligible impact on application performance. We believe that the novel performance-vs-security trade-off facilitated by PracAttest will expedite the adoption of runtime attestation on edge platforms.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134156706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Eluding ML-based Adblockers With Actionable Adversarial Examples 用可操作的对抗性示例避开基于ml的广告拦截器

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3488008

Shitong Zhu, Zhongjie Wang, Xun Chen, Shasha Li, Keyu Man, Umar Iqbal, Zhiyun Qian, Kevin S. Chan, S. Krishnamurthy, Zubair Shafiq, Yu Hao, Guoren Li, Zheng Zhang, Xiaochen Zou

{"title":"Eluding ML-based Adblockers With Actionable Adversarial Examples","authors":"Shitong Zhu, Zhongjie Wang, Xun Chen, Shasha Li, Keyu Man, Umar Iqbal, Zhiyun Qian, Kevin S. Chan, S. Krishnamurthy, Zubair Shafiq, Yu Hao, Guoren Li, Zheng Zhang, Xiaochen Zou","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488008","url":null,"abstract":"Online advertisers have been quite successful in circumventing traditional adblockers that rely on manually curated rules to detect ads. As a result, adblockers have started to use machine learning (ML) classifiers for more robust detection and blocking of ads. Among these, AdGraph which leverages rich contextual information to classify ads, is arguably, the state of the art ML-based adblocker. In this paper, we present a4, a tool that intelligently crafts adversarial ads to evade AdGraph. Unlike traditional adversarial examples in the computer vision domain that can perturb any pixels (i.e., unconstrained), adversarial ads generated by a4 are actionable in the sense that they preserve the application semantics of the web page. Through a series of experiments we show that a4 can bypass AdGraph about 81% of the time, which surpasses the state-of-the-art attack by a significant margin of 145.5%, with an overhead of <20% and perturbations that are visually imperceptible in the rendered webpage. We envision that a4’s framework can be used to potentially launch adversarial attacks against other ML-based web applications.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128282761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

FINN: Fingerprinting Network Flows using Neural Networks 指纹识别网络使用神经网络

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3488010

F. Rezaei, A. Houmansadr

{"title":"FINN: Fingerprinting Network Flows using Neural Networks","authors":"F. Rezaei, A. Houmansadr","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488010","url":null,"abstract":"Traffic analysis is essential to network security by enabling the correlation of encrypted network flows; in particular, traffic analysis has been used to detect stepping stone attackers and de-anonymize anonymous connections. A modern type of traffic analysis is flow fingerprinting, which works by slightly perturbing network flows to embed secret information into the flows that later can be used for traffic analysis. It is shown that flow fingerprinting enables the use of traffic analysis in a wide range of applications. In this paper, we introduce an effective flow fingerprinting technique by leveraging neural networks. Specifically, our system uses a fully connected network to generate slight perturbations that are then added to the live flows to fingerprint them. We show that our fingerprinting system offers reliable performance in the different network settings, outperforming the state-of-the-art. We also enforce an invisibility constraint in generating our flow fingerprints and use GAN to generate fingerprinting delays with Laplacian distribution to make it similar to natural network jitter. Therefore, we show that our fingerprinted flows are highly indistinguishable from benign network flows.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130558742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Rocky: Replicating Block Devices for Tamper and Failure Resistant Edge-based Virtualized Desktop Infrastructure Rocky:复制块设备用于基于边缘的防篡改和防故障虚拟化桌面基础设施

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485886

Beom Heyn Kim, Hyoungshick Kim

{"title":"Rocky: Replicating Block Devices for Tamper and Failure Resistant Edge-based Virtualized Desktop Infrastructure","authors":"Beom Heyn Kim, Hyoungshick Kim","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485886","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, edge-based virtual desktop infrastructure (EdgeVDI), which brings the power of virtualized desktop infrastructure to cloudlets closer to users, has been considered as an attractive solution for WAN mobility. However, ransomware and wiper malware are becoming more and more prevalent, which can impose serious cybersecurity threats to EdgeVDI users. Existing tamper-resistant solutions cannot deal with cloudlet failures. In this paper, we propose Rocky, the first distributed replicated block device for EdgeVDI that can recover from tampering attacks and failures. The key enabler is replicating to store a consistent write sequence across cloudlets as an append-only immutable mutation history. In addition, Rocky uses a replication broker to allow heterogenous cloudlets to control replication rates at their pace and reduces both disk space and network bandwidth consumption by coalescing writes for both uplink and downlink. To show the feasibility of Rocky, we implemented Rocky in Java. The experimental results show that Rocky’s write and read throughputs are similar to those of a baseline device with 8.4% and 11.9% additional overheads, respectively. In addition, we could reduce repeated writes by 88.5% and 100% for editing presentation slides and a photo, respectively.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129739186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Keeping Safe Rust Safe with Galeed 用Galeed保护生锈的安全

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485903

Elijah Rivera, Samuel Mergendahl, Howie Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi, N. Burow

