On Law and JusticePub Date : 2019-11-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0006
Alf Ross
{"title":"The Concept of Rights","authors":"Alf Ross","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the concept of rights. It is a task for legal science to systematize the legal rules, that is, to provide a description of the law which is as simple and clear as possible. The concept of rights serves this purpose. It is argued that in itself the concept of rights does not refer to anything. It does not designate any phenomenon of any kind which inserts itself between conditioning facts and conditioned consequences. The concept of rights is solely a means through which it is possible to visualize—more or less accurately—the content of a set of legal rules, namely, those rules which connect a certain disjunctive plurality of conditioning facts with a certain cumulative plurality of legal consequences. Building on this analysis of the concept of rights, the chapter provides an account of the typical rights situation, of rights as substance, and of the structure of the right. In conclusion, this analysis of the concept of rights is compared with and distinguished from the critique of the concept of rights put forward by Duguit in France and Lundstedt in Sweden.","PeriodicalId":162296,"journal":{"name":"On Law and Justice","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121281262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On Law and JusticePub Date : 2019-11-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0009
Alf Ross
{"title":"Operative Facts","authors":"Alf Ross","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers operative facts, which are defined as the complex totality of all facts that can be of relevance to a decision according to scientifically valid law. Among the operative facts, we can distinguish between those which are of specific relevance and those which are merely of conditioning (modifying, excluding) relevance. The former are also called law-creating facts and they are defined as those facts that, as a rule, give reason the specific legal effects. Among these facts are human acts which again should be divided into factual acts and legal acts or dispositions. Both groups are dealt with here. The former group include the act that is contrary to duty (the unlawful act), which is analysed independently. Acts in the latter group are always the effect of a competence. A distinction between public legal acts and private transactions is introduced but the account given is restricted only to private transactions.","PeriodicalId":162296,"journal":{"name":"On Law and Justice","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121119266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On Law and JusticePub Date : 2019-11-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0014
Alf Ross
{"title":"Science and Politics","authors":"Alf Ross","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses how it is possible to arrive at a scientific legal politics understood as something that has the characteristics of advice, guidance, or instructions to the legislator. It is argued that the role of knowledge (science) within the sphere of action can never consist in setting up categorical or self-valid norms of action, that is, norms whose motivating force lies in knowledge itself and is, thus, independent of any subjective attitude or interest. The function of knowledge can only consist in giving directives which are valid hypothetically only, that is, under the assumption of a given irrational motive (interest, attitude). Science can only serve and guide rational argumentation by providing it with scientifically tenable assertions and by critically separating those which do not lend themselves to scientific examination. By contrast, all participation in, or support of, persuasion must be outside the scope of science. Accordingly, it is argued that ordinary political debate is not located at the level of science and logic, but rather at the psychologico-technical-causal level: it purports to bring about practical agreement, by influencing an opponent’s point of view through argumentation and persuasion.","PeriodicalId":162296,"journal":{"name":"On Law and Justice","volume":"416 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126700143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}