{"title":"Error recovery in critical infrastructure systems","authors":"John C. Knight, Matthew C. Elder, Xing Du","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798357","url":null,"abstract":"Critical infrastructure applications provide services upon which society depends heavily; such applications require survivability in the face of faults that might cause a loss of service. These applications are themselves dependent on distributed information systems for all aspects of their operation and so survivability of the information systems is an important issue. Fault tolerance is a key mechanism by which survivability can be achieved in these information systems. Much of the literature on fault-tolerant distributed systems focuses on local error recovery by masking the effects of faults. We describe a direction for error recovery in the face of catastrophic faults, where the effects of the faults cannot be masked using available resources. The goal is to provide continued service that is either an alternate or degraded service by reconfiguring the system rather than masking faults. We outline the requirements for a reconfigurable system architecture and present an error recovery system that enables systematic structuring of error recovery specifications and implementations.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115636339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Toward a scalable method for quantifying aspects of fault tolerance, software assurance, and computer security","authors":"Philip Koopman","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798360","url":null,"abstract":"Quantitative assessment tools are urgently needed in the areas of fault tolerance, software assurance, and computer security. Assessment methods typically employed in various combinations are fault injection, formal verification, and testing. However these methods are expensive because they are labor-intensive, with costs scaling at least linearly with the number of software modules tested. Additionally, they are subject to human lapses and oversights because they require two different representations for each system, and then base results on a direct or an indirect representation comparison. The Ballista project has found that robustness testing forms a niche in which scalable quantitative assessment can be achieved at low cost. This scalability stems from two techniques. Associating state-setting information with test cases based on data types, and using one generic, but narrow, behavioral specification for all modules. Given that this approach has succeeded in comparing the robustness of various operating systems, it is natural to ask if it can be made more generally applicable. It appears that Ballista-like testing can be used in the fault tolerance area to measure the generic robustness of a variety of API implementations and in particular to identify reproducible ways to crash and hang software. In software assurance, it can be used as a quality check on exception handling, and in particular as a means to augment black box testing. Applying it to computer security appears more problematic, but might be possible if there is a way to orthogonally decompose various aspects of security-relevant system state into analogs of Ballista data types. While Ballista-like testing is no substitute for traditional methods, it can serve to provide a useful quality assurance check that augments existing practice at relatively low cost. Alternately, it can serve to quantify the extent of potential problems, enabling better informed decisions by both developers and customers.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127516507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A fault tolerance approach to survivability","authors":"P. Ammann, S. Jajodia, Peng Liu","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798367","url":null,"abstract":"Attacks on computer systems have received a great deal of press attention; however, most of the focus has been on how an attacker can disrupt an organization's operations. Although attack prevention is clearly preferred, preventive measures do fail, and some attacks inevitably succeed in compromising some or all of particular systems, i.e., databases. We propose research into a fault-tolerance approach that addresses all phases of survivability: attack detection, damage confinement, damage assessment and repair, and attack avoidance. We focus attention on continued service and recovery issue. A promising area of research for continued service addresses relaxed notions of consistency. Expanding on the notion of self stabilization, the idea is to formalize the degree of damage under which useful services is still possible. A complementary research area for recovery is the engineering of suitable mechanisms into existing systems. We explain the underlying models for these research areas and illustrate them with examples from the database domain. We argue that these models form a natural part of a fault tolerance approach and propose research into adapting these models for larger systems.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114837936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dependability-a unifying concept","authors":"B. Randell","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798354","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the need for a clear set of system dependability concepts and terminology, adequate for situations in which there are uncertainties about system boundaries, the very complexity of systems (and their specifications, if they have any) is a major problem, judgements as to possible causes or consequences of failure may need be very subtle, and there are only fallible provisions for preventing faults causing failures. It then relates this terminology to that in use in the survivability, critical infrastructures, information warfare, and intrusion detection research communities, before describing the European Dependability initiative a contribution to the planning of the European Unions Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131136366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A symbiotic relationship between formal methods and security","authors":"Jeannette M. Wing","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798355","url":null,"abstract":"Security played a significant role in the development of formal methods in the 70s and early 80s. Have the tables turned? Are formal methods now ready to play a significant role in the development of more secure systems? While not a panacea, the answer is yes, formal methods can and should play such a role. In this paper we first review the limits of formal methods. Then after a brief historical excursion, we summarize some recent results on how model checking and theorem proving tools revealed new and known flaws in authentication protocols. Looking to the future we discuss the challenges and opportunities for formal methods in analyzing the security of systems, above and beyond the protocol level.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116297643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security and dependability: then and now","authors":"Catherine Meadows, John McLean","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798363","url":null,"abstract":"We survey security research from the point of view of the dependability taxonomy developed by IFIP Working Group 10.4 and discuss changes since a similar survey was performed four years ago.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126539773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Certificate revocation the responsible way","authors":"Jonathan Millen, Rebecca N. Wright","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798366","url":null,"abstract":"Public-key certificates are managed by a combination of the informal web of trust and the use of servers maintained by organizations. Prompt and reliable distribution of revocation notices is an essential ingredient for security in a public-key infrastructure. Current schemes based on certificate revocation lists on key servers are inadequate. An approach based on distributing revocation notices to \"dependers\" on each certificate, with cascading forwarding, is suggested. Research is necessary to investigate architectural issues, particularly reliability and response time analysis.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121507546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical techniques for damage confinement in software","authors":"David J. Taylor","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798361","url":null,"abstract":"In a large software system that is required to be dependable, preventing the spread of damage from one system component to another is important. Damage confinement both allows damage to be assessed in a reasonable way once an error is detected and prevents a fault in a single component from causing sudden collapse of the entire system. This paper examines techniques for constraining the spread of damage, both the kinds of constraints required and the means for enforcing those constraints. Techniques developed primarily or exclusively for uses other than fault tolerance are described and examined for suitability in confining damage. The influence on damage confinement of the level of dependability required, e.g., for safety-critical systems versus other systems, is also discussed.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120993348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diversity against accidental and deliberate faults","authors":"Y. Deswarte, K. Kanoun, J. Laprie","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798364","url":null,"abstract":"The paper is aimed at examining the relationship between the three topics of the workshops that gave rise to this book: security, fault tolerance, and software assurance. Those three topics can be viewed as different facets of dependability. The paper focuses on diversity, as a desirable approach for addressing the classes of faults that underlay all these topics, i.e., design faults and intrusion faults.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121514964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should architectural principles be enforced?","authors":"N. Minsky","doi":"10.1109/CSDA.1998.798359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDA.1998.798359","url":null,"abstract":"There is an emerging consensus that an explicit architectural model would be invaluable for large evolving software systems, providing them with a framework within which such a system can be reasoned about and maintained. But the great promise of architectural models has not been fulfilled so far, due to a gap between the model and the system it purports to describe. It is our contention that this gap is best bridged if the model is not just stated, but is enforced. This gives rise to a concept enforced architectural model-or, a law-which is explored in this paper. We argue that this model has two major beneficial consequences: first, by bridging the above mentioned gap between an architectural model and the actual system, an enforced architectural model provides a truly reliable framework within which a system can be reasoned about and maintained. Second, our model provides software developers with a carefully circumscribed flexibility in molding the law of a project, during its evolutionary lifetime-while maintaining certain architectural principles as invariant of evolution.","PeriodicalId":171437,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Computer Security, Dependability, and Assurance: From Needs to Solutions (Cat. No.98EX358)","volume":"17 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114035798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}