{"title":"Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?","authors":"I. Marinescu, E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3335174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3335174","url":null,"abstract":"In the last several years, economists have learned about an antitrust problem of vast scope. Far from approximating the conditions of perfect competition as long assumed, most labor markets are characterized by monopsony — meaning that employers pay workers less than their productivity because workers lack a credible threat to quit and find a higher-paying job in the same market. Yet while antitrust law regulates labor monopsony in the same way as it regulates monopoly on the product market side, antitrust litigation against employers is rare. We document both the magnitude of labor monopsony and the paucity of cases, and argue that this “litigation gap” exists because antitrust case law, which has developed through product-side litigation, is poorly tailored to labor-side problems. We conclude with four proposals for reform of antitrust law so it can better deter labor monopsony.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"199 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114370303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Market for Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Bargaining in the Shadow of Compulsory Licensing","authors":"Mark F. Schultz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3292512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3292512","url":null,"abstract":"The music business is, in some respects, more regulated than most other industries. For instance, most countries essentially impose a compulsory license on the owners of rights to sound recordings, requiring them to license the right to broadcast and publicly play their recordings to all who are willing to pay a standard rate. They cannot refuse to license; they cannot do exclusive deals; and, importantly, they cannot set their own prices. Instead, rates are set by courts, regulators, or legislatures rather than markets. \u0000 \u0000This institutional arrangement is quite unusual. Society usually leaves price setting to the market for good reasons. Regulators and courts simply cannot set “correct” prices, as they have neither the access to information nor the capacity to process it that millions of market participants do collectively. Moreover, non-market pricing violates important non-economic values such as self-determination and autonomy. \u0000 \u0000The imposition of remuneration-only rules has profoundly distorted the market for performance licenses for sound recordings. Drawing and applying new insights from the literature on Standard Essential Patents, this article explains the ways in which remuneration-only rules skew bargaining power in favor of licensees, suppress rates, ignore market conditions, and deprive consumers of choice and diversity in the market for music. It concludes with policy suggestions to ameliorate these distortions.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128653919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Errors in Probabilistic Reasoning and Judgment Biases","authors":"D. Benjamin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3293360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3293360","url":null,"abstract":"Errors in probabilistic reasoning have been the focus of much psychology research and are among the original topics of modern behavioral economics. This chapter reviews theory and evidence on this topic, with the goal of facilitating more systematic study of belief biases and their integration into economics. The chapter discusses biases in beliefs about random processes, biases in belief updating, the representativeness heuristic as a possible unifying theory, and interactions between biased belief updating and other features of the updating situation. Throughout, I aim to convey how much evidence there is for (and against) each putative bias, and I highlight when and how different biases may be related to each other. The chapter ends by drawing general lessons for when people update too much or too little, reflecting on modeling challenges, pointing to areas of economics to which the biases are relevant, and highlighting some possible directions for future work.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117222232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Notice and Disclosure","authors":"Peter S. Menell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3242854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242854","url":null,"abstract":"Notice of intellectual property content, ownership, boundaries, scope of rights (and limitations), enforcement institutions, and remedial consequences plays a central role in resource planning and other economic and social functions. This chapter examines the function, design, and economic effects of intellectual property notice and disclosure rules and institutions. Based on this analysis, the chapter offers a comprehensive set of policy, institutional, and litigation reforms.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116201794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Certification Paradox","authors":"Jonathan M. Barnett","doi":"10.1017/9781316416785.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316416785.015","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly observed that certification intermediaries mitigate informational asymmetries by “lending” reputational capital to support transacting parties’ quality commitments. However, this proposition is challenged by cases in which well-established intermediaries have failed to detect fraud, misrepresentation and other misbehavior. The “certification paradox” provides a more nuanced account that anticipates both the general success, and periodic failure, of certification intermediaries. Transacting parties minimize search and evaluation costs by using a small number of certification intermediaries with large stocks of reputational capital. Incumbent certifiers are substantially protected by entrants’ high costs of accumulating sufficient reputational capital and users’ high costs of switching to new certifiers. Incumbent certifiers have incentives to preserve reputational capital by generally maintaining investments in informational accuracy but, given the limited threats of competitive entry and user defection, to periodically save on costs by reducing certification effort. At least historically, certifiers have sought to commit against opportunistic reductions in informational accuracy by adopting non-profit, partnership and other “constrained” organizational forms that cap the gains from shirking on certification effort. This organizational prophylactic against certification failure may outperform direct regulatory interventions, which are liable to overestimate the demand for informational accuracy or erode the market rents that support certifiers’ incentives generally to maintain informational accuracy.