LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Company-Specific Risk Premiums: Update on the Scholarly Evidence","authors":"David C. Smith, Brian Calvert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1791213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1791213","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a comprehensive and up-to-date synthesis of empirical studies examining company-specific risk premiums (CSRPs). We cover a number of new papers that have revived an academic debate as to whether or not company-specific risk is priced into the cost of capital. We show that the current evidence supports the original Fama and MacBeth (1973) finding that company-specific risk does not explain variation in cross-sectional stock returns and that holders of risky securities do not appear to receive compensation for bearing company-specific risk. Thus, the most recent empirical evidence does not support the assertions of some practitioners that the CSRP should be included in the cost of capital.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132412722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Institutional Framework for Doing Sports Business: Principles of EU Competition Policy in Sports Markets","authors":"Oliver Budzinski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1746948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1746948","url":null,"abstract":"The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an important institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 overhaul of the approach and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy towards sports associations and clubs. Nowadays, virtually all activities of sports associations that govern and organize a sports discipline with business elements are subject to antitrust rules. This includes genuine sporting rules that are essential for a league, championship or tournament to come into existence. Of course, 'real' business or commercial activities like ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also have to comply with competition rules. Regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European competition rules if they pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent to that objective and proportionate to it. This new approach offers important orientation for the strategy choice of sports associations, clubs and related enterprises. Since this assessment is done following a case-by-case approach, however, neither a blacklist of anticompetitive nor a whitelist of procompetitive sporting rules can be derived. Instead, conclusions can be drawn only from the existing case decisions - but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open. With respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is on centralized marketing arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute cartels and are viewed to be anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be exempted from the cartel prohibition on efficiency and consumer benefits considerations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that centralized marketing arrangements must comply with in order to be legal. Although this policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the decision practice reveals several open problems. Other areas of the buying and selling behavior of sports associations and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed and do not provide much orientation for business.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117344161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'Clean and Safe' for All? The Interaction between Business Improvement Districts and Local Government in the Provision of Public Goods","authors":"Rachel Meltzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1701926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1701926","url":null,"abstract":"Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) privately supplement local public goods, and theory predicts that the public sector will interact with BIDs in their provision of local services. This paper provides the first empirical study of the sub-municipal effect of BIDs on the allocation of publicly provided services. Using unique, neighborhood-level data from New York City, I find that BIDs are associated with a significant, but substantively small, shift in the allocation of police and sanitation services. However, after instrumenting for BID presence, any significant effect of BIDs on public spending and service provision disappears. Together the results indicate that there is little or no interaction between public and private governments in the provision of local services.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124603509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards an Economic Analysis of the Antecedent Benefit Doctrine","authors":"G. Deli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1653845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1653845","url":null,"abstract":"We need the antecedent benefit doctrine because it combines the legal regime and moral incentives into a vehicle of welfare enhancement. Neither law nor morality leads separately to efficient result. The legal regime needs morality as it gives incentives to provide others with unsolicited benefits, encourages promises where there is no material reason to promise, helps to keep these promises, and counterweights eventual negative effects of the legal regulation. In turn, morality is also improved by the legal regime as far as law secures more effective enforcement and, more importantly, selects among socially desirable and undesirable promises by making only desirable promises enforceable.However, law and morality are distinct regulatory forces within the doctrine and should remain as such. Law cannot absorb morality without infringing on the human integrity necessary for free promises. By trying so, it would also undermine the beneficial effect of morality, as independent and costless motivating force. In the other hand, morality alone would sometimes produce socially inefficient exchanges. This paper, in a deconstructive manner, makes clear why not all promises should be legally enforceable, despite the fact that it is desirable to have a contradictory social norm suggesting that \"all promises should be kept.\" It also demonstrates where and how the antecedent benefit doctrine works better than restitution arguing that in certain cases where restitutionary remedies are unavailable or would remain neutral the antecedent benefit doctrine promotes social welfare. It argues that the real function of the antecedent benefit rule is not the legal approbation of moral consideration rather the quantitative refinement of boundedly rational promises. It has the potential to make non-bargained-for transactions more efficient.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130910999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Can Contract Lawyers Learn from Law and Economics?","authors":"Qi Zhou","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1642099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1642099","url":null,"abstract":"This is the lecture text which I was invited to given at the University of Tasmania. My aim in this lecture is to offer some general observations on what insights law and economics, which is also known as the economic analysis of law, can offer us into contract law. I argue that despite some serious limitations of this approach, contract lawyers can benefit from the economic analysis of contract law. At least, we can benefit in three ways. Firstly, economic analysis can be a method to evaluate the effectiveness of law. Secondly, it can help us in identifying the winners and losers created by the law. Thirdly, it can broaden our understanding of business behaviour so that we can make contract law meet legitimate commercial expectations. The lecture will proceed as follows. After a brief review of the history of the law and economics movement, I will use three examples in English contract law, namely misrepresentation, the exclusion clause in consumer contracts, and the unfair contract term to illustrate the three merits of law and economics noted above.