F. López-Arceiz, A. Bellostas-Pérezgrueso, Pilar Rivera
{"title":"Nonprofits and Governments. Financial Dependency and Economic Strategies","authors":"F. López-Arceiz, A. Bellostas-Pérezgrueso, Pilar Rivera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2691969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691969","url":null,"abstract":"In European economies, the Third Sector has been characterized by its financial dependence on public and philanthropic funding sources. This paper analyses whether these entities consider the market as a supplier of alternative funding sources for public funds at present. It also studies the use that nonprofits make of their financial resources in the design of their economic and social strategy. The results show that nonprofits consider the market as an alternative supplier, and still maintain ties of financial dependence with governments. Moreover, it reveals that the models of economic management are not consolidated in these organizations.","PeriodicalId":169917,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Public Policies (Social) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134061841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Investment: New Investment Approaches for Addressing Social and Economic Challenges","authors":"Karen E. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2501247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2501247","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to provide an introduction and overview about the social investment market for OECD member countries. Social investment is becoming increasingly important as a way to address both social and economic challenges. Several OECD member countries have been active in creating policies and support mechanisms for social investment. This paper seeks to provide background information on social investment, demonstrate how the market is evolving and highlight the role that policy makers can play in facilitating the development of the market.","PeriodicalId":169917,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Public Policies (Social) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124432052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring Public Entrepreneurship of Quangos","authors":"P. Friedrich, K. Ukrainski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2172801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172801","url":null,"abstract":"Quangos and public entrepreneurship are closely related. The economic theory of quangos allows us to develop a quango theory and highlight the effects of public entrepreneurship. By considering principal agent relations we show how public entrepreneurship of government and quango influence each other in the framework of vertical competition. Also horizontal competition between a quango and other quangos as well as to private enterprises influences the political entrepreneurship. Reference is made to a duopoly model for a competing quango of version 2. Considering the measurement of success of political entrepreneurship, we find that when it is related to increasing output the output development of the quangos may be used as measure of public entrepreneurship success which is relatively high in case of output maximising management. With other types of management the success turns out lower. If the political success is measured by effects of quango on third parties additional difficulties arise. A model of voters reactions on quango production within a model of public sector shows measurement of public political and public quango entrepreneurship and the budgets which result from these entrepreneurships. As there is no satisfying effect measurement models for quangos, which are empirically verified. Moreover, no social welfare function or a general social indicator function is available. Also social success in the sense of welfare maximisation by benefit-cost measurement through willingness to pay measurement is not applicable. Therefore, the success should be measured at the quango level by application of output oriented criteria. Examples from Germany and Estonia show chances and limits of public entrepreneurship within and through quangos.","PeriodicalId":169917,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Public Policies (Social) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114186170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal","authors":"Brian Galle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2055384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2055384","url":null,"abstract":"Federal law significantly limits the political activities of charities, but no one really knows why. In the wake of Citizens United, the absence of any strong normative grounding for the limits may leave the rules vulnerable to constitutional challenge. This Article steps into that breach, offering a set of policy reasons to separate politics from charity. I also sketch ways in which my more-precise exposition of the rationale for the limits helps guide interpretation of the complex legal rules implementing them. Any defense of the political limits begins with significant challenges because of a long tradition of scholarly criticism of them. Critics of the limits suggest that the “market failures” that justify tax subsidies for charity also afflict group efforts to monitor politicians and organize politically, so that the subsidy should extend to cover those activities. These claims, though, overlook a series of additional issues suggested by transaction cost economics and other aspects of economic theory. Most significantly, even if lobbying and electioneering should be subsidized, it does not follow that these functions should be carried out by charities. I argue that combining politics with charity produces a set of diseconomies of scope, including higher agency costs, diminished “warm glow” from giving, and greater inframarginality of deduction recipients. In addition, I argue that the economically ideal tools for reaching the socially optimal levels of charity and lobbying are incompatible with one another. While there are also off-setting gains from the combination, many of these gains further exacerbate the diseconomies.","PeriodicalId":169917,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Public Policies (Social) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125603638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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