{"title":"Keeping Safe Rust Safe with Galeed","authors":"Elijah Rivera, Samuel Mergendahl, Howie Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi, N. Burow","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485903","url":null,"abstract":"Rust is a programming language that simultaneously offers high performance and strong security guarantees. Safe Rust (i.e., Rust code that does not use the unsafe keyword) is memory and type safe. However, these guarantees are violated when safe Rust interacts with unsafe code, most notably code written in other programming languages, including in legacy C/C++ applications that are incrementally deploying Rust. This is a significant problem as major applications such as Firefox, Chrome, AWS, Windows, and Linux have either deployed Rust or are exploring doing so. It is important to emphasize that unsafe code is not only unsafe itself, but also it breaks the safety guarantees of ‘safe’ Rust; e.g., a dangling pointer in a linked C/C++ library can access and overwrite memory allocated to Rust even when the Rust code is fully safe. This paper presents Galeed, a technique to keep safe Rust safe from interference from unsafe code. Galeed has two components: a runtime defense to prevent unintended interactions between safe Rust and unsafe code and a sanitizer to secure intended interactions. The runtime component works by isolating Rust’s heap from any external access and is enforced using Intel Memory Protection Key (MPK) technology. The sanitizer uses a smart data structure that we call pseudo-pointer along with automated code transformation to avoid passing raw pointers across safe/unsafe boundaries during intended interactions (e.g., when Rust and C++ code exchange data). We implement and evaluate the effectiveness and performance of Galeed via micro- and macro-benchmarking, and use it to secure a widely used component of Firefox.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127000607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

MineHunter: A Practical Cryptomining Traffic Detection Algorithm Based on Time Series Tracking MineHunter:一种实用的基于时间序列跟踪的密码挖掘流量检测算法

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3485835

Shize Zhang, Zhiliang Wang, Jiahai Yang, Xin Cheng, Xiaoqian Ma, Hui Zhang, Bo Wang, Zimu Li, Jianping Wu

{"title":"MineHunter: A Practical Cryptomining Traffic Detection Algorithm Based on Time Series Tracking","authors":"Shize Zhang, Zhiliang Wang, Jiahai Yang, Xin Cheng, Xiaoqian Ma, Hui Zhang, Bo Wang, Zimu Li, Jianping Wu","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485835","url":null,"abstract":"With the development of cryptocurrencies’ market, the problem of cryptojacking, which is an unauthorized control of someone else’s computer to mine cryptocurrency, has been more and more serious. Existing cryptojacking detection methods require to install anti-virus software on the host or load plug-in in the browser, which are difficult to deploy on enterprise or campus networks with a large number of hosts and servers. To bridge the gap, we propose MineHunter, a practical cryptomining traffic detection algorithm based on time series tracking. Instead of being deployed at the hosts, MineHunter detects the cryptomining traffic at the entrance of enterprise or campus networks. Minehunter has taken into account the challenges faced by the actual deployment environment, including extremely unbalanced datasets, controllable alarms, traffic confusion, and efficiency. The accurate network-level detection is achieved by analyzing the network traffic characteristics of cryptomining and investigating the association between the network flow sequence of cryptomining and the block creation sequence of cryptocurrency. We evaluate our algorithm at the entrance of a large office building in a campus network for a month. The total volumes exceed 28 TeraBytes. Our experimental results show that MineHunter can achieve precision of 97.0% and recall of 99.7%.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121890855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Reproducible and Adaptable Log Data Generation for Sound Cybersecurity Experiments 声音网络安全实验中可重复和可适应的日志数据生成

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2021-11-15 DOI: 10.1145/3485832.3488020

Rafael Uetz, Christian Hemminghaus, Louis Hackländer, Philipp Schlipper, Martin Henze

{"title":"Reproducible and Adaptable Log Data Generation for Sound Cybersecurity Experiments","authors":"Rafael Uetz, Christian Hemminghaus, Louis Hackländer, Philipp Schlipper, Martin Henze","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488020","url":null,"abstract":"Artifacts such as log data and network traffic are fundamental for cybersecurity research, e.g., in the area of intrusion detection. Yet, most research is based on artifacts that are not available to others or cannot be adapted to own purposes, thus making it difficult to reproduce and build on existing work. In this paper, we identify the challenges of artifact generation with the goal of conducting sound experiments that are valid, controlled, and reproducible. We argue that testbeds for artifact generation have to be designed specifically with reproducibility and adaptability in mind. To achieve this goal, we present SOCBED, our proof-of-concept implementation and the first testbed with a focus on generating realistic log data for cybersecurity experiments in a reproducible and adaptable manner. SOCBED enables researchers to reproduce testbed instances on commodity computers, adapt them according to own requirements, and verify their correct functionality. We evaluate SOCBED with an exemplary, practical experiment on detecting a multi-step intrusion of an enterprise network and show that the resulting experiment is indeed valid, controlled, and reproducible. Both SOCBED and the log dataset underlying our evaluation are freely available.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"137 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131558169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12