{"title":"Trust, Fear, Reciprocity, and Altruism: Theory and Experiment","authors":"James C. Cox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.976041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes central topics in our research program on social preferences. The discussion covers experimental designs that discriminate among alternative components of preferences such as unconditional altruism, positive reciprocity, trust (in positive reciprocity), negative reciprocity, and fear (of negative reciprocity). The paper describes experimental data on effects of social distance and decision context on reciprocal behavior and male vs. female and group vs. individual differences in reciprocity. The exposition includes experimental designs that provide direct tests of alternative models of social preferences and summarizes implications of data for the models. The discussion reviews models of other-regarding preferences that are and are not conditional on others revealed intentions and the implications of data for these models.","PeriodicalId":166719,"journal":{"name":"Andrew Young: Department of Economics (Topic)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131686088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Individual Choices in a Non-Consequentialist Framework: A Procedural Approach","authors":"W. Gaertner, Yongsheng Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.892626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.892626","url":null,"abstract":"Non-consequentialist features of a choice procedure may matter. The procedural aspect behind availability of alternatives may induce an individual to abstain from choosing any element at all so that the choice set becomes empty. In this paper, the concept of choice is related to procedural aspects of different kinds. Availability of objects, different aspects of production as such and shrinkages from an originally given set of options to various of its subsets are considered. Rationalizability of choice in such contexts is studied axiomatically. We relate our conditions to the standard consistency conditions from traditional choice theory.","PeriodicalId":166719,"journal":{"name":"Andrew Young: Department of Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130803891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A Country Paen Analysis","authors":"D. Colombo, J. Martínez-Vázquez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3460222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3460222","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on both public investment in innovation (measured as the share of research and development - R&D - spending in total government budget) and on the intensity of basic research within the public R&D bundle. We present a theoretical model where a ‘benevolent government’ invests in R&D aiming at maximizing net income available in the country (central government) or in the respective region (subnational government), where states compete to attract capital investment, and where R&D results are subject to interregional knowledge spillovers. The model predicts that decentralization leads to a lower level of public spending on innovation, and to a lower share of basic research in government R&D budget. The implications of the model are empirically tested utilizing country aggregate data. We find evidence that expenditure decentralization leads to lower intensity of basic research within public R&D, and that both revenue and expenditure decentralization negatively affect the size of innovation spending. The findings suggest that fiscal decentralization policy, expected to be beneficial in many other dimensions, should be accompanied by measures to compensate for the otherwise decrease in innovation spending, and that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities should have central government play a greater role in financing and carrying out basic research.","PeriodicalId":166719,"journal":{"name":"Andrew Young: Department of Economics (Topic)","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134164931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
