LSN: Rights & Liberties (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Death of Privacy?","authors":"A. Froomkin","doi":"10.2307/1229519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229519","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid deployment of privacy-destroying technologies by governments and businesses threatens to make informational privacy obsolete. The first part of this article describes a range of current technologies to which the law has yet to respond effectively. These include: routine collection of transactional data, growing automated surveillance in public places, deployment of facial recognition technology and other biometrics, cell-phone tracking, vehicle tracking, satellite monitoring, workplace surveillance, internet tracking from cookies to “clicktrails,” hardware-based identifiers, intellectual property protecting “snitchware,” and sense-enhanced searches that allow observers to see through everything from walls to clothes. The cumulative and reinforcing effect of these technologies may make modern life completely visible and permeable to observers; there could be nowhere to hide. The second part of the article discusses leading attempts to craft legal responses to the assault on privacy – including self-regulation, privacy-enhancing technologies, data-protection law, and property-rights based solutions – in the context of three structural obstacles to privacy enhancement: consumers’ privacy myopia; important First Amendment protections of rights to collect and repeat information; and fear of what other people may do if not monitored. The article concludes that despite the warnings of information privacy pessimists, all is not lost – yet.","PeriodicalId":171535,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Rights & Liberties (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134172936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disinformation and the First Amendment: Fraud on the Public","authors":"Wes Henricksen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3860211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3860211","url":null,"abstract":"If one deceives another in a manner that profits the deceiver and harms the victim, it is fraud, a crime and a tort. However, if one deceives a great number of people in a manner that profits the deceiver and harms the public, it is generally neither a crime nor a tort. It is often legal to mislead the public for profit. As a result, harmful disinformation is disseminated constantly by politicians, the media, and corporations. This disinformation causes a multitude of harms to human health, life, and property, to the environment, and to democratic institutions and systems. Because of the emergence and growth of the internet, email, and social media, disinformation spreads faster and is, in many measures, more problematic today than it has ever been. And it is getting worse. Disinformation cannot, in general, be stopped without infringing on fundamental First Amendment rights. If Congress or a state passed a law curtailing disinformation, or any broad category within it, such a content-based regulation would not survive a First Amendment challenge under strict scrutiny. Why? Because disinformation and other terms like it (e.g., fake news, lies, and misinformation) are broad and vague, and encompasses both protected and unprotected speech. This Article argues that some of the most harmful disinformation, which results in widespread damage, should be deemed unprotected speech because it is fraudulent speech and not merely false speech. Harmful disinformation that amounts to “fraud on the public” is distinct from (and worse than) other kinds of disinformation. The Article sets forth elements that must be met to qualify as fraud on the public. Conduct that qualifies as fraud on the public, rather than merely spreading disinformation, should be deemed either to fit within the fraud exception to the First Amendment, or to have its own carve-out from First Amendment protections. This argument is, in some ways, a radical one; the fraud exception to the First Amendment normally applies only to behavior satisfying the elements of civil or criminal deceit, or one of the other long-established categories of fraudulent speech, such as securities fraud or false advertising. However, because fraud on the public is carried out in the same manner as fraud on the individual, and because the harm it causes to individuals, society, and the environment is as bad or worse than fraud on the individual, fraud on the public, like fraud, runs counter to the very aims of the free speech provision of the First Amendment. As a result, fraud on the public should be deemed unprotected fraudulent speech. Failure to do this will result in the continued growth and spread of the most harmful disinformation, further damaging public health and the environment, poisoning political discourse, and generating further attacks on democracy.","PeriodicalId":171535,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Rights & Liberties (Topic)","volume":"37 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133289822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Roots of Revolution: The African National Congress and Gay Liberation in South Africa","authors":"Joseph H. Jackson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3619433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3619433","url":null,"abstract":"South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutions were the first in the world to contain an explicit prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, and that prohibition established the foundation for marriage equality and broad judicial and legislative protection of gay rights in South Africa. The source of this gay rights clause in the South African Constitution can be found in the African National Congress’s decision to include such a clause in the ANC’s A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa, published when the apartheid government of South Africa was still in power. This article traces the story of that decision, and demonstrates that the gay rights clause was included in the ANC’s draft Bill of Rights as a direct result of the ANC’s Women’s Section’s demand that the ANC confront and address a broader problem: the oppression of women. First, the article lays out the context, explaining the origins of the ANC’s Constitutional Committee, its work in presenting alternative models for a future constitutional order, and its success in securing the ANC’s commitment to true multi-party democracy and an enforceable bill of rights. The article then shows that leaders of the ANC’s Women’s Section, dissatisfied with the ANC’s constitutional proposals as they stood, sparked a thorough-going examination of the problem of sexism and women’s oppression. This examination prompted the ANC to recognize the fundamental human right of gay men and lesbians to be who they are, and led the ANC to prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in its draft Bill of Rights.","PeriodicalId":171535,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Rights & Liberties (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116790534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Judicial Infringement of the Right to Internet Access by the Imposition of Special Sentencing Conditions","authors":"Nina White","doi":"10.26686/wgtn.17011964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/wgtn.17011964","url":null,"abstract":"Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.","PeriodicalId":171535,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Rights & Liberties (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131208287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}