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2.3. Accounting and Corporate Decisions最新文献

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Incentive Provision and Optimal Team Size for Managing Innovation 管理创新的激励机制与最优团队规模
2.3. Accounting and Corporate Decisions Pub Date : 2017-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2823108
Oliver M. Dürr, Markus Nisch, Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
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引用次数: 0
Selective Information Sharing of a Multi-Product Manufacturer 多产品制造商的选择性信息共享
2.3. Accounting and Corporate Decisions Pub Date : 2016-07-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2815554
Clemens Löffler
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引用次数: 0
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