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129494198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Imperfect Substitutes for Perfect Complements: Solving the Anticommons Problem","authors":"M. Alvisi, Emanuela Carbonara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1628130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1628130","url":null,"abstract":"An integrated monopoly, where two complements forming a composite good are offered by a single firm, is typically welfare superior to a complementary monopoly. This is ‘the tragedy of the anticommons’. We analyse the robustness of such result when competition is introduced for one or both complements. Particularly, competition in only one of the two markets may be welfare superior to an integrated monopoly if and only if the substitutes differ in their quality so that, as their number increases, average quality and/or quality variance increases. Then, absent an adequate level of product differentiation, favouring competition in some sectors while leaving monopolies in others may be detrimental for consumers and producers alike. Instead, competition in both markets may be welfare superior if goods are close substitutes and their number in each market is sufficiently high, no matter the degree of product differentiation.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117349296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Hidden Cost of Contracts on Relationships and Performance","authors":"E. Chou, N. Halevy, J. Murnighan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1612376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612376","url":null,"abstract":"Rather than acting as a safeguard, contracts may actually damage relationships. Using field and lab studies, we assessed the effects of contracts on contract formation, implementation, and ultimate outcomes. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the presence of a contract led people to anticipate more contentious interactions, which then led to a reduction in their actual cooperative behavior. Studies 3 and 4 showed that contracts that included sanctions led to poor team performance.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126592165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Origins, Comparative Law, and Political Economy","authors":"J. Reitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1473913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1473913","url":null,"abstract":"The “legal origins” scholarship of the past decade has created controversy both in its application of quantitative methods to comparative law and in its claims that common law is better than civil law for economic development. These controversies have unleashed a storm of criticism by traditional comparative law scholars. Without denying the validity of much of that criticism, this short contribution to a symposium on the legal origins literature seeks to emphasize some positive points with three main arguments: (1) the quantitative methods used by the legal origins literature are not a substitute for traditional, non-quantitative comparative studies but an extension of traditional scholarship, on which quantitative methods must perforce rely and to which they offer a potentially fruitful partnership; (2) despite the substantial criticisms of the application and interpretation of quantitative methods by the legal origins literature, there is no reason to reject the methods themselves; comparative law needs to explore the utility of quantitative methods for developing and testing generalities about legal systems and we should be wary of a disciplinary bias against using them; and (3) the core idea of the legal origins thesis - that there are aspects of the civil law tradition reflecting a more intrusive or regulatory conception of the state than is found in the common law tradition - is borne out by my own work on the political economy of legal systems though the generalization appears to be more useful for fostering understanding across legal traditions than as a blueprint from legal reform.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134283471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Access, Property Rights and Welfare: An Examination of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act","authors":"H. Ergas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1428184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1428184","url":null,"abstract":"Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act provides a mechanism by which third party access can be mandated to facilities such as rail links. This paper examines what it is that Part IIIA might be doing from an economic perspective, and what that tells us about when mandated third party access might be efficient. A critique is presented of simple ‘monopoly leveraging’ arguments for third party access, and it is argued that when profit-maximising vertically integrated firms refuse to provide access, the most likely explanation is not monopoly, but rather that the transactions costs associated with access exceed any potential efficiency gains. These transactions costs are illustrated by reference to the long-running dispute between the Fortescue Metals Group Ltd ('FMG') and BHP Billiton Iron Ore ('BHPBIO') over access to BHPBIO's rail track in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The conclusion reached is that third party access regimes can cause significant welfare losses, making it important that the scope of these regimes be narrowly defined. Part IIIA is examined in the light of these conclusions and it is argued that the Part as it stands creates a risk of regulatory over-reach. Given that risk, repeal of the Part would be the simplest option; but there may be a case for retaining it, conditional on substantial reform. That reform would significantly restrict the scope the Part provides for mandating third party access.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"74 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132778015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict","authors":"D. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1183482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1183482","url":null,"abstract":"Much of insurance law and regulation is concerned with compensating consumers who have been wrongly denied coverage. But policyholders nonetheless have relatively few realistic options for challenging an insurer's adverse coverage determination. Litigation is often too slow and costly for those who have recently suffered significant financial loss. Meanwhile, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options that do exist-such as the conciliation services that insurance regulators offer or the existing variants of insurance arbitration-are generally either ineffective or unavailable for most disputes. This Article proposes a new way forward by looking to the United Kingdom's innovative Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), which operates parallel to the British financial services regulator and is devoted solely to resolving consumer financial disputes. The comparative success of the FOS, the Article argues, is attributable primarily to the ways in which it blends elements of the individual, uncoordinated insurance ADR schemes that are used in the United States. As such, this Article concludes that American lawmakers can significantly improve insurance compensation by strategically rethinking the institutional architecture of insurance dispute resolution. It also suggests that the British FOS may offer a model for improving consumer dispute resolution in realms beyond insurance.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128889600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}