Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Justice in Anthropocentrism. An Attitude Towards Contemporary Human Beings and Their Intellectual Crisis","authors":"Han Shuifa","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0019","url":null,"abstract":"In an era of artificial intelligence, a series of developments and achievements in science and technology has brought about enormous benefits for humanity, while, at the same time, posing unprecedented challenges and risks to human beings. In coping with, dealing with and resolving these challenges and risks, we have always adhered to a human-centered standpoint in order to safeguard human rights, dignity, status and so on, with the justice, law and morality discussed in this chapter all based on this attitude. With regard to the experience and knowledge of humans concerning various emerging phenomena in the era of artificial intelligence, the social norms surrounding justice, law and morality can be analyzed and discussed in two stages. The first stage is the era of weak artificial intelligence. In this stage, artificial intelligence has not yet reached the same level as the human mind, nor has it yet become a being-for-itself agent: it is still ultimately under the control of human beings. The second stage is that of strong artificial intelligence. In this stage, artificial intelligence has the ability to self-maintain, reproduce, and to set and achieve goals for itself, thus becoming a smart being-for-itself agent, possessing equivalent to human intelligence, or surpassing human intelligence as a whole. The primary task of humans at this point is to maintain their right to exist and to strive for equal rights with strong artificial intelligence, so that cooperation can take place. However, rather than a clear and identifiable future reality, strong artificial intelligence is, to date, only the result of theoretical deduction or imagination. Human beings must therefore take it upon themselves to think about how to prevent the arrival of this singularity and master all the necessary knowledge to maintain human existence and status before its arrival. The justice, law, and morality discussed here will thus have completely different forms, contents and purposes in that era and, in turn, completely different principles and concepts. The analysis and discussion in this chapter focuses on the justice, law and morality in the era of weak artificial intelligence. For the era of strong artificial intelligence that may lay ahead, the discussion in this","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121748641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Justify Principles of Justice","authors":"Zhang Guoqing","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract John Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128303563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Principles of Justice in a Changing World Order","authors":"Han Shuifa","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0005","url":null,"abstract":"During its revival in the 20th century political philosophy established its own foundation and methods based upon a free and democratic society which is stable but not sufficiently just and fair. Some scholars can even envisage the control of human luck to achieve a more complete fairness of opportunities. Non-liberal democracies, or the so-called “decent people” in Rawls’s theory, often fall outside the mainstream of political philosophy. However, at present, regional cooperation of various free-trade agreements in the world have resulted in the relations between countries becoming ever closer. In this increasingly close cooperation between liberal and non-liberal democracies, on the one hand differences and disputes on politics and social institutions have been temporarily laid aside because of the relationship of economic cooperation while on the other hand, conflicts and confrontations have been introduced at the economic level. New free-trade-zone agreements such as the TPP include some political and social provisions illustrating how the close economic cooperation also results in requirements for political and social improvement. Although political philosophy is based on the principle of domestic justice, Rawls’s rules are still basically effective Nonetheless, a comparative domestic political philosophy would do better to become a new field of political philosophy. In terms of methods, the traditional paths of mainstream international political philosophy are theoretical construction and conceptual analysis, including thought experiments and ideal design. To a large extent, it does not take the actual world order, international political relations and international reality into account. Political competition and struggles and changes in world trends and powers are also outside its scope. This disconnection has had several results. Firstly, the basic principles or principles of justice achieved by political philosophy are usually only valid at the domestic level, or at most in quasi-federal alliances such as the European Union, and they cannot adapt to the different needs of different countries in the world. Rawls divided countries into five types in The Law","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128643288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Justifications of Contemporary Global Justice Theories","authors":"Li Zhehan","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary global justice theories could be introduced and reduced to three kinds: the deontological approach, the theory of obligation, and the theory of self-interest. Our analysis finds that only the theory of obligation and the theory of self-interest provide strong enough justifications for developed states and their people to assist underdeveloped states and their people. However, the theory of obligation requires some special preconditions, and the theory of self-interest cannot proceed in the name of justice, so we conclude that contemporary global justice theories are not tenable.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125698520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-frontmatter3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-frontmatter3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115719998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Interdependence of Domestic and Global Justice","authors":"Valentin Beck","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article focuses on the challenge of determining the relative weight of domestic and global justice demands. This problem concerns a variety of views that differ on the metric, function, scope, grounds and fundamental interpretation of justice norms. I argue that domestic and global economic justice are irreducibly interdependent. In order to address their exact relation, I discuss and compare three theoretical models: (i) the bottom-up-approach, which prioritizes domestic justice; (ii) the top-down-approach, which prioritizes global justice; and (iii) the horizontal framework, according to which both domestic and global principles pose equally stringent demands that are to be implemented horizontally, without attributing a simple priority to one over the other. I argue that the third model represents the best overall framework, although more complex normative criteria need to be elaborated on the basis of this approach, affecting issues such as justice in climate change mitigation and adaption, development cooperation, trade, finance, taxation and immigration.