Yale Law School最新文献_第4页

The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting 昂贵合同的法律和经济学

Yale Law School Pub Date : 2001-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.295659

Alan G. Schwartz, Joel Watson

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引用次数: 114

Higher Education as an Associative Good 高等教育作为一种关联商品

Yale Law School Pub Date : 1999-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.192576

Henry Hansmann

{"title":"Higher Education as an Associative Good","authors":"Henry Hansmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.192576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.192576","url":null,"abstract":"Education, and particularly higher education, has an important characteristic that distinguishes it from most other goods and services: it is an \"associative\" good. The essential characteristic of an associative good is that, when choosing which producer to patronize, a consumer is interested not just in the quality and price of the firm's products, but also in the personal characteristics of the firm's other customers. When choosing among undergraduate colleges, for example, a student is interested not just -- or even primarily -- in the colleges' faculty, curriculum, and facilities, but also in the intellectual aptitude, previous accomplishments, sociability, athletic prowess, wealth, and family connections of the colleges' other students. The reason is obvious: these and other attributes of a student's classmates have a strong influence on the quality of the student's educational and social experience, the relationships (including marriage) that the student will have later in life, and the student's personal and professional reputation. Markets for associative goods do not function like markets for other goods and services. This is especially true when the producing firms are all nonprofit or governmental, as is the case in the upper reaches of higher education. Most importantly, when nonprofit firms produce associative goods, there is a particularly strong tendency for customers to become stratified across firms according to their personal characteristics. Those customers who are most desirable as fellow customers will tend to cluster at one firm, the next most desirable at another, and so on down. This essay surveys the implications of the associative character of higher educat","PeriodicalId":171240,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114919456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 36

The Employment Contract 雇佣合同

Yale Law School Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.192132

I. Ayres, Stewart J. Schwab

{"title":"The Employment Contract","authors":"I. Ayres, Stewart J. Schwab","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.192132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.192132","url":null,"abstract":"This article is an edited transcript of a lecture on the Employment Contract presented to a conference of state law judges. Part I introduces a model of a well-functioning labor market, which provides all employee benefits, and only those employee benefits, that employees value more than it costs employers to provide. Part II articulates ways in which labor markets might fail to provide such cost-justified benefits. Market failures can arise from asymmetric information, asymmetric performance, or collective goods. Such failures can justify legal intervention, although policymakers must worry about the cure being worse than the disease. Additionally, even without market failure policymakers might intervene for paternalistic or distributive reasons. Part III separates out \"unequal bargaining power\" as an argument for legal intervention, and argues it does not describe a market failure and is generally an incoherent justification for legal intervention. Part IV applies this framework to evaluate legal erosions of the employment-at-will doctrine. Many courts have upheld claims that a termination breached an implied-in-fact promise not to dismiss a worker without cause. Sometimes, these claims can be justified as correcting problems of opportunism arising from asymmetric performance, problems that vary during the life cycle of a career employee. Contract protections generally are default rules, in that parties can reject them through explicit clauses in a contract. The article articulates the basic theories of default rules, which include mimic-the-market rules and penalty defaults. Other courts have recognized the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. This tort can be justified as an effort to have employers internalize third-party effects of discharges.","PeriodicalId":171240,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law School","volume":"236 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127662009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 27

The Making of the Supreme Court Bar: How Business Created a Solicitor General for the Private Sector 最高法院律师的形成:企业如何为私营部门创造副总检察长

Yale Law School Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36644/mlr.online.117.making

Jeremy Pilaar

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引用次数: 2