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"5 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131540173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New Evidence on Determinants of IP Litigation: A Market-Based Approach","authors":"D. Czarnitzki, Kristof Van Criekingen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165383","url":null,"abstract":"We contribute to the economic literature on patent litigation by taking a new perspective. In the past, scholars mostly focused on specific litigation cases at the patent level and related technological characteristics to the event of litigation. However, observing IP disputes suggests that not only technological characteristics may trigger litigation suits, but also the market positions of firms, and that firms dispute not only about single patents but often about portfolios. Consequently, this paper examines the occurrence of IP litigation cases in Belgian firms using the 2013 Community Innovation Survey with supplemental information on IP litigation and patent portfolios. The rich survey information regarding firms’ general innovation strategies enables us to introduce market-related variables such as sales with new products as well as sales based mainly on imitation and incremental innovation. Our results indicate that when controlling for firms’ IP portfolio, the composition of turnover in terms of innovations and imitations has additional explanatory power regarding litigation propensities. Firms with a high turnover from innovations are more likely to become plaintiffs in court. Contrastingly, firms with a high turnover from incremental innovation and imitation are more likely to become defendants in court, and, moreover, are more likely to negotiate settlements outside of court.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116939277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auditor Lobbying on Accounting Standards","authors":"Abigail Allen, K. Ramanna, Sugata Roychowdhury","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2545378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2545378","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how Big N auditors' changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973-2006). We examine the influence of auditors' lobbying incentives arising from three basic factors: managing expected litigation and regulatory costs; catering to clients' preferences for flexibility in GAAP; and being conceptually aligned with the FASB, particularly on the use of fair values in accounting. We find evidence that auditor lobbying is driven by prevailing standards of litigation and regulatory scrutiny and by support for fair-value accounting. But we find no evidence that catering to clients' preferences for flexibility in GAAP drives auditor lobbying. Broadly, our paper offers the first large-sample descriptive analysis of the role of Big N auditors in the accounting standard-setting process.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120883787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law and Economics: The Contributions of the Austrian School of Economics","authors":"Peter J. Boettke, Todd J. Zywicki","doi":"10.4337/9781788113106.00006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788113106.00006","url":null,"abstract":"The Austrian contribution to the development of law and economics is the study of endogenous rule formation, or the spontaneous evolution of social institutions, which can be traced to the founder of the Austrian School, Carl Menger. While Menger’s emphasis on spontaneous institutional analysis was born out of the Methodenstreit, a methodological battle engaged against the German Historical School, this chapter argues that the Austrian contribution to law and economics emerged directly from the socialist calculation debate against market socialism. This debate, we will argue, played an essential role in the re-discovery of the institutional framework in economics during the post-WWII era, particularly in the development of law and economics. In the aftermath of the socialist calculation debate, Menger’s earlier emphasis on institutional analysis was reemphasized by F.A. Hayek, who in turn influenced the early pioneers of law and economics, particularly Aaron Director, Ronald Coase, and Bruno Leoni.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114895088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dangerous Activities: A Law and Economics Perspective","authors":"Enrico Baffi, D. Nardi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3089336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3089336","url":null,"abstract":"This work seeks to identify, in light of the main schools of thought within the field of Law and Economics, some useful criteria for optimal discipline of ultrahazardous activities. From that perspective, we examine potential solutions described by Shavell, Landes and Posner, by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi. These solutions are likely to induce everyone within a given society, using tort remedies, to implement efficient, decentralized choices, even when there might be a danger of accidents arising out of the exercise of a ultrahazardous activity. Afterwards, we go on to discuss the issue of information that may be disseminated within that context by the potential tortfeasor, underscoring his informational advantage compared to the potential injured parties who, generally speaking, fail to appreciate the risk created by a dangerous activity. The analysis we have undertaken underscores that the potential tortfeasor, in order to reduce the size of the expected damage, may be led to demand excessive precautions, or an equally excessive reduction in activity levels on the part of the potential injured parties. The remedy to that problem could be a provision for an independent tort regarding the disclosure of subottimal informations. We then discuss how a fault-based liability system appears to be preferable, provided that the injured parties sue in a court of law. Indeed, the harm incurred by a single victim – from conforming her conduct to an instruction given by the operator of a dangerous activity – usually is not big enough to warrant filing suit. Therefore, the potential tortfeasor acts as though such independent source of liability does not exist. Punitive damages and class actions, on the other hand, may create incentives for filing suit, thereby disincentivizing the operator of a dangerous activity from requiring excessive precautions or excessive limitations of activity levels.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128573452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Litigation and Selection with Correlated Two-Sided Incomplete Information","authors":"Daniel Klerman, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Lawrence S. Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2927248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927248","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the selection of disputes for litigation in a setting with two-sided incomplete information and correlated signals. The models analyzed here suggest that Priest and Klein’s conclusion that close cases are more likely to go to trial than extreme cases remains largely valid when their model is interpreted as involving correlated, two-sided incomplete information and is updated (i) to incorporate take-it-or-leave-it offers or the Chatterjee–Samuelson mechanism, (ii) to take into account the credibility of the plaintiff’s threat to go to trial, and (iii) to allow parties to make sophisticated, Bayesian inferences based on knowledge of the distribution of disputes. On the other hand, Priest and Klein’s prediction that the plaintiff will win 50% of litigated cases is sensitive to bargaining and parameter assumptions.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121418228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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