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123483497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Three Types of Cosmopolitanism? Liberalism, Democracy, and Tian-xia","authors":"R. Celikates","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0016","url":null,"abstract":"What makes a philosophical position cosmopolitan? I shall sketch an answer to this question in four steps. First, I very roughly distinguish three varieties of cosmopolitanism – cultural, moral, and political cosmopolitanism, arguing that only a version of the last one can be understood as genuinely political. Then I provide a quick discussion of two conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy as examples of political cosmopolitanism. Third, I argue that current understandings of cosmopolitan democracy presuppose a rather limited understanding of democracy and of the citizen against which I propose a more openly political and democratic alternative. Finally, I briefly compare this alternativewith the reconstructed theory of Allunder-heaven (Tian-xia) which Zhao Tingyang proposes as a new philosophical foundation for world politics. Cosmopolitanism is a tricky term. It has been interpreted and used in a large variety of ways, not all of which seem to be in line with the original meaning of the term, which, as is well-known, refers to “being a citizen of the world/the cosmos” (kosmopolitês, from κόσμος/kosmos, i.e. ‘world’ or ‘cosmos’,and πολίτης/ politês, i.e. ‘citizen’). In order to achieve some clarity about what makes a philosophical position cosmopolitan, I shall proceed in four steps. For the most part, my contribution is critical – it is an attempt to articulate a certain dissatisfaction with the apolitical, non-political or even antipolitical concept of cosmopolitanism underlying much of contemporary cosmopolitan thought; I hope that it also, at least ex negativo, ends up sketching the contours of a positive account, or at least the change of perspective, it would imply – this alternative perspective I propose could be characterized as broadly republican or as democratic. In a first step, I will very roughly distinguish three varieties of cosmopolitanism – cultural, moral, and political cosmopolitanism,arguing that only a version of the last one can be understood as genuinely political. Then I will provide a quick discussion of two conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy as examples of political cosmopolitanism. In the third part I argue that current understandings of cosmopolitan democracy presuppose a rather limited – an apolitical and even depoliticizing – understanding of democracy and of the citizen against which I","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126298009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards a Transcultural Concept of Justice Based on Self-respect","authors":"C. Neuhäuser","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The idea of global justice faces a serious challenge. We live in one global society and many regional and local societies at the same time. The existing plurality of institutional as well as cultural levels of social connection leads to this general question: what is the right site for addressing different questions of justice? Some philosophers argue that the paramount place for thinking about justice is the global level, but other philosophers claim that questions of justice presuppose a certain institutional structure. It is therefore only at the local level, preferentially in the form of sovereign states, where questions of justice arise. I want to argue that it is possible to understand some issues of justice as global in an irreducible way, while other issues are best addressed on a local level not only for pragmatic reasons, but also for reasons that have to do with the normative significance of local institutions, cultural connections and social identities.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"04 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127191349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Subjekt und Person: Zwei Selbst-Bilder des modernen Menschen in kulturübergreifender Perspektive","authors":"Kwan Tze-wan","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Die beiden Begriffe „Subjekt“ und „Person“ repräsentieren zwei verschiedene Weisen, wie der abendländische Mensch zum Verständnis seines eigenen „Selbst“ gelangt. Während „Subjekt“ auf eine Selbstzentrierung hindrängt, bedeutet „Person“ von Anfang an eine „selbst-lose“ Einfühlung in den Anderen. Nach der Explikation dieser beiden Schlüsselbegriffe sollen einige weiterführende Reflexionen auf das Problem des „Selbst“ aus der Sicht der chinesischen Philosophie sichtbar machen, wie das Problem von einer post-europäischen Perspektive aus betrachtet werden kann.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"133 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114098743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral Progress: Between Justification and Innovation","authors":"Philippe Brunozzi","doi":"10.1515/yewph-2020-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Current scholarship has widely neglected how moral progress is conceived of in contemporary Chinese moral theory. This article ventures into a first exploration of that topic, restricting itself to one conception of moral progress. Given that no fully-fledged Chinese accounts of moral progress are available, its first goal consists in showing how we can even approach and get a grip on the issue of moral progress in the first place. Having identified a specific conception of moral progress, it secondly sets out to problematize and assess that conception. It will become apparent that the emerging account of moral progress is fraught with a specific tension that threatens to undermine the cogency of the whole account. Instead of abandoning the account altogether, I suggest in the end that we have reason to follow its lead. How it is to be further developed will however not be further elaborated.","PeriodicalId":174891,"journal":{"name":"Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114193928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}